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l)DIFFUSION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BELIEFS:
BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE ORIENTATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
The globalization and liberalization of national economies have contributed to an
increasing diffusion of Anglo-American corporate governance practices worldwide. In this
dissertation, we examine the spread of two types of corporate governance beliefs: the
emerging focus on board independence and a shareholder value orientation. Through a
series of five studies, utilizing multiple theoretical lenses, levels of analysis and methods,
we analyze developments in the formal independence of supervisory boards and a greater
focus on shareholder value in the Netherlands, and examine the antecedents and conse -
quences of these phenomena.
In doing so, we contribute to the enrichment of theories on diffusion processes as well
as to the understanding of key changes in the Dutch corporate governance landscape. We
show that (i) substantive change has taken place in the governance of listed corporations,
(ii) the technical, political and cultural contexts in which firms operate explain companies’
(non)response to prevailing corporate governance beliefs, (iii) changing corporate gover -
nance beliefs may be associated with unintended consequences and negative performance
implications, and (iv) macro contextual factors have a significant impact on the afore -
mentioned processes. Thereby, our findings highlight important avenues for further research.
Furthermore, we provide directors, regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders with
new insights in key corporate governance developments, in particular in the Netherlands.
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PREFACE 
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times. Corporate governance scandals, regulatory initiatives and shareholder activism 
have significantly altered the Dutch corporate governance setting and it has been 
intriguing to reflect on these developments from a strategic management perspective. 
In particular, the changing role of boards and the diffusion of a shareholder value 
orientation triggered my curiosity, resulting in a dissertation that extensively addresses 
both developments. 
 While writing a Ph.D. thesis is quite lonely at times, I am very grateful to the 
people I met along the way who inspired me to pursue my research. In particular, the 
interviews and conversations with board members and industry experts were very 
insightful and gave me the opportunity to connect theory with practice. I am also very 
grateful to my co-authors from whom I learned a lot, pushing me beyond my 
boundaries and triggering me to perform at the top of my abilities. Thanks Amedeo, 
Alessandro, Ed, Frans, Gregory, Han, Henk, Morten and Stefan for sharing your 
knowledge and experience with me! I also want to express my gratitude to Frans and 
Henk for providing me with the opportunity to do Ph.D. research at the crossroads of 
strategy and corporate governance, and giving me the freedom and (financial) means 
to pursue my research interests. A special thanks goes to Gregory who supported me 
as a daily supervisor. From the strangest places on earth I received your comments 
with a turnaround time that was simply impressive. Thank you for believing in me - 
even when I sometimes kept making the same mistakes. Furthermore, I would like to 
thank Arlette, Johannes, Lotte, Martin, Mariano and Rick for their excellent research 
assistance. Without their support, I would not have been able to write this dissertation. 
Moreover, I would like to thank my colleagues at RSM Erasmus University for provi-
ding a challenging, yet amiable, working environment to conduct research. A special 
thanks goes out to Carolien, Patricia and Marisa, for their continuing support during 
this project. 
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 While conducting management research nowadays is often a goal-oriented 
process, I am thankful to Michiel and Paul for always reminding me that der Weg ist 
das Ziel, i.e., that not reaching your targets is decisive, but that enjoying what you are 
doing is most important. Thanks mates for your friendship and continuing support 
during the lows and heights of my Ph.D. trajectory. Last but certainly not least, I 
would like to thank my family and Meriam for simply being there and believing in me. 
I owe you a lot!  
  I hope that you will enjoy reading this thesis on the changing corporate 
landscape in the Netherlands. It has been a pleasure working on it. Given the recent 
financial crisis, the increasing impact of international stakeholders, and repetitive 
nature of governance scandals, the discussed issues in this thesis seem topical and 
important for the upcoming years. 
 
Pieter-Jan Bezemer 
Waddinxveen, February 2010 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the attention for corporate governance has been burgeoning. 
Triggered by numerous scandals (e.g., Ahold, Enron, Parmalat and WorldCom) and 
the recent financial crisis, increased regulation and societal criticism, scholars and 
practitioners have heavily debated topics as diverse as the rights and duties of share-
holders, financial transparency and risk management, the fiduciary role of auditors, 
executive pay and the sustainability of the business model of financials. Particularly, 
the globalization and liberalization of financial markets seem to have added an extra 
layer of complexity to these questions, as listed companies nowadays are increasingly 
exposed to national regulatory initiatives, and varying predispositions of international 
stakeholders. As a result, profoundly understanding and adequately managing corporate 
governance issues are of paramount importance to managers and directors. 
 While corporate governance problems can be found as early as in the writings 
of Shakespeare (e.g., The Merchant of Venice) and accounts of the Dutch United East 
India Company (VOC), the first joint stock company established in 1602, the field of 
corporate governance did not develop before the 1980s. Defining corporate governance 
has been a challenge given the multitude of adopted definitions (Tricker, 1993; 2000). 
While one stream of research has defined corporate governance as “the relationship 
among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations” (Monks & Minow, 1995:1) and “concerned with holding the balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals” 
(Cadbury, 1999:6), another group of researchers has more narrowly defined it as an 
area that “deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:737).  
 Similarly, financial markets may see the purpose of the public company diffe-
rently. While coordinated market economies (e.g., Japan and Germany) conceptualize 
corporations as communities of stakeholders whose interests should be served, liberal 
market economies (e.g., the United States) view corporations as mere instruments to 
create value for its shareholders (cf. De Wit & Meyer, 2004; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 
2006; Heemskerk, 2007). Accordingly, differences in corporate governance structures 
and role requirements of governance bodies and actors are quite profound across 
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national boundaries (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2008; Witt & 
Redding, 2009; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). An illustrative example is the two-tier board 
model in Germany and the Netherlands, which places alternative demands on directors 
and creates different dynamics at the apex of large corporations than one can observe 
in the one-tier board model, which is more regularly used around the globe (Huse, 
2007; Maassen, 1999; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). 
While international differences in corporate governance used to be quite 
persistent (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Witt & Redding, 
2009), the globalization and liberalization of national economies have contributed to an 
increasing exchange of corporate governance beliefs and practices worldwide (Morris 
et al., 2008; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Among others, the following two corporate 
governance beliefs and associated practices have diffused globally. First, financial 
markets have emphasized the importance of board control and independence. In line 
with principles of the agency theory, regulatory initiatives in Western countries have 
introduced provisions aimed at improving the oversight function of boards of directors 
(Daily et al., 2003; Enrione et al., 2006). Second, the Anglo-American shareholder 
value orientation has diffused to coordinated market economies such as France 
(Morin, 2000), Germany (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 2006; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003), and 
Japan (Jackson, 2003; Yoshikawa, et al., 2007; Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008) and 
contributed to the “financialization” of listed corporations (Froud et al., 2000).  
 
1.2 Research Aim 
This dissertation aims to enhance the understanding of the diffusion of the previously 
described corporate governance beliefs1, i.e., principles and practices related to board 
independence and shareholder value orientation. While prior studies have investigated 
the diffusion of corporate governance beliefs from a variety of angles (see Table 1.1), 
the antecedents, consequences and influence of contextual factors are still topic of 
debate. Regarding the antecedents, scholars have not reached agreement about the 
drivers and inhibitors of the diffusion of corporate governance beliefs (cf. Ansari et 
                                                 
1 In this dissertation we refer to “beliefs” to highlight that new corporate governance practices are 
not “simply single techniques” (Fiss & Zajac, 2004:502), i.e., they are embedded in broader political 
and social contexts that affect how managers and regulators perceive them and respond to them. 
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al., 2010; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). While one stream of research posits that the 
economic and technical benefits associated with new corporate governance beliefs 
explain why firms adopt them, another research stream argues that social factors, i.e., 
“the way things are” and “the way things are to be done” (Scott, 1987:496; Suchman, 
1995) have a significant imprint on a corporation’s response to these new beliefs. 
Furthermore, the role of various actors in stimulating and resisting the diffusion of new 
corporate governance beliefs is topic of debate. In particular, scholars have posed the 
question whether corporate governance change is more likely to be stimulated by insi-
ders who observe the merits of new approaches, or by outsiders that have an interest in 
the diffusion of new corporate governance beliefs (e.g., Ansari et al., 2010; Fiol & 
O’Connor, 2002; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). 
 
Table 1.1 Major debates regarding the diffusion of corporate governance beliefs 
 
Debates 
 
Main research issues 
 
Key contributions 
 
 
 
Debate 1: 
Antecedents 
of Diffusion 
 
 
x Do technical, cultural and/or 
political antecedents explain the 
diffusion of new beliefs? 
 
 
x Is the diffusion of new beliefs 
insider-driven or outsider-
driven? 
Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; 
Ansari et al., 2010; Davis, 1991; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
 
Ansari et al., 2010; Fiol & O’Connor, 
2002; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Sanders & Tuschke, 
2007; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
 
 
Debate 2: 
Performance 
Consequences 
 
x How does the adoption of new 
beliefs affect a company’s 
performance?  
 
x Do firms respond symbolically 
or substantively to new beliefs? 
Dalton et al., 1998; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Tuschke 
& Sanders, 2003; Westphal, 2002. 
 
Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994; 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004. 
 
 
Debate 3: 
Impact of  
Contextual 
Factors 
x Is the diffusion of new beliefs a 
global or a nation-specific 
development? 
 
 
x Do firms simply adopt new 
beliefs or do they adapt them? 
Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev & 
Boyd, 2009; Hambrick et al., 2008; 
Pugliese et al., 2009. 
 
Ansari et al., 2010; Aguilera et al., 
2008; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Yoshikawa et 
al., 2007; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
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 Furthermore, the subsequent performance consequences of the adoption and 
implementation of new corporate governance beliefs are subject to inquiry. Evidence 
is rather mixed regarding the conditions under which board independence and a share-
holder value orientation create strategic and economic value for a corporation (Dalton 
et al., 1998; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Tuschke & Sanders, 
2003). In particular, when such corporate governance beliefs contest prevailing logics, 
their adoption and implementation may give rise to important unintended consequences 
(Bezemer et al., 2007; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Westphal, 2002). Moreover, scholars have 
debated whether the symbolic adoption of corporate governance beliefs (i.e., referring 
to these beliefs without actually implementing them) already generates positive market 
reactions, or that it is a necessity that companies put their money where their mouth is 
(Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
 A third topic of debate is the impact of contextual factors on the diffusion of 
new corporate governance beliefs. Scholars have noted that the macro, meso and micro 
contexts in which beliefs diffuse are not neutral: they are loaded with technical, social 
and political values and predispositions (cf. Ansari et al., 2010; Rosenberg, 2005). As 
such, the institutional contexts in which a corporation is embedded, may strongly affect 
a firm’s (non)response to the introduction of new beliefs (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Hambrick et al., 2008). This 
raises the question to which extent the diffusion of new beliefs is a global or a nation-
specific process. A related question is whether companies simply adopt new beliefs or 
that they adapt and tailor them to the specifics of their contexts. Several studies have 
suggested that corporations might actually adopt “hybrid models” in which elements of 
the old logic are blended together with new corporate governance beliefs (Ansari et al., 
2010; Ponssard et al., 2005; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). 
 This PhD study aims at contributing to these three major debates related to the 
diffusion of corporate governance beliefs (see Table 1.1). More specifically, we inves-
tigate the diffusion of principles regarding board independence and a shareholder value 
orientation among Dutch listed companies during the period 1992-2007. In the various 
chapters of this dissertation, we will examine the extent to which the corporate gover-
nance practices of these firms have changed, assess the antecedents and performance 
consequences of these changes, and analyze the role of contextual factors. While prior 
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studies in this area have mainly focused on the dynamics in the US context (Filatotchev 
& Boyd, 2009; Peck & Ruigrok, 2000; Pugliese et al., 2009) and in large economies 
such as Germany (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 2006; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007; Tuschke & 
Sanders, 2003) and Japan (Yoshikawa, et al, 2007; Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008), we 
conduct our study within the Netherlands: a relatively small and open economy. Given 
its reliance on developments in the global economy, the Dutch context is an interesting 
research setting. We expect that the introduction of new corporate governance beliefs 
will be closer to the surface in this context, as firms are less buffered against pressures 
by international capital markets. By addressing the aforementioned scholarly debates 
in the Dutch context, the main objective of this dissertation is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Research Setting 
Before discussing the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of our research, 
we first provide a summary of the main characteristics of the Dutch corporate gover-
nance context, given its centrality in this dissertation (see Table 1.2). The roots of the 
contemporary Dutch open economy can be found in the glory days of the Golden Age 
(1600-1700). In this era, when the Netherlands were one of the largest trading nations, 
the Dutch founded the Dutch United East India Company (VOC), the first joint stock 
company in the world (Maassen, 1999). With a small group of large, internationally 
diversified firms and a GDP that is earned abroad for more than 60 per cent, the Dutch 
trade origins and its international orientation are still prominent. The Netherlands are a 
welfare state with a long tradition of balancing the interests of societal groups. The 
Dutch corporate governance system is unique in the sense that company law explicitly 
defines publicly listed firms as legal entities that must take into account the rights of 
all stakeholders affected by the firm. The institutionalized stakeholder approach is 
supported by a two-tier board model consisting of a management board and a super-
visory board. The supervisory board consists of non-executive directors to assure its 
independence and has the duty by law to supervise and advice the management board 
To enhance our understanding of the antecedents and consequences of the 
diffusion of corporate governance beliefs (board independence and a  
shareholder value orientation) in the context of a small and open economy.  
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while acting in the best interests of the firm and its stakeholders (cf. Akkermans et al., 
2007; Bezemer et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2005; 2006; Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, 
2004; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). 
 Within the Dutch institutionalized stakeholder model, managers basically hold 
“the control rights of the firm” instead of the shareholders (Van Ees et al., 2003:92; 
Van Veen & Elbertsen, 2008). Hostile takeovers have been rare (Groot, 1998; Kabir et 
al., 1997) and, until recently, shareholders have not been pursuing their own agendas 
actively (Chirinko et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2006). Three distinct features of the 
Dutch corporate governance system largely explain the entrenched position of 
management. First, while the market for corporate control is active in the United 
States and the United Kingdom (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000), the Dutch market for 
corporate control used to be severely constrained by several anti-investor protection 
measures, such as preference shares and tradable depository receipts (cf. Chirinko et 
al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2005; Kabir et al., 1997; Van Ees & Postma, 2005). Second, 
while dispersed ownership is common in the United States and the United Kingdom 
(La Porta et al., 1998), the Dutch context used to be characterized by large block 
holdings of domestic institutional investors. In particular, financial institutions, such 
as banks, insurance companies and pension funds, used to have large ownership stakes 
in Dutch listed firms (Van Ees et al., 2003). The majority of these institutional investors, 
however, had a rather “passive attitude” (De Jong et al., 2005:482) and has been 
characterized as “long-term, patient investors” (Chirinko et al., 2004:125). The passive 
attitude of institutional investors is illustrated by low attendance rates at annual 
general meetings of shareholders and the limited number of rejected management 
proposals (De Jong et al., 2006). Third, the entrenched position of managers was 
supported by a small elite community of board members, referred to as the “old-boys 
network”, which used to occupy a central position in the Dutch network. In particular, 
the top-three listed banks (ABN Amro, Fortis and ING) played a central role in this 
board network during the 1990s (Heemskerk et al., 2003). Elite membership was often 
associated with prestigious functions in societal interest groups and membership of 
exclusive dining clubs (Heemskerk, 2007).  
 However, over the last decade, Dutch financial markets have seen dramatic 
changes. The globalization and liberalization of the financial market, (self)regulatory 
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initiatives (i.e., the codes by the committees Peters, Tabaksblat and Frijns), corporate 
governance scandals and societal pressure have led to increased shareholder rights and 
activism, abolished anti-investor protection devices and disintegrating managerial elite 
networks (Bezemer et al., 2007; Van Hamel et al., 1998; Heemskerk et al., 2003; 
Heemskerk, 2007; Maassen, 1999; Van Veen & Elbertsen, 2008). Among others, these 
developments have contributed to increasing convergence of the Anglo-American 
shareholder model and the Rhineland stakeholder model (Gamble & Kelly, 2001; 
Morris et al., 2008; Thomsen, 2003) and a convergence of the one-tier and the two-tier 
board models (Collier & Mahbub, 2005; Maassen, 1999; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 
1999).  
 
Table 1.2: Main characteristics of the Dutch corporate governance context* 
 
Categories 
 
Main Characteristics 
 
Recent Developments 
 
General 
economic 
characteristics 
x Small and open economy. 
x Coordinated market economy 
with institutionalized stakeholder 
orientation. 
x Increased pressure on the Dutch 
stakeholder model. 
x Move towards the Anglo-
American shareholder model. 
 
 
Board model 
x Two-tier boards with a manage-
ment board and supervisory board. 
x Structural separation of decision 
making and decision control. 
x Increased pressure on the two-
tier board model. 
x Move towards the one-tier board 
model. 
 
 
 
Board network 
x Dutch elite community of board 
members, referred to as the “old-
boys network”. 
x Dutch banks used to have a 
central network position. 
x Dutch network of board inter-
locks has been disintegrating. 
x Dutch banks (ING, ABN Amro 
and Fortis) have lost their central 
network position. 
 
 
 
Shareholders 
x Presence of large blockholders 
that used to be “rather passive”. 
x Presence of anti-investor 
protection measures (such as 
preference shares and TDRs). 
x Increased shareholder activism. 
x Increased number of foreign 
investors. 
x Abolishment of several anti-
investor protection devices. 
*Sources: Akkermans et al., 2007; Bezemer et al., 2007; Chirinko et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2005; 2006; 
Groot, 1998; Heemskerk et al., 2003; Heemskerk, 2007; Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, 2004; Kabir et al., 
1997; Maassen, 1999; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999; Van Ees & Postma, 2005; Van Ees et al., 2003; 
Van Hamel et al., 1998; Van Veen & Elbertsen, 2008. 
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1.4 Research Approach 
It is in this evolving research setting that we aim to enhance our understanding of the 
diffusion of corporate governance beliefs (board independence and shareholder value) 
among listed firms in a small and open economy. To achieve this aim, we conduct five 
research studies (see Table 1.3), all approaching our main research question from a 
slightly different theoretical and methodological angle. Applying such a pluralism in 
terms of lenses and methods increases our understanding of the phenomenon, i.e., the 
diffusion of corporate governance beliefs, as each theory and methodology highlights 
and uncovers another element of the “beast” (Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999:21). 
 However, before addressing this theoretical and methodological pluralism, the 
following paragraphs provide a summary of each study’s motives, research questions, 
method and intended contributions. The first four research studies investigate the roles 
of the board of directors and their chairman, and assess changes in these roles as a 
result of a stronger emphasis on board independence. The fifth study examines the 
diffusion of a shareholder value orientation among Dutch listed firms. 
 
1.4.1 Study 1: The Board-Strategy Relationship 
The appropriate role of boards of directors in formulating and implementing strategy 
has been long debated (Andrews 1981a, 1981b; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Useem, 2003). While the literature has acknowledged the importance 
and need for adequate board control and independence (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Jensen & Zajac, 2004), both the contributions of boards to strategy and the desirability 
of such practice have remained topics of debate (Daily et al., 2003; Golden & Zajac, 
2001). In light of a multitude of theoretical lenses and inconclusive empirical findings 
in the management literature, Zahra and Pearce’s observation that “there is controversy 
over the nature of directors’ strategic role” (1989:328) still seems to be topical after 
twenty years of research. In this context, the first study of this dissertation assesses the 
literature on boards and strategy by highlighting emerging trends and identifying seve-
ral avenues for future research. More formally, we investigate the following questions: 
 
 
 
 
1. What is the status of research in the board-strategy domain?  
2. How has research in this domain evolved over time?  
3. What are the main challenges and future opportunities in this domain? 
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 We research these questions through the use of a content analysis of all peer-
reviewed publications in management journals until 2007. Papers were selected if they 
simultaneously contained the search terms “board” and “strateg*” or “director” and 
“strateg*” in the title, abstract and/or key words. In sum, our final sample consists of 
150 articles published in 23 journals from 1972 until 2007. In order to describe and 
analyze how research on boards of directors and strategy has evolved over time, two 
raters independently analyzed and coded the set of 150 articles. The two raters codified 
all basic elements of a publication: (i) type of article, (ii) main research topic, (iii) use 
of theories, (iv) research setting, (v) source of data and (vi) the definition of board 
strategic involvement (cf. Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Insch et al., 1997; Krippendorff, 
2004). Finally, we statistically analyzed the obtained data. 
 Thereby, this study contributes to the literature on boards and strategy in three 
ways (see Table 1.4). First, it describes how studies on boards and strategy have been 
evolving and illustrates how certain topics, theories, settings and sources of data 
interact and have influenced our knowledge about board-strategy relationships during 
certain time periods. For instance, our data reveal that during the 1990s the field was 
dominated by empirical studies in a US setting that mainly refer to agency theory and 
focus on the determinants and consequences of boards’ strategic involvement. Second, 
this study complements previous literature reviews that have (partially) covered this 
domain (Deutsch, 2005; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Given the time 
elapsed since these reviews, the intensification of the corporate governance debate 
internationally and the large number of studies conducted on boards of directors and 
strategy more recently, it is the right time for due reflection on achievements in this 
area (Huse, 2005). Third, this study highlights several avenues to advance the field of 
study. Our findings encourage governance scholars to further investigate the impact of 
contextual forces at multiple levels, to further comprehend board processes and dyna-
mics, and to adopt methods aimed at opening the black box of board research. Finally, 
the study has implications for practice. Existing board practices emphasize, in fact, 
board control and independence as antecedents of good governance, but these aspects 
may also hinder the board’s contribution to strategy-making. In line with some recent 
works, this suggests that the requirements for an effective strategic task should be 
taken into account while composing boards and devising new regulations. 
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Table 1.4 Intended contributions of the five research studies 
Study Topic  Main contributions 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Review of the 
literature on 
boards and 
strategy 
x Highlighting the evolvement of the board-strategy debate in terms 
of topics, theories, settings and sources of data. 
x Complementing prior literature reviews by reflecting on emerging 
research paths and discussing avenues for future research. 
x Informing practitioners about the status of the board-strategy debate 
and highlighting key issues that should be taken into account. 
 
 
2 
The changing 
service tasks of 
non-executives in 
the Netherlands 
x Investigating how the emphasis on board control and independence 
has affected the value creating potential of boards. 
x Highlighting how boards of directors fulfill their tasks in a two-tier 
board context. 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
The changing role 
of the non-
executive 
chairman in the 
Netherlands 
x Examining how the changing Dutch corporate governance context 
has affected the role of the chairman of the board of directors. 
x Investigating how the changing context and role of the chairman of 
the board of directors have affected their structural position.  
x Highlighting how chairmen of boards of directors fulfill their role in 
a two-tier board context. 
 
 
4 
 
Institutional 
antecedents of the 
disintegrating 
Dutch network of 
interlocks 
x Examining how the positioning of firms affects their vulnerability to 
boardroom reform efforts. 
x Assessing the mechanisms firms have at their disposal to partially 
nullify reform pressures. 
x Highlighting the role and evolvement of board networks in the 
Dutch corporate governance context. 
 
 
 
5 
Antecedents and 
consequences of 
the espousal of a 
shareholder value 
orientation among 
firms in the 
Netherlands 
x Examining how the varying preferences of major owners influence 
the diffusion of contested corporate governance beliefs. 
x Investigating how the macro and micro political contexts influence 
the available maneuvering space major owners have to affect a 
firm’s main orientation. 
x Assessing the performance implications of a company’s referral to 
contested corporate governance beliefs. 
 
1.4.2 Study 2: The Changing Service Tasks of Non-Executive Directors 
In the second study of this dissertation, we further investigate the aforedescribed notion 
that existing board practices generally emphasize board control and independence as 
antecedents of good governance, while they might simultaneously hinder the board’s 
contribution to strategy-making. In particular, globalization and liberalization of finan-
cial markets, changing societal expectations and corporate governance scandals have 
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increased the attention for the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors. In this con-
text, recent corporate governance reform initiatives have emphasized the control task 
and independence of non-executive directors. However, the impact of these reform 
initiatives on the service tasks of non-executive directors has been largely neglected. 
In fact, the emphasis on board control and independence may hamper non-executive 
directors’ external service task in providing access to resources on which corporations 
are dependent (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972; 1973) and they may limit their task in 
corporate learning through board relationships (Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the emphasis on board control and board independence might undermine 
non-executive directors’ internal service task in providing advice and counseling to 
executive directors (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). After 
all, interdependence, maintenance of closeness and a focus on joint value creation are 
necessary for fostering the external and internal service tasks (cf. Forbes & Milliken, 
1999; Van Hamel et al., 1998). Accordingly, we address the following research ques-
tion in the second study: 
 
 
 
 
 
 We empirically investigate this question by analyzing the evolvement of board 
structures related to the functioning of the external and internal service tasks. We posit 
that non-executive directors will only be able to perform their service tasks adequately 
in the presence of mechanisms that facilitate the exchange of knowledge, information 
and other resources. Examples include network ties and joint board meetings with 
executive directors. Data on the board structures were collected for all top-100 listed 
companies at the Euronext in Amsterdam for the period 1997-2005. We deliberatively 
chose this timeframe, given our focus on the influence of reform initiatives: during the 
first year of this period, the Peters Committee published its forty recommendations 
and started a formal national corporate governance debate in the Netherlands, which 
resulted in the Tabaksblat Code in 2003. 
How have external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors been 
affected by reform initiatives (i.e., provisions in corporate governance codes) that 
emphasize the control task and independence of non-executive directors? 
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 By doing so in the Dutch financial market, this study makes two main contri-
butions (see Table 1.4, page 11). First, it describes how Dutch corporate governance 
codes with an emphasis on the control task and the independence of non-executive 
directors relate to the external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors. 
We find empirical evidence that corporate governance measures taken to reinforce 
board control may hamper non-executive directors’ external service task, while reinvi-
gorating their internal service task. Second, by describing how non-executive directors 
fulfill their service tasks in a two-tier board context, we provide a more thorough 
understanding of the functioning of the two-tier board model regarding these tasks. 
 
1.4.3 Study 3: The Changing Role of the Non-Executive Chairman 
In the third study of this dissertation, we extend our second study by focusing on a unit 
of analysis that has received limited scholarly attention in board research: individual 
board members. In this study, we posit that the chairman of the board of directors may 
be subject to changing role expectations, as (s)he is most visible to the outside world 
(cf. Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007a; 2007b; Roberts, 2002). Given the chairman’s 
responsibility for (i) counterbalancing the power of the CEO and (ii) functioning of 
the board of directors (Hill, 1995; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), the changing role 
requirements may in fact have a far-reaching impact on the checks and balances within 
corporations. Yet, to date, relatively little is known about (i) contemporary challenges 
for chairmen, (ii) the evolution of the chairman’s role vice versa key organizational 
bodies and individuals such as the CEO, and (iii) the drivers of the changing role of 
chairmen of boards of directors (Kakabadse et al., 2006; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 
2007a, 2007b; Roberts, 2002; Roberts & Stiles, 1999). Accordingly, we investigate the 
following questions: 
 
 
 
 
  
 We research these questions through combining two methods. First, we collect 
qualitative data by conducting thirty semi-structured interviews with non-executive 
1. Which environmental changes do non-executive chairmen observe? 
2. What do these developments imply for their role and companies? 
3. How has their structural position co-evolved with environmental changes? 
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chairmen and CEOs of listed firms at the Euronext Stock Exchange in Amsterdam. In 
particular, we aim to improve our understanding of the nature of environmental 
change and its impact on the functioning of non-executive board chairmen. Second, 
we collect quantitative data on the structural position of all non-executive board chair-
men of the top-100 listed firms at the Euronext in Amsterdam for the period 1997-
2005 to address our third question. 
 This study offers three contributions (see Table 1.4, page 11). First, while 
prior research in general has examined the impact of environmental change on the role 
of the board of directors as a group, we explore its influence on the role fulfillment of 
the board’s main individual actor, i.e., the chairman. Our results highlight that several 
environmental developments have significantly altered the level and scope of a 
chairman’s involvement and working style. Interestingly, the opinions regarding the 
performance implications of the evolving role of board chairmen vary widely within 
our sample. Second, we illustrate that the changing role of board chairmen has co-
evolved with their structural position. Our empirical results illustrate that the chair-
men’s increasing responsibilities are reflected in increased levels of cash payment, 
more turnover and fewer additional supervisory board positions. Simultaneously, the 
demographic profile of the supervisory board chairman (i.e., age, tenure, nationality 
and gender) remained similar, suggesting a disconnection between demographics and 
role fulfillment. Third, while one-tier boards have been investigated quite extensively, 
we provide a more thorough understanding of the challenges that board chairmen face 
in two-tier boards. We illustrate that the legal separation of decision control and 
decision management in two-tier boards adds an extra layer of complexity to changing 
societal expectations of board chairmen. Thereby, we tentatively highlight the oppor-
tunities and drawbacks chairmen face while operating in the two-tier board model. 
 
1.4.4 Study 4: The Disintegrating Dutch Board Network  
In the fourth study of this dissertation, we extend our second study by focusing on the 
diminishing involvement of non-executive directors in their external service task, i.e., 
the observed disintegration of the Dutch board network. While scholars have often 
emphasized the benefits of interlocking directorates (cf. Mizruchi, 1996), over the last 
years, board networks of firms have increasingly been scrutinized by the public and 
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policy makers (Heemskerk, 2007). Well-known corporate governance scandals (such as 
Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and Ahold) have changed the opinion and expectations 
of the public. The media have paid more attention to corporate governance issues and 
renowned non-executive directors’ have been accused of acting as mere rubber stamps. 
Accordingly, European corporate governance reform initiatives have attempted to 
strengthen the independence of non-executive directors (Daily et al., 2003; Enrione et 
al., 2006; Sheridan et al., 2006). However, little is known about how listed firms react 
and cope with normative beliefs to reform their board networks. Accordingly, we 
address the following research questions in the fourth study: 
 
 
 
 
 
 We empirically investigate these questions by analyzing the evolving board 
networks of listed companies at the Euronext in Amsterdam between 2001 and 2005. 
Archival data were collected for two years prior and two years after the introduction of 
the Tabaksblat Code (2003), at the time of data collection the latest Dutch reform 
initiative containing provisions regarding board networks. Our choice for the period 
2001-2005 enables us to control for firms that have anticipated board reform provisions 
in the Tabaksblat Code and to take into account firms’ delayed responses to the code. 
Data were obtained from multiple sources, such as the Spencer Stuart Netherlands 
Board Indexes, annual reports, and the BoardEx, Reach and Worldscope databases. 
By doing so, this study makes three contributions (see Table 1.4, page 11). 
First, in line with institutional theory, we explore whether the larger listed firms have 
been affected more strongly by the boardroom reform efforts than smaller companies 
due to their higher visibility and closer monitoring by the public. Second, we 
investigate whether companies with foreign listings and with ties to regulatory bodies 
are better positioned to nullify pressures to reform their corporate board networks than 
less connected and nationally oriented companies. Third, by conducting our empirical 
study in a traditional two-tier board context in the Netherlands, we provide a more 
thorough understanding of the role of board networks in this setting. 
1. Why have certain corporations been affected more strongly by institutional 
pressures to reform their board networks? 
2. What strategies have firms employed to counterbalance these pressures? 
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1.4.5 Study 5: The Diffusion of a Shareholder Value Orientation  
In the fifth study of this dissertation, we investigate the diffusion of another corporate 
governance belief: a shareholder value orientation. While coordinated market econo-
mies, such as the Netherlands, used to define corporations as communities of interests 
whose stakeholder should be served (e.g., De Wit & Meyer, 2004; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 
Heemskerk, 2007), practitioners and scholars have noted that board members in these 
contexts are progressively struggling with pressures for the espousal of a shareholder 
value orientation (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003; Yoshikawa 
et al., 2007). However, both the rationale and consequences of a company’s referral to 
a shareholder value orientation in an institutional context with a competing logic, are 
subject to academic inquiry (e.g., Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 2006; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Sanders & Tuschke, 2007; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). We contribute to this stream of 
research by posing the following research questions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 We investigate these questions by analyzing the (non)espousal of a shareholder 
value orientation by top-100 listed firms in their annual reports. These reports are still 
one of the major corporate tools in use to communicate with shareholders in the Dutch 
context. As such, the used language inside these reports regarding shareholder value is 
an important reflection of managerial predispositions towards this “normative gover-
nance paradigm” (Fiss & Zajac, 2004:512; Pye, 2002) and of the way in which a firm 
publicly presents itself to the capital markets. Subsequently, we related the (non)-
espousal of a shareholder value orientation to archival data on (i) the technical, cultural 
and political environments of companies and (ii) their financial performance, in order 
to assess the antecedents and consequences of a firm’s referral to contested beliefs. 
In doing so, we contribute to the literature in three ways (see Table 1.4, page 
11). First, building upon prior studies using a sociopolitical perspective (Fiss & Zajac, 
2004; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 1995; 2004), we examine 
how the varying preferences of major shareholders affect a company’s inclination to 
1. Which power dynamics explain the diffusion of a contested practice (a 
shareholder value orientation) among Dutch listed firms? 
2. What are the performance implications of the adoption this practice? 
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espouse a shareholder value orientation in a context with an alternative logic. While 
prior studies on institutional change have generally examined the influence of 
“insiders” (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2009), we investigate the impact of 
“outsiders”. We posit that a firm’s espousal is more likely to be stimulated from 
without, i.e., by powerful owners who can associate themselves technically and 
culturally with the shareholder model, then from inside, i.e., by powerful owners who 
identify themselves technically and culturally with the status quo in a particular firm. 
Second, while the antecedents of institutional change have been examined extensively 
in prior studies, the sources of a firm’s refusal to refer to contested shareholder value 
practices have received scant attention. Scholars have noted that institutionalized 
practices are often highly resistant to change, as they are embedded in social 
phenomena such as national belief systems (cf. Granovetter, 1985; Maguire & Hardy, 
2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005) and reflect the distribution of power in societies (Ansari 
et al., 2010; Jürgens et al., 2000; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Accordingly, we 
extend our central argument by simultaneously incorporating inhibitors of change, i.e., 
macro and micro political factors. Third, we contribute to contemporary literatures by 
analyzing and discussing the performance implications of a firm’s referral to the 
shareholder value model. While some scholars have suggested a negative relationship 
between the espousal of a shareholder value orientation and performance in a 
stakeholder oriented context (cf. Mintzberg, 2000; Raynor, 2008), there exists little 
empirical evidence. In fact, Fiss and Zajac (2006), as one of the few studies, find a 
positive relationship between a firm’s espousal and market performance.  
 
1.4.6 Multiple Lenses and Methods 
While the preceding paragraphs highlight the variety of this dissertation in terms of 
theories and methods (see Table 1.3), applying such a pluralistic approach increases 
our basic understanding of the research phenomenon, i.e., the diffusion of corporate 
governance beliefs, as each theory and method highlights and uncovers another ele-
ment of the “beast” (Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999:21). Thereby, we follow-up calls for: 
 
 
 
 
x “a more holistic, interdisciplinary analysis of various aspects of corporate gover-
nance research that urge consideration of the multiple dimensions of corporate 
governance across a wide range of countries” (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009:263).  
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 Accordingly, on the theoretical side, we complement theories from the econo-
mics and finance fields by incorporating several other theoretical lenses in this disser-
tation (see Table 1.3). We use social network theory, resource dependency theory and 
the resource based view of the firm to highlight the value creating potential of boards 
of directors and their chairmen (studies 2 and 3). Furthermore, we utilize institutional 
theory to explain companies’ legitimacy seeking responses under conditions of macro 
institutional change (study 4). Finally, we apply a sociopolitical perspective while 
investigating how the preferences and predispositions of central actors, such as major 
owners and board members, enable and constrain a company’s referral to a shareholder 
value orientation (study 5).  
 On the methodological side, we use multiple data sources for triangulation (see 
Table 1.3). Over the course of this dissertation, we analyzed the content of 150 papers 
and over 1400 annual report, we conducted 38 interviews with CEOs, board members 
and industry experts, and we collected secondary data on boards of directors and 
ownership structures of listed corporations in the Netherlands via the databases 
Thompson One Banker, Worldscope, BoardEx, Reach, LexisNexis, Spencer Stuart 
Board Indices and Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen. With the exception of study 
4, all studies use longitudinal data, which logically follows from our aim to enhance our 
understanding of evolving corporate governance practices in the context of diffusing 
new beliefs (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Yin, 2003). Furthermore, we address our 
main research question at varying levels: while studies 4 and 5 address the firm-level, 
studies 2 and 3 investigate the board and individual level. Although we do not apply 
multilevel techniques, most of the studies illustrate cross-level influences and issues. 
In conclusion, the adopted pluralistic research approach, in terms of theoretical lenses 
x “a more context dependent understanding of corporate governance [which], in 
turn, will prove very useful for practitioners and policymakers interested in apply-
ing corporate governance in particular situations” (Aguilera et al., 2008:488). 
x “[studies that] have a broader scope, encompassing such quite complex matters 
as multiple stakeholders, boardroom dynamics, managerial processes, managerial 
values and motives, and national systems (including culture, legal legacies, and 
so on)” (Hambrick et al., 2008:385). 
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and methods, reflects the importance of understanding the multi-faced nature of the 
diffusion of corporate governance beliefs across nations (Ansari et al., 2010). 
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows (see Figure 1.5): the chapters 
two to five each focus on studies on the changing role and tasks of boards of directors 
and non-executive chairmen. Chapter six contains the fifth study examining the 
diffusion of a shareholder value orientation among listed companies in the Netherlands.
Finally, chapter seven highlights the main conclusions of this study and provides a 
reflection on our empirical results and approaches taken. 
Figure 1.5: Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
Chapter 2: 
Literature Review Board-
Strategy Relationship (Study 1)
Chapter 6: 
Diffusion of a Shareholder Value 
Orientation (Study 5)
Chapter 3: 
Changing Service Tasks of the 
Board of Directors (Study 2)
Chapter 4: 
Changing Role of Supervisory 
Board Chairman (Study 3)
Chapter 5:
The Disintegrating Dutch Board 
Network (Study 4) 
Chapter 7:
Discussion and  
Conclusions 
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Chapter 2: Boards of Directors’ Contribution to Strategy: 
A Literature Review and Research Agenda2 
 
Abstract 
Over the last four decades, research on the relationship between boards of directors 
and strategy has proliferated. Yet to date there is little theoretical and empirical 
agreement regarding the question of how boards contribute to strategy. This paper 
assesses the extant literature by highlighting emerging trends and identifying several 
avenues for future research. Using a content analysis of 150 articles published in 23 
management journals until 2007, we describe and analyze how research on boards of 
directors and strategy has evolved. We illustrate how certain topics, theories, settings 
and sources of data interact and influence insights about board-strategy relationships 
during three specific periods. In particular, our study illustrates that research on boards 
and strategy evolved from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and 
cognitive approaches. Our results encourage future studies to examine the impact of 
institutional and context-specific factors on the contribution of boards to strategy, and 
to apply alternative methods to fully capture the impact of board processes and dyna-
mics on strategy-making. Moreover the increasing interest in boards’ contribution to 
strategy echoes a movement towards more strategic involvement of boards. Best 
governance practices and the emphasis on board independence and control, however, 
may hinder the board contribution to the strategic decision-making. Our study invites 
investors and policy-makers to consider the requirements for an effective strategic task 
when they nominee board members and develop new regulations.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades, corporate governance systems have undergone profound 
changes worldwide. The globalization and liberalization of financial markets, corpo-
rate governance scandals and stronger demands for accountability and transparency 
have placed the duties and functioning of boards of directors at the centre of the 
                                                 
2 Published article by Pugliese, A., Bezemer. P., Zattoni, A., Huse, M., Van den Bosch, F.A.J. 
& Volberda, H.W. (2009), Corporate governance: An International Review, 17, 292-306. 
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corporate governance debate (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2005; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
The societal call for an increasing involvement of the board of directors has raised the 
question what the appropriate role of boards should be. While scholars and practi-
tioners have generally acknowledged the importance of adequate board control and 
independence (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Jensen & Zajac, 2004), boards’ involve-
ment in their strategic role, or the lack thereof, has been widely debated (Daily et al., 
2003; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 The discussion on boards’ strategic involvement has been fueled by a 
combination of contextual factors, alternate theoretical perspectives and inconclusive 
empirical results. First, in the 1970s, it was observed that US boards of directors had 
been rather passive in the wake of corporate failures and more strategic involvement 
was necessary to restore the public confidence (Clendenin, 1972; Heller & Milton, 
1972; Mace, 1976; Machin & Wilson, 1979; Vance, 1979). More recently, corporate 
governance reforms (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Enrione et al., 2006; Sheridan 
et al., 2006) and the increasing influence of institutional investors may have brought 
board members closer to strategic decision-making (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992). These developments have stimulated boards of directors to challenge 
CEOs, and to become more involved in strategy, an area that in the past was exclu-
sively controlled by CEOs (Monks & Minow, 1995; Ruigrok et al., 2006). Second, the 
emergence of alternative, partially conflicting theoretical viewpoints have contributed 
to the debate. Theories, such as agency theory, resource dependency theory and 
stewardship theory, have ascribed different responsibilities to boards of directors with 
regard to strategy (Davis, 1991; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). Third, while 
studies suggest that board members are becoming more aware of their strategy role 
(Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Heracleous, 2001; Huse, 2005), scholars have regularly 
highlighted the disagreement in the empirical research on the relationship between 
boards and strategy (Deutsch, 2005; Johnson et al., 1996). 
The above theoretical pluralism and empirical inconclusiveness in the 
literature on boards of directors and strategy raises the following questions: what is the 
stance of research in this area? How has the field been evolving over time? And what 
are the main challenges and future opportunities? In this paper we analyze 150 articles 
on boards and strategy published in 23 management journals until 2007, in order to 
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provide answers to these questions. Thereby, this paper contributes to the literature on 
boards and strategy in three ways. First, it describes how studies on boards and 
strategy have been evolving and illustrates how certain topics, theories, settings and 
sources of data interact and have influenced our knowledge about board-strategy 
relationships during certain periods. For instance, our data reveal that during the 1990s 
the field was dominated by empirical studies in a US setting that mainly refer to 
agency theory and focus on the determinants and consequences of boards’ strategic 
involvement. Second, the paper complements previous literature reviews that have 
(partially) covered this domain (Deutsch, 2005; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Given the time elapsed since these reviews, the intensification of the corporate 
governance debate internationally and the large number of studies conducted on 
boards of directors and strategy more recently, it is the right time for due reflection on 
achievements in this area (Huse, 2005). Third, the paper highlights several avenues to 
advance the field of study. Our findings encourage governance scholars to further 
investigate the impact of contextual forces at multiple levels, to further comprehend 
board processes and dynamics, and to adopt methods aimed at opening the black box 
of board research. Finally, the article has implications for practice. Existing board 
practices emphasize, in fact, board control and independence as antecedents of good 
governance, but these aspects may also hinder the board’s contribution to strategy-
making. In line with some recent works, our study suggests that the requirements for 
an effective strategic task should be taken into account while composing boards and 
devising new regulations.  
 The paper is structured as follows: section one describes the basics of the 
board-strategy debate and the theoretical pluralism and empirical inconclusiveness 
emerging from the literature on boards and strategy. Section two describes the research 
method, i.e., how we selected journals and determined our sample of 150 articles to be 
included in our review, how we coded the content of each article and how data were 
analyzed statistically. Next, in section three we present the results of our review, 
describe how the field has evolved and illustrate how certain topics, theories, settings 
and sources of data interact and have dominated in certain time periods. In our final 
section, we discuss the implications and avenues for future research. 
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2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Debate on Boards and Strategy  
The appropriate role of the board of directors in formulating and implementing 
strategy has been long debated (Andrews 1981a, 1981b; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Useem, 2003). While the literature has acknowledged the 
importance and need for adequate board control and independence (e.g., Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Jensen & Zajac, 2004), both the contributions of boards to strategy 
and the desirability of such practice have remained topics of discussion (Daily et al., 
2003; Golden & Zajac, 2001). In light of a multitude of theoretical lenses and empi-
rical findings in the management literature, Zahra and Pearce’s observation that ‘there 
is controversy over the nature of directors’ strategic role’ (1989: 328) still seems to be 
topical after twenty years of research. 
The debate on boards’ strategic contribution dates as far back as the 1970s. 
During this decade, several US scholars and practitioners observed that boards were 
rather passive in the wake of US corporate failures and that more strategic 
involvement was necessary to restore public confidence (Clendenin, 1972; Mace, 
1976; Vance, 1979). A growing theoretical debate was boosted by Fama and Jensen’s 
seminal work (1983) in which they distinguished decision management, i.e. initiating 
and implementing (strategic) decisions, and decision control, i.e. ratifying and 
monitoring (strategic) actions. The two tasks were ascribed to the top management 
team and the board of directors respectively. Their rationale has influenced the debate 
ever since. By relying on a clear distinction of responsibilities between boards and 
management, scholars have viewed the potential contributions of boards to strategy as 
fairly limited due to their distance from day-to-day operations, the presence of 
information asymmetries and the need to remain independent (Charan, 1998; Conger 
et al., 2001; Hendry & Kiel, 2004). Instead, others have argued that boards of directors 
are legally responsible for the strategy of companies (Coffee, 2006; Harrison, 1987; 
Yawson, 2006) and that boards are in an excellent position to contribute to strategy 
(Andrews, 1980; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Goodstein et al., 1994; Tricker, 1984). 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Pluralism in the Board-Strategy Debate 
From a theoretical standpoint, the debate around board strategic involvement has been 
fueled by conflict and consensus theories (Davis, 1991; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 
1999; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). A conflict perspective conceptualizes managers as 
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self-interested agents that should be closely monitored (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). For instance, agency theory posits that boards affect strategic choices 
by preventing managers from acting opportunistically at the expense of shareholders 
(Mizruchi, 1983). In this view, boards are not expected to initiate and implement 
strategies, but they contribute through ratifying and monitoring strategic decisions 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Goodstein et al., 1994). Board involvement in strategy appears 
to conflict with this view, as it would make boards of directors co-responsible for stra-
tegic decisions and it would jeopardize the required distance between board members 
and managers (Boyd, 1990, 1994; Huse, 1994; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). 
A consensus perspective conceptualizes managers as intrinsically motivated 
agents acting in the best interest of the firm (Davis et al., 1997). Accordingly, through 
various theoretical lenses boards are defined as organizational bodies that may support 
empowered managers in strategy formulation and implementation (Bezemer, et al., 
2007; Huse, 2007). For example, resource dependency theory suggests that board 
members are in an excellent position to contribute to (strategic) decision-making by 
providing access to resources on which firms depend (cf. Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The stewardship theory challenges the 
rationale of agency theory by arguing that the interests of managers and board 
members do not necessarily collide (Davis et al., 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). In 
this perspective, the role of boards is to facilitate and empower managers, also in the 
realm of strategy. More lately, cognitive and behavioral approaches have emphasized 
the importance of understanding cognitive contributions of board members and the 
impact of boardroom dynamics on strategic decision-making (McNulty & Pettigrew, 
1999; Pettigrew, 1992; Pye & Camm, 2003; Rindova, 1999). 
 
2.2.2 Empirical Inconclusiveness in the Board-Strategy Debate 
Aside to the theoretical debate, empirical findings provide mixed results as well. In 
recent decades scholars have regularly emphasized the presence of a wealth of 
inconclusive empirical findings (Deutsch, 2005). On the one hand, studies have shown 
that boards have been rather passive and subject to CEOs and executives’ dominance 
(e.g., Herman, 1981; Kosnik, 1987; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971). Further-
more, anecdotal evidence suggests that boards might destroy value when they become 
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involved in strategy (Fulghieri & Hodrick, 2006; Hitt et al., 2001; Jensen, 1993). On 
the other hand, scholars have shown that boards are becoming more actively involved 
in strategy (Ingley & van der Walt, 2005; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006; Schmidt & Brauer, 
2006; Zahra, 1990; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Moreover, boards have affected 
important elements of strategies, such as the scope of the firm (Jensen & Zajac, 2004; 
Tihanyi et al., 2003), entrepreneurship and innovation (Fried et al., 1998; Hoskisson et 
al., 2002; Zahra et al., 2000), strategic change (Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Johnson et 
al., 1993; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001), R&D strategies (Baysinger et al., 1991; 
Kor, 2006) and internationalization (Datta et al., 2003; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). In 
sum, the literature on boards of directors and strategy is characterized by theoretical 
pluralism and by empirical inconclusiveness, both originating from scholarly contri-
butions and anecdotal evidence. In the remainder of this paper, we seek to highlight 
how distinct patterns of research have emerged over the years and their key attributes. 
 
2.3 Method 
 
2.3.1 Selection of Journals and Papers 
To examine the evolving literature on boards and strategy, we decided to focus on 
peer-reviewed studies published in management journals, regardless of their impact 
factor (Seglen, 1994). We selected all journals included in the management category 
within the ISI-Web of Knowledge during 2007. Our search produced 81 records in 
total. In the next phase, we used the databases ABI/Inform, Business Source Premier, 
Ebsco-Host, JSTOR and Swetsnet to search for all paper publications containing 
simultaneously the terms ‘board’ and ‘strateg*’ or ‘director’ and ‘strateg*’ in the title, 
abstract and/or key words. This approach enabled us to identify a set of articles 
directly referring to the debate on boards’ and directors’ contribution to strategy. This 
procedure resulted in 371 hits in total: 150 papers (40.4%) turned out to be relevant to 
our examination. The large difference between the number of hits and the number of 
included papers is due to several factors. We excluded papers referring to board 
games, papers using the term across-the-board, fictive Harvard cases, letters from 
editors, book reviews, papers referring to organizations with the term ‘board’ in their 
name and papers referring to other management layers than the board of directors. In 
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sum, our final sample consists of 150 articles published in 23 journals from 1972 (first 
included paper) until 2007. 
 
2.3.2 Content Analysis 
In order to analyze the evolving nature of studies on boards of directors and strategy, 
two raters have independently analyzed and coded the set of 150 articles (Coffey & 
Atkinson, 1996; Krippendorff, 2004). The two raters were asked to codify all basic 
elements of a paper: (i) type of article, (ii) main research topic, (iii) use of theories, 
(iv) research setting, (v) source of data and (vi) the definition of board strategic 
involvement (Insch et al., 1997). The coding scheme was pretested on two sub-
samples of 30 articles after which the raters came to an agreement about the final set 
of items to be used in the classification for each category. A review was then 
conducted on the whole set of articles (D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990). At the end of 
the coding procedure, the two sets of data were matched. There appeared to be a high 
overlap in the responses: only 54 out of 828 items were coded differently by the two 
raters. Interrater reliability scores were calculated and the percent agreement (93.5%) 
and Cohen’s Kappa (0.916) were both above the acceptance threshold (Cohen, 1960; 
Dewey, 1983). A final meeting was arranged to discuss the 54 inconsistencies in the 
responses. To reconcile the disagreements, the articles were reread and recoded. If the 
raters still did not agree on the coding, a senior strategy professor – who was involved 
in the research project – was asked to provide a clarifying interpretation (Lee, 1999). 
In the following sections we will discuss all categories in more detail. 
(i) Type of article. The 150 articles were differentiated according to their 
nature: ‘conceptual’ versus ‘empirical’. Papers were coded ‘conceptual’ when they 
aimed to advance or refine theory and were solely based on deductive reasoning with-
out any empirical metrics. Papers were labeled ‘empirical’ if authors applied inductive 
logics, described their methods in a separate section and argued on the strength of data 
obtained from qualitative research methods (i.e. interviews, participant observation 
and anecdotes) and/or quantitative methods (i.e. archival data and surveys). 
 (ii) Main research topic. Building upon prior studies (e.g. Huse, 2005; Pearce 
& Zahra, 1992; Stiles, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) we distinguished four groups of 
papers in relation to the main research topic. The first group examines the determinants 
of board strategic involvement. Among others, scholars have sought to relate environ-
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mental characteristics, ownership structure, board composition and incentive mecha-
nisms to various levels of board strategic involvement. The second group of studies 
investigates the consequences of board strategic involvement. For instance, scholars 
have addressed the impact of specific board characteristics on strategic outcomes, such 
as diversification, internationalization, innovation and strategic change. The third 
group of papers explores boards’ participation in strategic decision-making processes, 
i.e., the ways in which boards contribute internally to decision making processes by 
interacting with TMTs in various phases. Finally, the fourth group of papers discusses 
from a normative stance why board strategic involvement may or may not be 
desirable. Topics of debate include the reasons for the perceived passivity of boards in 
this respect and the question how far board involvement into strategy should be going. 
 (iii) Use of theories. To examine the theoretical development of the field, we 
mapped to which theories each paper explicitly referred. Given the widespread appli-
cation of agency theory in the literature on boards and strategy, we decided to create a 
variable capturing whether a paper referred to: (i) agency theory solely; (ii) multiple 
theories, including agency theory and (iii) other theories than agency theory or no 
theory at all. 
(iv) Research Setting. As highlighted by comparative corporate governance 
studies, institutional contexts widely vary between nations and have a profound impact 
on local corporate governance structures and practices (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Aguilera et al., 2008; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Therefore an important dimen-
sion to our analysis is added by examining the empirical setting in which research on 
boards and strategy has been conducted. As most empirical articles in our sample are 
based on US data, we decided to use the following categorization: (i) articles using 
exclusively data drawn from the US; (ii) articles using data from multiple-countries, 
including the US and (iii) articles using data drawn from a non-US context. 
 (v) Source of data. To provide insights in the use of different data sources, we 
coded the empirical articles with the following six categories: i) interviews, ii) 
anecdotal evidence, iii) archival data, iv) survey data, v) direct observations and vi) 
combinations of the above-mentioned sources. In the latter category we only included 
articles using combinations of interviews and survey data, interviews and archival 
data, and survey data and archival data. 
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 (vi) Definition of board strategic involvement. Board strategic involvement is 
a latent construct and no single way to define or interpret it emerges from literature 
(Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). Building upon prior studies (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1990), we 
distinguished four broad categories to classify the definition of board strategic 
involvement. The first category includes studies assessing how boards of directors 
impact on the general strategy of companies. For example, by developing the mission, 
establishing long-term targets and allocating resources (Volberda et al., 2001; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1990). The second group of papers investigates how boards contribute to 
specific strategic outcomes. The majority of papers in this category are input-output 
studies that aim to identify how board composition affects strategic outcomes, such as 
innovation, change, diversification, and mergers and acquisitions (Johnson et al., 
1996). The third group encompasses research that explores how boards participate in 
various phases of strategic decision-making through interacting with TMTs. Among 
others, the studies conducted by Judge & Dobbins (1995), Forbes & Milliken (1999) 
and Rindova (1999) are included in this category. Finally, the fourth category consists 
of papers in which the nature of board strategic involvement is not clearly stated and 
defined. Most papers published in the 1970s and 80’s fit into this category, as the 
concept of board strategic involvement was in general ill-defined in the early years. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
 
2.4.1 Growing Attention to Research on Boards and Strategy 
In recent decades, scholars and practitioners have debated the relationship between the 
boards of directors and strategy. Figure 2.1 illustrates the historical development of the 
number of published articles explicitly referring to boards and strategy in the 
management literature. As depicted, the first paper was published in 1972 and in the 
following decades the number of published articles steadily increased. Studies on 
boards and strategy were published irregularly during the early years, prior to the 
publication of Zahra and Pearce’s study in 1989. Since then, the marked increase in 
the average number of articles on the topic has reflected the growing attention of 
scholars in the field of strategy and governance (from 1.3 in the period 1972-1989 to 
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9.6 in the period 2001-2007). Also in relative terms the space devoted to studies on 
boards of directors and strategy has increased: from 0.1 articles per management 
journal per year in the period 1972-1989 to 0.4 articles in the period 2001-2007. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that in the period 1972-1989 most papers were published in 
general, applied practice-oriented journals such as the Long Range Planning (8), 
California Management Review (6) and Harvard Business Review (5). Since 1990 two 
specialized journals in strategy and corporate governance, Corporate Governance: an 
International Review (24) and Strategic Management Journal (14), have contributed 
the most (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.1: Historical Development Research on Boards and Strategy 
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Figure 2.2: Overview of Journals with Included Publications per Time Period 
 
 
1972-
1989 
1990-
2000 
2001-
2007 
 
overall 
Corporate Governance: An International Review N/A* 4 20 24 
Strategic Management Journal 2 7 7 16 
Long Range Planning 8 6 2 16 
Academy of Management Journal 1 8 5 14 
Harvard Business Review 5 6 2 13 
Journal of Management 1 6 4 11 
Administrative Science Quarterly 0 7 3 10 
Journal of Management Studies 0 4 6 10 
California Management Review 6 1 1 8 
Academy of Management Executive 0 2 4 6 
Academy of Management Review 0 3 0 3 
Organizational Dynamics 0 0 3 3 
Organization Studies 0 1 1 2 
Organization Science N/A* 2 0 2 
Journal of Small Business Management 0 0 2 2 
British Journal of Management N/A 1 1 2 
International Journal of Technology Management 0 1 1 2 
Management Science 0 0 1 1 
Journal of International Business 1 0 0 1 
Decision Science 0 1 0 1 
Tourism Management 0 0 1 1 
Journal of Organizational Change Management 0 0 1 1 
Service Industries Journal 0 0 1 1 
*N/A: Journal was founded after this particular time period 
 
2.4.2 Descriptives and Interactions of Topics, Theories, Settings and Data Sources 
Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the characteristics of the articles that have 
contributed to the growing attention in boards of directors and strategy. The papers are 
overwhelmingly empirical (n=114; 76%). Most empirical studies have been conducted 
in the USA (n=72; 62%) or in multiple settings including the USA (n=5; 4%). With 
regard to the main research topic, most articles have contributed to the debate on the 
 32 
desirability of board strategic involvement (n=41; 27%), although the overall sample 
is distributed evenly across all categories. In terms of use of theories, agency theory is 
the prevailing lens (n= 63; 42%): it has been used as the sole theoretical lens (n=27; 
18%) and in combination with other theoretical lenses (n=36; 24%). The sources of 
data are quite diverse, although the use of archival data (n=45; 40%) and of multiple 
sources (n=22; 19%) is most common. Finally, the largest group of studies defines 
board strategic involvement in terms of boards’ contributions to specific strategic 
outcomes (n=52; 35%), while the smallest group defines it as boards’ participation to 
strategic decision-making (n=22; 15%).  
Furthermore, Figure 2.3 illustrates how topics, theories, settings and data 
sources interact. Most notable are the key differences between empirical studies that 
have been conducted in a US context and those conducted in a non-US context. In the 
US context scholars have published most on the determinants (n=26; 36%) and 
consequences of board strategic involvement (n=21; 29%). Furthermore, these studies 
refer to agency theory in most instances (n=38; 53%) and mainly use archival data 
(n=39; 54%). Finally, board strategic involvement has generally been defined as the 
contribution of boards to specific strategic outcomes, such as innovation, strategic 
change and mergers and acquisitions (n=37; 51%). In contrast, studies conducted in a 
non-US context most often examine the participation in strategic decision-making by 
boards (n=14; 38%). Furthermore, these studies often refer to alternative theoretical 
lenses (n=25; 68%) and use qualitative methods, such as interviews (n=10; 27%) and 
direct observations (n=5; 14%) more often. Finally, these studies differ in their 
definition of board strategic involvement, i.e., all categories are evenly represented. 
Theoretical papers differ from both types of empirical papers. These papers generally 
address the practice and question the desirability of boards’ strategic involvement 
(n=19; 53%), show a limited reference to agency theory (n=13; 36%) and the defi-
nition of board strategic involvement is in most instances rather unspecified (n=17; 
47%). We tested the above-mentioned interactions for statistical significance. Several 
cross tabulations reveal that the relationships between the main research topic, use of 
theories, research setting and the definition of board strategic involvement are indeed 
statistically significant (p<.05). 
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2.4.3 Three Distinct Research Periods 
In order to observe an evolutionary pattern in previous research, we identified three 
periods and assigned each article to one of them according to the year of publication. 
Even though the three windows are not homogeneous in terms of time-length, we 
clustered them in accordance with two criteria. First, we observed changes in the slope 
of the curve with cumulative number of articles published over time (see Figure 2.1). 
We considered a cut-off for a ‘new period’ if (i) there was a sharp increase in the 
number of publications in a given year and if (ii) this number was significantly higher 
than the average during the previous years. Second, we identified a ‘new period’ if 
relevant and highly influential articles (or groups of articles) came out during a given 
year or the year before. Major changes in a field of study often occur thanks to 
breakthrough and innovative articles that suggest new theoretical approaches and/or 
methods and set a new agenda for future research (Kuhn, 1962). We checked for 
robustness by examining whether our findings would change if we slightly changed 
our cut-off points. Although our results became less significant, overall the witnessed 
developments proved to be robust. 
  Our first observation window covers the period from the first publication 
(1972) until Zahra and Pearce’s literature review in 1989. In this period, the interest in 
studies on boards and strategy seems to be infrequent and concentrated around the 
years 1972, 1979 and 1986. In 1990, one year after Zahra and Pearce’s literature 
review, six papers on the topic were published, i.e. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), 
Boyd (1990), Hoskisson and Turk (1990), Kosnik (1990), Lang and Lockhart (1990) 
and Zahra (1990). These papers provided input to a new strand of research and most of 
the literature in the following years sought to analyze the relationship between board 
composition and strategic outcomes. Our second observation window ends in 2000. In 
1999 and 2000 great interest around boards and strategy arouse, as 17 articles were 
published in the two years. During this period an alternate stream of literature came 
out with a new perspective on boards’ roles and behavior (Dalton et al., 1998; Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Hillman et al., 2000; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999). These researchers had a significant impact on the 
field and fueled the debate around cognitive and behavioral approaches. In the 
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following sections, we will discuss the distinctive characteristics of articles published 
during each period (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5). 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Evolution of the Literature on Boards and Strategy 
 1972- 
1989 
1990-
2000 
2001-
2007 
overall 
Summary: 
Number of articles 
Average number of articles per year 
Average number of articles per journal per year 
 
24 
1.33 
0.10 
 
59 
5.36 
0.23 
 
67 
9.57 
0.42 
 
150 
4.16 
0.20 
Type of Article†: 
Conceptual 
Empirical 
Total 
 
10 (42%) 
14 (58%) 
24 (100%) 
 
14 (24%) 
45 (76%) 
59 (100%) 
 
12 (18%) 
55 (82%) 
67(100%) 
 
36 (24%) 
114 (76%) 
150 (100%) 
Main Research Topic*: 
Determinants of board strategic involvement 
Consequences of board strategic involvement 
Boards’ participation in strategic decision making 
Desirability of strategic involvement (normative) 
Total 
 
3 (13%) 
3 (13%) 
2 (8%) 
16 (67%) 
24 (100%) 
 
16 (27%) 
18 (31%) 
12 (20%) 
13 (22%) 
59 (100%) 
 
17 (25%) 
15 (22%) 
23 (34%) 
12 (18%) 
67 (100%) 
 
36 (24%) 
36 (24%) 
37 (25%) 
41 (27%) 
150 (100%) 
Use of Theories*: 
Articles referring to agency theory 
Articles referring to multiple lenses (including agency) 
Articles solely referring to other theories or no theory 
Total  
 
2 (8%) 
1 (4%) 
21 (88%) 
24 (100%) 
 
13 (22%) 
19 (32%) 
27 (46%) 
59 (100%) 
 
12 (18%) 
16 (24%) 
39 (58%) 
67 (100%) 
 
27 (18%) 
36 (24%) 
87 (58%) 
150 (100%) 
Research Setting*: 
Articles based on US data only 
Articles based on multiple settings (including the US) 
Articles based on non-US data  
Total 
 
7 (50%) 
4 (29%) 
3 (21%) 
14 (100%) 
 
38 (84%) 
1 (2%) 
6 (13%) 
45 (100%) 
 
27 (49%) 
0 (0%) 
28 (51%) 
55 (100%) 
 
72 (62%) 
5 (4%) 
37 (32%) 
114 (100%) 
Source of Data: 
Interviews 
Anecdotal Evidence 
Archival Data 
Survey 
Direct Observations 
Multiple Sources 
Total 
 
1 (7%) 
3 (21%) 
3 (21%) 
2 (14%) 
0 (0%) 
5 (36%) 
14 (100%) 
 
5 (11%) 
4 (9%) 
22 (49%) 
3 (7%) 
2 (4%) 
9 (20%) 
45 (100%) 
 
9 (16%) 
7 (13%) 
20 (36%) 
8 (15%) 
3 (6%) 
8 (15%) 
55 (100%) 
 
15 (13%) 
14 (12%) 
45 (40%) 
13 (11%) 
5 (4%) 
22 (19%) 
114 (100%) 
Definition of Board Strategic Involvement*: 
Unspecified 
Boards define strategy at a general level  
Boards are responsible for specific outcomes 
Boards participate to decision-making process 
Total 
 
11 (46%) 
8 (33%) 
3 (13%) 
2 (8%) 
24 (100%) 
 
20 (34%) 
8 (14%) 
26 (44%) 
5 (8%) 
59 (100%) 
 
17 (25%) 
12 (18%) 
23 (34%) 
15 (22%) 
67 (100%) 
 
48 (32%) 
28 (19%) 
52 (35%) 
22 (15%) 
150 (100%) 
  * Differences between the three time periods are statistically significant (p<.05; two-tailed). † Differences  
  between the three time periods are statistically significant (p<.10; two-tailed). 
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Period 1 (1972-1989): The emerging debate about boards’ strategic involvement  
The early literature explicitly referring to boards and strategy dates back to the 
beginning of the 1970s. At that time, the debate was mostly driven by the practical 
needs that the US business community was facing. Corporate failures and governance 
scandals together with the increasing requirements for higher accountability fueled 
studies on boards and governance issues (Lorsch, 1986; Vance, 1979). At the same 
time, strategy started to become established as research field (Volberda & Elfring, 
2001), fueled by major changes in the business environment of most Western 
countries (i.e. the increase in Japanese competition and the oil crisis) (Pettigrew, et al., 
2002). During this first period, research on boards and strategy was characterized by a 
debate on the desirability of active board involvement, also in the realm of strategy. 
This discussion followed an ongoing US debate around a perceived passivity of boards 
of directors at that time (Herman, 1981; Mace, 1971; Stiles & Taylor, 2002). The 
ongoing debate has been hosted mainly by three general, applied practice-oriented 
journals (e.g., Long Range Planning, California Management Review and Harvard 
Business Review) that covered almost 80% of the studies in this period (see Figure 
2.2). Regardless of the type of articles, both conceptual and empirical articles have 
generally sought to initiate a discussion around the desirability of boards’ involvement 
in strategy (67%).  
 Overall, two strands of research with opposite views on the topic can be 
distinguished during this period. On the one hand, boards were considered one of the 
main actors in strategic decision-making processes, though they are not expected to 
formulate strategy. For instance, Andrews (1980; 1981a) emphasized that boards are 
in a perfect position to search for alternative corporate strategies. Furthermore, Felton 
(1979) argued that boards should confront management in case where results deviate 
from expectations, also in the realm of strategy. To support adequate fulfillment of the 
strategy role, Wommack (1979) and Harrison (1987) suggest that boards should create 
an internal board committee dedicated to this issue. On the other hand, another group 
of scholars strongly argued that boards should not be actively involved in strategy. For 
instance, according to Heller and Milton (1972) strategic issues are a difficult subject 
for directors to get into, as they are often not involved in the company on a daily basis. 
Moreover, Mace (1976) argues that outside directors are mostly hired through coop-
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tation or hold board positions elsewhere; this practice may limit their commitment and 
involvement in strategic issues. Finally Rosenstein (1987) describes several hurdles 
that directors may face when they try to get involved in strategy. 
In sum, the key characteristics of research during this period are (i) the lack of 
one prevailing theory, (ii) the predominance of articles discussing the desirability of 
board strategic involvement (67%) and (iii) a broadly defined concept of board 
strategic involvement in most instances (79%). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
Zahra and Pearce, at the end of this period, assert that “overall, empirical research on 
the boards’ strategic role is in its infancy stage” (1989:304). 
 
Period 2 (1990-2000): The heyday of ‘input-output approaches’ 
Two breakthrough articles influenced the emerging literature on boards of directors 
and strategy at the beginning of the 1990s. Zahra and Pearce’s (1989) literature review 
highlighted the importance of understanding the relationship between board charac-
teristics and structure, and strategy. Additionally, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
discussed the prominence of board-TMT dynamics and its implications for strategy. 
Furthermore, they emphasized also that ‘evaluating the strategic implications of boards 
of directors requires empirical analysis’ (1990:73). Following these suggestions, 
multiple studies were published during the next decade. Generally, they relate board 
characteristics and structure (i.e., board size, CEO-duality, board diversity, outsider 
ratio, tenure and directors’ equity stakes) to strategic outcomes, such as acquisitions 
(Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), 
change (Bergh, 1995; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Goodstein et al., 1994), corporate 
restructuring (Daily, 1995; Sheppard, 1994), entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996), R&D 
expenditures (Baysinger et al., 1991) and internationalization (Sanders & Carpenter, 
1998). Generally, these studies provide mixed evidence of relationships between board 
characteristics and strategy (Daily et al., 2003; Deutsch, 2005). 
 Illustrative of this line of inquiry is that the majority of studies (i) refers to 
agency theory (54%), (ii) uses US samples (86%), (iii) analyzes archival data (49%) 
and (iv) was published in the journals Academy of Management Journal, Admini-
strative Science Quarterly and Strategic Management Journal (37.3%) (see Figure 
2.2). Interestingly, two different lines of inquiry started to develop as well. One group 
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examined the antecedents of board strategic involvement (Fried et al., 1998; Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992; Zahra, 1990; Zahra & Pearce, 1990). A second group investigated the 
effects of the relationship between board and TMTs on strategic decision-making 
(Bradshaw-Camball & Murray, 1991; Fried & Hisrich, 1995; Gulati & Westphal, 
1999; Judge & Dobbins, 1995; Westphal, 1998). At the end of the 1990s, contributions 
by Forbes and Milliken (1999), McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) and Rindova (1999) 
opened up the debate on boards’ contribution to strategy processes and led to a new 
stream of research in this area. 
 
Period 3 (2001-2007): Towards more pluralism in the board-strategy debate 
As witnessed by the sharp increase in the average number of papers published each 
year (9.6), research on boards and strategy gained even more momentum during this 
period. These years are characterized by the co-existence of different research 
approaches. Most studies still focus on the determinants and consequences of board 
strategic involvement (47%), use archival data (36%) in a US setting (49%) and 
extensively refer to agency theory (42%). At the same time, studies with different 
features emerged in this period. First, empirical studies drawing on non-US data 
become more frequent. For example, the corporate governance contexts of Australia 
(Bonn & Fisher, 2005), Belgium (Van Den Heuvel et al., 2006), Italy (Zona & Zattoni, 
2007), Japan (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2005), New Zealand (Ingley & Van der Walt, 
2005), Norway (Huse et al., 2005) and the United Kingdom (Long et al., 2005; 
Yawson, 2006) were examined. Second, new theoretical standpoints have been used to 
interpret phenomena (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Keenan, 2004) and most of the published 
articles do not refer to agency theory, but to alternate theoretical lenses (58%).  
 Building upon earlier contributions by Forbes and Milliken (1999), McNulty 
and Pettigrew (1999) and Rindova (1999), research on boards and strategy is also 
characterized by the emergence of behavioral and cognitive approaches also. Studies 
in this tradition aim to understand how boards participate in strategic decision-making 
as an active part of it (Stiles & Taylor, 1996). Based on this approach, Jensen and 
Zajac (2004) and Useem and Zelleke (2006) highlight that boards participate in these 
processes through continuously interacting with managers and/or other stakeholders. 
Moreover, Rindova (1999) and Fiegener (2005) argue that board of directors’ work is 
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not limited to ratification and monitoring only (cf. Fama & Jensen, 1983): boards of 
directors should rather be involved in all phases. Furthermore, Mueller et al. (2004) 
underline the conflicting requirements boards face in fulfilling the monitoring role 
(independence) and the strategy role (involvement). Scholars have also started to 
investigate the joint impact of board dynamics, working style and structure on 
strategic issues (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Huse, 2005), as well as how the expertise, 
abilities and network ties of board members affect their ability and motivation to con-
tribute to strategy formulation (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Hillman, 2005; Roberts, 
2002) and the boards’ overall capacity to impact on CEOs and TMTs (Arthaud-Day et 
al., 2006; Grossman & Cannella, 2006; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Over the last four decades, the interest in research on the relationship between boards 
of directors and strategy has grown significantly (see Figure 2.1). Scholars and 
practitioners have extensively discussed the potential contribution of boards as well as 
the (un)desirability of active boards in this domain. Witnessing pluralism and contro-
versy in the literature on boards and strategy in terms of theoretical underpinnings and 
empirical findings, our review provides insights on previous research contributions 
illustrating the way in which the literature evolved, highlighting implications for both 
scholars and practitioners, and suggesting avenues for future research. In particular, 
our results highlight two important trends in literature on boards and strategy.  
 First, our findings illustrate that research on boards of directors and strategy 
developed from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and cognitive 
approaches (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5). While early studies mainly discussed the desi-
rability of board strategic involvement (period 1) and used ‘input-output approaches’ 
(period 2), a more recent strand of research posits boards as decision-making groups 
whose internal processes and external context should be better understood (e.g. Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). 
This evolution is in line with the general shift in strategic management from studying 
‘strategy as content’ to understanding ‘strategy as process and context’ (cf. Pettigrew 
et al., 2002).  
 Second, our results highlight that research questions, theories, settings and 
sources of data interact and influence our insights about the relationship between 
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boards and strategy (see Figure 2.3). On the one hand, most empirical studies analyze 
US companies, refer to agency theory, examine the role of boards with regard to 
specific outcomes, and use archival data as main source of data. On the other hand, a 
relatively limited number of studies analyze non-US companies, define board strategic 
involvement as boards’ participation in decision-making, and use qualitative methods 
(cf. Deutsch, 2005). 
 
2.5.1 Theoretical Implications 
Our study has several scholarly implications and highlights avenues for future 
research. First, our results reveal the need to understand the role of context at multiple 
levels as (i) most of the contemporary wisdom originates from US-samples of large 
public companies and (ii) comparative corporate governance studies are sparse (see 
Figure 2.3). As a result, the impact of the national setting (e.g. the legal system, culture 
and economic conditions) and firm characteristics (e.g. the ownership structure, board 
structure, firm performance and lifecycle) on the relationship between boards and stra-
tegy is not fully understood (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Hambrick et al., 2008; 
Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). For example, as the majority of studies referring to agency 
theory used US samples and ‘input-outcome approaches’, the application of agency 
theory to strategic decision-making processes in different national contexts may lead 
to the discovery of new theoretical and empirical issues (Peck & Ruigrok, 2000). 
Furthermore, the growing number of studies that define board strategic involvement as 
participation in strategic decision-making may stimulate more dynamic theories and 
promote research designs explicitly investigating the changing contributions of boards 
of directors over time (Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). In sum, multi-level approaches and 
international comparative corporate governance studies may contribute to the develop-
ment of a better understanding of interactions between macro, meso and micro dyna-
mics and how these forces jointly shape the relationship between boards of directors 
and strategy (Hambrick et al., 2008; Volberda et al., 2001; Volberda & Lewin, 2003). 
 Second, our results highlight the number and variety of theoretical perspec-
tives and inconclusive empirical findings. More recently, scholars emphasized the 
need to go beyond structuralism and to examine board processes, board behavior and 
directors’ cognition. This movement encourages scholars to investigate what boards 
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and their members actually do, think and/or perceive (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; 
Lawrence, 1997; Pettigrew, 1992). Although our literature review shows an increasing 
interest to these topics, the number of studies in this area is still rather limited. Given 
the importance of understanding politics and bargaining processes between key actors 
(cf. Bradshaw-Camball & Murray, 1991; Parker, 2007; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006) and 
the impact of overlapping and conflicting preferences within and between groups of 
actors (Hambrick et al., 2008), a considerable amount of research remains to be done 
in this area in order to clarify and improve our understanding of the board of directors’ 
contribution to strategy-making. For example, future studies should investigate the 
interaction between large shareholders, board members and top management teams 
inside and outside board meetings (Useem & Zelleke, 2006). To reach this purpose, 
governance scholars are encouraged to open the black box of board research 
developing longitudinal studies aimed at exploring processes over an extensive time 
period and collecting primary data using interviews, surveys and direct observation 
techniques (Huse, 2005; Pettigrew et al., 2002). 
 
2.5.2 Practical Implications 
Our empirical findings have also implications for practitioners. First, the increasing 
attention in boards’ contribution to strategy echoes a movement towards more board 
strategic involvement. Interestingly, this development seems to be conflicting with 
principles from agency theory that consider decision control as the primary role of 
boards of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Based on principles from agency theory, 
governance recommendations and best practices have generally encouraged indepen-
dence and formality between independent directors and executive directors (Huse, 
1994; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Van Hamel et al., 1998). This view has been 
reinforced after each wave of corporate governance scandals, as reform initiatives 
(such as SOX, EU directives and national corporate governance codes) have generally 
emphasized board control and board independence as key mechanisms to ensure 
corporate accountability (Daily et al., 2003; Enrione et al., 2006). However, clearly 
separating decision control from decision management might pose a serious threat on 
a board’s ability to perform its strategic role (Bezemer et al., 2007). Scholars have 
highlighted that the maintenance of openness, pro-activeness and a focus on joint 
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value creation are important antecedents of the board’s contribution to the strategic 
decision-making process (Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Moreover, an effective contribution 
of board members to strategy requires both (i) an adequate composition and structure, 
and (ii) well-organized internal processes (Minichilli et al., 2009). Furthermore, the 
introduction of governance practices, such as board induction programs and annual 
board reviews, may contribute to an increased awareness of the expected contribution 
of boards to strategy (Huse, 2005). In sum, an increase in the directors’ awareness of 
their strategic function should be associated to a higher consideration from regulators: 
board composition and processes should be designed to allow all members of the 
board to contribute to strategic decision-making (Roberts et al., 2005).  
Second, practitioners should be aware that most of the contemporary wisdom 
originates from a limited set of empirical contexts. As there may be important 
differences across contexts in terms of role expectations, board structures and actors, 
practitioners should be careful in applying practices in their own national context 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Bamberger, 2008). The witnessed theoretical and empirical 
pluralism in the board-strategy literature is supportive in this respect. 
 
2.5.3 Limitations 
Our literature review has several limitations. First, in this review only 81 journals in 
the management domain were included. There could be further research potential in 
investigating to what extent journals in other research fields (e.g. most notably 
finance, accounting and law) have contributed to research on boards and strategy. 
Second, in this study we solely focused on published articles which explicitly 
mentioned the search terms director or board together with strateg* in their title, 
abstract and/or key words. By choosing this exploratory approach, one risks missing 
important papers that do not claim to be in this domain explicitly and/or refer to 
strategic content directly. Future studies could examine to what extent our findings 
hold when a broader definition is employed (i.e. governance and strateg*). Third, as a 
result of the above choices, leading books on the topic were not included in our 
statistical analysis (e.g. Charan, 1998; Conger et al., 2001; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; 
Huse, 2007; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Stiles & Taylor, 2002). Future studies could 
assess how other types of publication (e.g. academic books and consultancy reports) 
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have contributed to the development of the board-strategy field. However, we believe 
that also this limitation should not be overemphasized as our analysis includes both 
academic and practitioners journal. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Our review of the literature on boards and strategy revealed that research on the 
contribution of boards of directors to strategy has rapidly developed and expanded in 
the last four decades. Several changes are observable across different periods in terms 
of the questions addressed and the methods applied. The growing attention witnessed 
in this review can be ascribed both to new challenges companies face in multiple 
contexts, and to the theoretical advancements in the fields of strategic management 
and corporate governance. Nevertheless, the proliferation of studies and the increasing 
call for more contributions have not provided a clear answer to the question of how 
boards of directors contribute to strategy. Despite all the endeavors undertaken in the 
past, we highlight that the debate on boards and strategy still provides a very 
promising and challenging research agenda. Corporate governance scholars are 
encouraged to open the black box of board research in order to develop a better 
understanding of the interactions between macro, meso and micro dynamics, and how 
these forces jointly shape the relationship between boards of directors and strategy. 
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Chapter 3: Investigating the Development of the Internal and External 
Service Tasks of Non-Executive Directors - The case of the Netherlands 
(1997-2005)3 
 
 
Abstract 
During the last decade, globalization and liberalization of financial markets, changing 
societal expectations and corporate governance scandals have increased the attention 
for the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors. In this context, recent corporate 
governance reform initiatives have emphasized the control task and independence of 
non-executive directors. However, little attention has been paid to their impact on the 
external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors. Therefore, this paper 
investigates how the service tasks of non-executive directors have evolved in the 
Netherlands. Data on corporate governance at the top-100 listed companies in the 
Netherlands between 1997 and 2005 show that the emphasis on non-executive 
directors’ external service task has shifted to their internal service task, i.e. from non-
executive directors acting as boundary spanners to non-executive directors providing 
advice and counseling to executive directors. This shift in board responsibilities affects 
non-executive directors’ ability to generate network benefits through board relation-
ships and has implications for non-executive directors’ functional requirements. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last ten years, the globalization and liberalization of financial markets and 
stronger societal demands for accountability and transparency of companies have 
placed the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors in the centre of the corporate 
governance debate. Recent corporate governance scandals such as Enron and 
WorldCom in the United States, Parmalat in Italy and Ahold in the Netherlands have 
heated the international corporate governance debate (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2005; 
Jonsson, 2005; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) and they have triggered worldwide corporate 
                                                 
3 Article published by Bezemer. P., Maassen, G.F., Van den Bosch, F.A.J. and Volberda, H.W. 
(2007), Corporate governance: An International Review, 15, 1119-1129.  
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governance reforms (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Enrione et al., 2006; Sheridan 
et al., 2006). This has resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, 
corporate governance directives in the European Union and additional national 
corporate legislation across the European Continent. In addition, most European 
countries have introduced new corporate governance codes such as the Cromme Code 
in Germany (2002), the Bouton Report in France (2002) and the Combined Code in 
the United Kingdom (2003). 
 Although the effectiveness of corporate governance codes in disciplining 
corporations and preventing corporate governance scandals has been questioned 
(Cools, 2006; Enrione et al., 2006), these codes are important reflections of corporate 
governance developments, societal norms and values, and expectations of key 
stakeholders. They highlight to society which improvements are central for regaining 
the trust in corporate governance systems and how corporations can enhance their 
legitimacy (Dacin, 1997; Ocasio, 1999; Oliver, 1997). Given this background, it is not 
strange that corporate governance codes, in line with principles from the agency 
theory, have attempted to strengthen the control task and the independence of non-
executive directors (Daily et al., 2003; Enrione et al., 2006). However, the impact of 
these reform initiatives on the service tasks of non-executive directors has been largely 
neglected. In fact, the emphasis on board control and board independence may hamper 
non-executive directors’ external service task in providing access to resources on 
which corporations are dependent (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972; 1973) and they may 
limit their task in corporate learning through board relationships (Mizruchi, 1996; 
Westphal et al., 2001). Furthermore, the emphasis on board control and independence 
may undermine non-executive directors’ internal service task in providing advice and 
counseling to executive directors (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; McNulty & Pettigrew, 
1999). After all, interdependence, maintenance of closeness and a focus on joint value 
creation are necessary for fostering the external and internal service tasks (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999; Van Hamel et al., 1998). 
 This raises the question as to how the external and internal service tasks of 
non-executive directors have been affected by corporate governance codes, triggered 
by broad corporate governance developments. By addressing this question in the 
Dutch financial market, the paper makes two main contributions. First, it describes 
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how two Dutch corporate governance codes with an emphasis on the control task and 
the independence of non-executive directors relate to the external and internal service 
tasks of non-executive directors. We find empirical evidence that corporate gover-
nance measures taken to reinforce board control may hamper non-executive directors’ 
external service task, while reinvigorating their internal service task. Second, by 
describing how non-executive directors fulfill their service tasks in a two-tier board 
context, we provide a more thorough understanding of the functioning of the two-tier 
board model regarding these tasks. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section one provides a short description of 
the Dutch corporate governance context, i.e. the two-tier board system, recent 
developments and corporate governance reform initiatives. Section two elaborates on 
the external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors and discusses how 
provisions in two Dutch corporate governance codes - aimed at strengthening the 
control task of non-executive director - are related to their service tasks. Section three 
portrays the evolution of the service tasks of non-executive directors on supervisory 
boards of the top-100 listed corporations at the Euronext in Amsterdam between 1997 
and 2005. Section four concludes with a discussion of our main findings and their 
implications for corporate governance scholars and practitioners. 
 
3.2 Corporate Governance in the Netherlands 
Most Dutch listed corporations have a two-tier board consisting of a management 
board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board solely consists of non-executive 
directors to assure its independence. It is responsible for the supervision of the 
management board and it assists executive directors with advice and counseling 
(Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999; Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, 2004). In line with 
this board model, the supervisory board has the fiduciary responsibility to act in the 
best interests of the company and all the company’s stakeholders.  
 Over the last ten years, Dutch financial markets have seen dramatic changes. 
The liabilities of non-executive directors have increased, the influence of shareholders 
has grown significantly, the financial press and general public have become more 
vocal and critical, and private equity and hedge funds have become more active (Van 
Hamel et al., 1998; Maassen, 1999). Moreover, Dutch supervisory boards have 
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internationalized and the financial board’ networks have changed (Heemskerk et al., 
2003; Heemskerk, 2007; Spencer Stuart, 2006a). These developments have resulted in 
an increasing convergence of the Anglo-American shareholder model and the Rhine-
land stakeholder model in the Netherlands, i.e. increasing communalities between the 
one-tier board model and the two-tier board model (Collier & Mahbub, 2005; Maassen 
& Van Den Bosch, 1999). In this context two Dutch corporate governance codes have 
been introduced since 1997. Both codes address the above mentioned corporate gover-
nance developments, societal norms and values and the expectations of key stake-
holders. Thereby, they highlight several important topics of the corporate governance 
debate in the Netherlands and their development and introduction might have affected 
and adjusted what non-executive directors in reality are doing (e.g., Mace, 1971; 1972; 
Ocasio, 1999; Huse, 2007). 
 The first corporate governance committee, the Peters Committee, was an 
initiative of representatives from the Association of Securities Issuing Companies and 
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The committee published its forty recommendations 
in 1997 and initiated a public corporate governance debate to introduce best practice 
provisions and to improve board practices on the basis of self-regulation (Maassen, 
1999). In 2003, a second corporate governance committee published the Tabaksblat 
Code. In contrast to its predecessor, this code was an initiative of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs, its scope was wider and aimed at legislative changes if 
needed. Although the Tabaksblat Code is based on self-regulation, a recent amend-
ment to Dutch corporate law legally binds listed companies to explain deviations from 
the Tabaksblat code’s recommendations in their annual reports. The amendment also 
requires companies to obtain the approval of the general meeting of shareholders for 
any deviation from the code based on a “comply or explain” regime. Table 3.1 
provides an overview of the main commonalities and differences between the Peters 
Code and the Tabaksblat Code. 
 
3.3 The external and internal tasks of non-executive directors  
Traditionally, the primary responsibility of the supervisory board has been to control 
the management board to assure that executive directors are acting in the best interests 
of shareholders. This control responsibility is rooted in agency theory and deemed 
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necessary for counteracting the potential for managerial opportunism, which can arise 
as a result of the separation between corporate ownership and management (Davis et 
al., 1997; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Supervisory boards are an important internal control 
mechanisms for shareholders (Daily et al., 2003; Hendry & Kiel, 2004) as they have 
the authority to nominate, reward and remove executive directors from office and to 
ratify audit reports, capital investments and other key corporate decisions (Baysinger 
& Hoskisson, 1990; Johnson et al., 1996). Based on principles from the agency theory, 
corporate governance reform initiatives have generally emphasized board indepen-
dence to avoid conflicts of interest of directors and third parties. By maintaining a 
distance from executive directors and by having a focus on the prevention of failures, 
non-executive directors are ascribed the position to adequately supervise management 
boards. 
Table 3.1: The Peters Code versus the Tabaksblat Code 
Code Attributes Peters Code Tabaksblat Code 
Publication Date October 28, 1997 December 9, 2003 
 
Initiator(s) 
Association of Securities Issuing 
Companies (VEUO), Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange (AEX) 
 
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs 
 
Composition of the 
governance committee 
Representatives from the VEUO and 
AEX, non-executive directors, and 
professional experts 
Representatives from the VEUO and 
AEX, non-executive directors, and 
professional experts 
 
Main Purpose  
 
Initiating a national corporate 
governance debate 
Improving the corporate governance 
system by providing principle-based 
best practices 
 
 
Short description 
 
40 best practices about the relations 
between management boards, 
supervisory boards and investors 
Detailed principles and best practice 
provisions about the relations 
between management boards, 
supervisory boards and investors 
 
 
Audience 
All companies with registered offices 
in the Netherlands and whose shares 
are listed on a recognized stock 
exchange 
All companies with registered offices 
in the Netherlands and whose shares 
are listed on a recognized stock 
exchange 
Legal grounding 
principle 
 
No; Self-regulation 
 
Yes; Comply or explain 
Sources: Peters Code (1997), Tabaksblat Code (2003) and Maassen (1999). 
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 As an additional task, scholars have recognized the service tasks of non-
executive directors and supervisory boards. Social network theory, resource depen-
dence theory and the resource based view have emphasized that non-executive directors 
are able to contribute positively to corporate decision-making as sources of knowledge 
(Huse, 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Huse (2005; 2007) distinguishes between the 
external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors. The external service task 
focuses on value that is created through the relationships non-executive directors have 
with external actors and is rooted in social network theory and resource dependence 
theory. The internal service task emphasizes corporate value that is created by non-
executives by providing advice and counseling to executive directors and originates 
from the resource based view. In contrast to the control task with its emphasis on 
board independence, the maintenance of interdependence, closeness and a focus on 
joint value creation is necessary to be able to utilize the external relations and internal 
knowledge and capabilities that non-executives bring along (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; 
Van Hamel et al., 1998). Table 3.2 provides an overview of the external and internal 
service tasks and juxtaposes them against the control task. The following sections 
discuss both service tasks in more detail.  
 
Table 3.2: The Building Blocks of the Control and External and Internal Services Tasks 
Building blocks Control Task External Service Task Internal Service Task 
 
 
Description Task 
 
Monitoring and 
supervision of executive 
directors 
Acquiring access to 
resources on which the 
corporation is dependent 
and networking 
 
Provision of advice and 
counseling to executive 
directors 
 
Theoretical 
Perspective(s) 
 
Agency Theory 
Resource dependence 
theory and social network 
theory 
 
Resource based view of 
the firm 
 
Value creation 
through… 
… monitoring skills and 
capabilities of non-
executives 
 
… external relations of 
non-executives  
... knowledge and 
cognitive capabilities of 
non-executives 
 
Characteristics  
Independence, distance, 
focus on prevention of 
failures 
Interdependence, 
closeness, focus on joint 
value creation  
Interdependence, 
closeness, focus on joint 
value creation  
Sources: Zahra and Pearce (1989), Johnson et al. (1996), Daily et al. (2003). Adapted from Huse (2005:72, 
Table 1), Huse (2007:39, Table 3.1) and Van Hamel et al. (1998:201). 
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3.3.1 The External Service Task of Non-Executive Directors 
Social network theory and resource dependence theory emphasize corporate value that 
accrues from the external network position of non-executive directors (Huse, 2005; 
Mizruchi, 1996). Social network theory asserts that interlocking directorates constitute 
an important learning vehicle through which corporations can tap into the knowledge 
base of interlock partners (Mizruchi, 1996). Past evidence suggests that these board 
ties can influence a whole array of corporate decision-making outcomes, such as 
mergers and acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993), the initiation of strategic renewal 
(Westphal et al., 2001) and the adoption of board protection devices (Davis, 1991). 
Furthermore, resource dependence theory asserts that board connections are used to 
incorporate resources from the environment, like legal expertise, political lobbying 
power and financial resources on which companies are dependent. Past evidence 
suggests that organizations indeed use board relationships to secure access to financial 
resources (Pfeffer, 1972) and adjust their board structure and composition to cope with 
environmental uncertainties (Boyd, 1990; Hillman et al., 2000).  
 While interlocking directorates may provide corporations with network bene-
fits and improve corporate performance, Dutch corporate policy makers have been 
worried about these relationships for several reasons. First, board relationships might 
jeopardize the independence of non-executive directors. Stakeholders, while influen-
cing firms through interlocking directorates, may become too involved in the boards’ 
decision-making processes and may have serious conflicts of interests. Second, a 
highly centralized and dense network of non-executive directors might create a social 
insular system in which board members are loyal to each other and merely act as 
rubber stamps. Third, as the number of board positions of non-executive directors 
increases, it may become more difficult for non-executive directors to devote enough 
time and effort to profoundly understanding the particularities of a company and to be 
an effective monitor. To negate these board network effects, the Peters Code (1997) 
and the Tabaksblat Code (2003) have introduced (1) a limitation on the total number 
of board positions a non-executive director may have on supervisory boards of listed 
companies (a maximum of five within listed corporations; chair positions count as two 
board positions) and (2) a limitation on the election of non-executive directors who 
had significant business relationships with the firm one year prior to their appointment. 
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Table 3.3 provides an overview of the recommendations in the Peters Code (1997) and 
the Tabaksblat Code (2003).  
 
Table 3.3: Control enhancing recommendations also relating to the external service task 
Board 
Mechanisms 
 
Specific Recommendations in Peters Code and Tabaksblat Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network Ties 
x “The number of supervisory seats at listed companies held by a single individual 
should be limited in such a way as to guarantee the satisfactory fulfillment of the 
allotted tasks” (Recommendation 9, Peters Code, 1997). 
x “A management board member may not be a member of the supervisory board of 
more than two listed companies. Nor may a management board member be the 
chairman of the supervisory board of a listed company” (II.1.7, Tabaksblat Code, 
2003). 
x “The number of supervisory boards of Dutch listed companies of which an 
individual may be a member shall be limited to such an extent that the proper 
performance of this duties is assured; the maximum number is five, for which 
purpose the chairmanship of a supervisory board counts double” (III.3.4, 
Tabaksblat Code, 2003). 
 
 
Network Ties 
Representing 
Financial 
Resource 
Dependencies 
x “A supervisory board member shall be deemed independent if […] he has  [not] 
had an important business relationship with the company, or a company asso-
ciated with it, in the year prior to the appointment. This includes the case were the 
supervisory board member, or the firm of which he is shareholder, partner, asso-
ciate or advisor, has acted as advisor to the company (consultant, external auditor, 
civil notary and lawyer) and the case where the supervisory board member is a 
management board member or an employee of any bank with which the company 
has a lasting and significant relationship” (III.2.2.c, Tabaksblat Code, 2003). 
 
3.3.2 The Internal Service Task of Non-Executive Directors 
The resource based view of the firm emphasizes value that accrues from the internal 
position of non-executive directors (Huse, 2005). With their (management) experience, 
industry knowledge and decision-making capabilities, non-executive directors may 
provide valuable advice and counseling during corporate decision-making processes 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 1996; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995; Rindova, 1999; Stiles, 2001). 
Recent evidence from Anglo-American oriented countries suggests that non-executive 
directors perceive their contributions in this area to be important to the performance of 
firms (Heracleous, 2001; Ingley & Van der Walt, 2005; Stiles, 2001). Other studies 
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indicate that non-executive directors are increasingly involved in decision-management 
(e.g., Hendry & Kiel, 2004; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). Joint board meetings of 
executive and non-executive directors on the board and board committees composed 
of executives and non-executives facilitate the internal service task of non-executive, 
because these two structural communication mechanisms enable the regular exchange 
of knowledge and ideas between executive and non-executive directors.  
 Although joint board meetings and board committees composed of executive 
and non-executive directors might compromise the independence of non-executive 
directors and hamper the adequate execution of the control task, Dutch policy makers 
have been relatively silent about this. The Peters Code (1997) and the Tabaksblat 
Code (2003) only suggest that the supervisory board evaluate its own functioning and 
relation with the management board once a year without executive directors being 
present. Generally, supervisory boards in the Netherlands comply with this principle 
(83.5%; Spencer Stuart, 2006a). Furthermore, seen from an agency perspective, both 
Dutch corporate governance reforms have advocated the use of independent moni-
toring committees (selection and appointment, remuneration and audit committees) to 
support the internal control task of supervisory boards (see Table 3.4 for the code 
recommendations).  
  At the same time, the code provisions may have supported the internal service 
task with their emphasis on the installation and role of board committees. First, 
executive directors often attend meetings of supervisory board committees, which in 
the Dutch two-tier board system by default consist of non-executives (Maassen, 1999; 
Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). Thereby, board committees become consultative 
forums also. Second, the scope of topics discussed in (monitoring) board committees 
tends to go beyond control issues and touches upon service issues as well (Spira & 
Bender, 2004). Third, the use of additional board committees associated with the 
internal service task, such as strategy and integrity committees, might have been 
promoted as well (Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999; Spencer Stuart, 2006a). In a 
similar vein, the stronger emphasis on board control might have stimulated the number 
of supervisory board meetings. As it is common practice in the Netherlands that 
executive directors join the meetings of non-executive directors, the intensity of 
advising and counseling may have increased also. In conclusion, the strengthening of 
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the control task of non-executive directors as a result of corporate governance 
developments and the introduction of the codes may therefore have fostered the 
internal service task simultaneously. 
 
Table 3.4: Control enhancing recommendations also relating to the internal service task 
Board 
Mechanisms 
 
Specific Recommendations in Peters Code and Tabaksblat Code 
 
 
 
Board 
committees 
x “The supervisory board should consider the appointment of a selections and 
appointments committee from among its members, as well as an audit committee 
and a remunerations committee” (Recommendation 15, Peters Code, 1997). 
x “If the supervisory board consists of more than four members, it shall appoint 
from among its members an audit committee, a remuneration committee and a 
selection and appointment committee. The function of the committees its to 
prepare the decision-making of the supervisory board” (III.5, Tabaksblat Code, 
2003). 
 
3.4 Methods and Sample 
The empirical research focuses on the supervisory boards of the top-100 listed com-
panies at the Euronext in Amsterdam, including all AEX, AMX and AScX companies. 
Together, these companies represent seven industries (construction, manufacturing, 
transport and communication, wholesale, retail, financial services, and other services) 
and constitute the backbone of the Dutch economy. The top-100 listed corporations 
for each year were selected on the basis of the average market capitalization. Super-
visory board data for the companies were collected for the period 1997-2005. During 
this period, 54 percent of the composition of the top-100 remained the same. During 
the first year of this period, the Peters Committee published their forty recommen-
dations and started a formal national corporate governance debate in the Netherlands, 
which resulted in the Tabaksblat Code in 2003. The data were obtained from the 
Spencer Stuart Netherlands Board Indexes that contain information on non-executive 
directors who occupied more than 8,000 board positions on supervisory boards in the 
Netherlands during this time period. The data were checked and complemented by 
data obtained from the Worldscope and Reach databases, and annual reports. Overall, 
this resulted in 900 firm-year observations. 
 55 
To utilize the external relationships and internal knowledge and capabilities 
that non-executive directors bring along and to manage resource dependencies (Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999; Van Hamel et. al., 1998), interdependence, maintenance of closeness 
and focus on joint value creation are necessary (Table 3.2). Therefore, an important 
indicator for the functioning of the service tasks is the presence of organizational 
mechanisms that facilitate the actual exchange of knowledge, information and 
resources, i.e. structural communication mechanisms at the board level (Zahra & 
George, 2002). In this study we assess how several board communication mechanisms 
related to the functioning of the external and internal service tasks have evolved in the 
light of corporate governance developments and reform initiatives in the Netherlands. 
 To portray developments in the external service task of non-executive 
directors, the following indicators were used: (1) the average number of ties a focal 
top-100 listed company has with other top-100 listed companies through formal ties at 
the supervisory board level, (2) the average number of ties a top-100 listed company 
has with financial service providers listed in the top-100 (banks, insurance companies 
and investment funds) through formal ties at the supervisory board level, and (3) the 
average number of ties a focal top-100 listed company has with the top-3 listed banks 
(ABN Amro, ING, Fortis) through formal ties at the supervisory board level. Multiple 
interlocks with the same company were counted as one, because we are not interested 
in the strength of network relationships in the light of our research question. All 
indicators represent formal board mechanisms that facilitate the external service task 
of non-executive directors, i.e. the first indicator represents networking and the other 
two indicators used represent the presence of financial resource dependencies at the 
supervisory board level (see Table 3.2).  
 To portray developments in the internal service task of non-executive 
directors, the following indicators were used: (1) the average number of joint board 
meetings of non-executive and executive directors per listed company, (2) the average 
number of board committees per listed company, (3) the average number of board 
committee meetings of listed companies that operate at least one board committee, and 
(4) the average size of board committees of listed companies that operate at least one 
board committee. The indicators reflect characteristics of two formal board commu-
nication mechanisms (joint board meetings and board committees) that facilitate the 
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internal service task of non-executive directors, i.e. providing advice and counseling to 
executive directors (see Table 3.2).  
 
3.5 Empirical Findings 
 
3.5.1 Developments in the External Service Task of Non-Executive Directors  
As corporate policy makers in the Netherlands are concerned with the adverse impact 
of board relations on the independence of non-executive directors, the corporate 
governance codes introduced a limitation on the number of board memberships and a 
restriction on resource dependencies within board relationships. Table 3.5 provides an 
overview of the developments with regard to interorganizational board relations. As 
shown, the average number of board relationships has decreased over time (-34.3%). 
Interestingly, the largest drop in the average number of board ties is observable right 
after the Tabaksblat Code became effective: from 6.1 ties in 2003 to 5.0 ties in 2004  
(-18.3%). Overall, this indicates that the potential for board network benefits is 
diminishing. 
 
Table 3.5: The Changing External Service Task of Non-executive Directors within  
Top-100 Listed Companies – Evidence from the Netherlands (1997-2005) 
 
Board Mechanisms 
 
1997 
 
2005 
% change 
1997-2005 
Average number of ties with top-100 listed firms 
through supervisory board ties 
 
7.49 a) 
 
4.92 a) 
 
-34.3%* 
Average number of ties with top-100 financial 
services providers through supervisory board ties 
 
0.94 a) 
 
0.66 a) 
 
-29.8 %* 
Average number of ties with top-3 listed banks (ING, 
ABN Amro, Fortis) through supervisory board ties 
 
0.56 a) 
 
0.28 a) 
 
-50.0%* 
* T-tests show that the difference is statistically significant (p<.05; two-tailed; n=100). 
 
 Scholars have noted that financial services providers often have a central role 
in the network of interlocking directorates. These network relationships provide 
financial services providers an ability to monitor and control indebted firms, while 
organizations may have greater access to financial resources (Mizruchi, 1996; Pfeffer, 
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1972). Although Dutch financial services providers have been the most highly 
networked corporations for a long period, their position has been declining since 1976 
(Heemskerk et al., 2003). The provisions in the Dutch corporate governance codes 
seem to have affected their network position also. Table 3.5 reveals that the average 
number of ties top-100 listed companies have with listed financial service providers 
(banks, insurance companies and investment funds) through ties at the supervisory 
board level decreased from 0.94 ties in 1997 to 0.66 ties in 2005 (-29.8%). 
Furthermore, the average number of board relations focal top-100 listed companies 
have with the top-3 listed banks (ABN Amro, ING, Fortis) through ties at the 
supervisory board level decreased from 0.56 ties in 1997 to 0.28 ties in 2005 (-50.0%). 
Interestingly, the largest drops in average numbers of finance-related board 
relationships are again observable right after the Tabaksblat Code became effective. 
 
3.5.2 Developments in the Internal Service Task of Non-Executive Directors  
As noted earlier, the attention paid to the monitoring task and the independence of 
non-executive directors has prevailed in the Netherlands. Corporate policy makers 
have been relatively silent about the internal service task of non-executive directors. 
Table 3.6 portrays the developments of two board mechanisms that facilitate the 
internal service task of non-executive directors: (1) joint board meetings with 
executive and non-executive directors, and (2) board committees (the average number, 
number of meetings and size). As shown, the average number of joint board meetings 
increased from 5.9 to 7.0 meetings between 1997 and 2005 (+18.6%). During this 
period, the average number of board committees per company increased as well from 
0.67 board committees in 1997 to 1.04 and 1.94 board committees in 2001 and 2005 
(+189.6%). Interestingly, most corporations seem to have established board commit-
tees in anticipation of the Tabaksblat Code, as the largest growth in the number of 
board committees is observable during the period 2001-2003 and the trend increa-
singly flattens thereafter. The average number of meetings of these board committees 
increased from 2.3 to 3.5 times annually (+36.2%). The average size of board 
committees developed differently. Until 2002, the average size decreased from 3.3 to 
3.0, while it subsequently increased to 3.5 in 2005 (+4.9% over the period). However, 
the change in average committee size appeared to be not significant. 
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Table 3.6: The Changing External Service Task of Non-executive Directors within  
Top-100 Listed Companies – Evidence from the Netherlands (1997-2005) 
 
Board Mechanisms 
 
1997 
 
2005 
% change 
1997-2005 
Average number of joint board meetings per listed 
company 
 
5.90 a) 
 
7.00 a) 
 
+ 18.6%* 
Average number of board committees used per listed 
company 
 
0.67 b) 
 
1.94 b) 
 
+ 189.6%* 
Average number of board committee meetings of 
listed companies that have at least one board 
committee 
 
2.32c) 
 
3.51 c) 
 
+ 36.2%* 
Average size of board committees of listed companies 
that have at least one board committee 
 
3.29 d) 
 
3.45 d) 
 
+ 4.9% 
* T-tests show that the difference is statistically significant (p<.05; two-tailed).a) Number of cases is 70 
(1997) and 96 (2005); b) Number of cases is 85 (1997) and 100 (2005) c) Number of cases is 14 (1997) 
and 70 (2005); 36 (1997) and 74 (2005) firms had committees d) Number of cases is 21 (1997) and 74 
(2005). 
 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Several self-regulatory and legislative corporate governance initiatives were intro-
duced to financial markets during the last decade. These initiatives are important 
reflections of corporate governance developments, societal norms and values and 
expectations of key stakeholders. Seen from an agency perspective, these reform 
initiatives have emphasized the control task of non-executive directors, while non-
executive directors’ service tasks have not been in the center of policy makers’ atten-
tion. Archival data of the top-100 listed companies in the Netherlands between 1997 
and 2005 reveal that the two Dutch corporate governance codes have affected non-
executive directors’ external and internal service tasks. Non-executive directors in the 
Netherlands have become less involved in their external service task between 1997 
and 2005 as: 
 
x the average number of ties with top-100 listed firms through supervisory board 
ties decreased significantly (-34%), 
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x the average number of ties with top-100 listed financial firms through super-
visory board ties decreased significantly (-30%), 
x the average number of ties with top-3 listed banks (ABN Amro, Fortis and 
ING) through supervisory board ties decreased significantly (-50%). 
 
At the same time non-executive directors in the Netherlands have become more invol-
ved in their internal service task between 1997 and 2005 as: 
 
x the number of joint board meetings increased significantly (+19%), 
x the average number of board committees per company (+190%) and the inten-
sity of their involvement increased significantly (+36%). 
 
3.6.1 Implications 
The changing involvement of non-executive directors in their external and internal 
service tasks in response to corporate governance reform initiatives has three major 
implications for non-executive directors and corporations. First, as the task of provi-
ding advice and counseling to executive directors grows in importance, the scope of 
board’s responsibilities broadens and non-executive directors increasingly spent more 
time and effort on fulfilling their internal service task adequately. Together with 
increasing board liabilities, more pressure is put on the non-executive function and 
therefore the pool of willing and well-qualified non-executive directors becomes more 
limited. According to Peij (2005), this will increasingly lead to a professionalization of 
the non-executive directors’ function in the Netherlands. Second, the changing service 
position of non-executives has implications for the selection of non-executive 
directors. Instead of mainly selecting non-executives on the basis of their external 
board network position, other qualifications may become more important. This 
suggests that selection criteria such as the cognitive fit with other board members, 
industry experience and decision-making capabilities will grow in importance in the 
near future (Rindova, 1999). Third, the declining importance of interlocking direc-
torates may adversely affect the strategic and financial performance of listed compa-
nies. As learning opportunities become more scarce and the management of resource 
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dependencies through board ties becomes more difficult, corporations have to search 
for alternative information means to secure their overall external network position. 
 
3.6.2 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The study has several limitations, but provides avenues for future research also. First, 
in the study we have solely focused on formal board communication mechanisms 
associated with the internal and external service tasks of supervisory boards. This 
raises for example the question how informal board communication mechanisms relate 
to these formal mechanisms. Scholars have for instance noted that informal board 
network relations may be more influential and insular than formal board network 
relations (Ghoshal et al., 1994; Tsai, 2002). Future studies could investigate whether 
the development of these informal board communication mechanisms follows the 
same pattern as the development of formal board mechanisms (see for example 
Heemskerk, 2007) and what both developments jointly imply for board task perfor-
mance and corporate performance. 
 Second, the board network measures we used provide no direct evidence on 
the quality and importance of board relationships. Companies may have reacted to 
corporate governance pressures by disposing non-vital board relations only. Further-
more, the board network measures used only take into account board relationships 
between top-100 listed corporations. Increasing levels of internationalization at the 
supervisory board level may have made the international board network more 
important (the number of foreign non-executive directors grew from 16.0% in 1997 to 
24.6% in 2005 (Spencer Stuart, 2006a)), while board network ties with non-listed 
corporations may provide valuable alternatives as well. Future research should take 
these issues into consideration when assessing developments in the board network in 
the Netherlands. 
 Third, the described board developments might be contingent on the specifics 
of the corporate governance context in the Netherlands. Future cross-country research 
studies could investigate to which extent the same patterns are observable in other 
countries with two-tier board systems (e.g., Germany and Austria) and in countries 
with one-tier board systems (e.g., Great Britain and the United States). 
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 Fourth, the study is silent about the dynamic processes by which listed com-
panies have reacted to corporate governance reform initiatives and have adapted the 
external and internal service tasks. Interestingly, the indicators show that in the case of 
board network ties (Table 3.5), companies appear to react to code recommendations 
afterwards. In the case of internal communication mechanisms (Table 3.6), companies 
appear to have anticipated the codes’ recommendations. Future studies applying 
institutional theory (e.g. Dacin et al., 2002; Ocasio, 1999) would be valuable to 
investigate how corporations in different institutional contexts have responded to 
corporate governance reforms. And whether the different legal groundings of the 
Peters Code (self-regulation) and the Tabaksblat Code (‘comply or explain’) led to 
different changes and patterns in board practices discussed.  
 
3.6.3 Conluding Remarks 
The study indicates that although corporate governance reforms have mainly 
emphasized the control task and independence of non-executive directors, they seem 
to have changed as unintended consequences the involvement in the external and 
internal service tasks of non-executive directors also. Corporate policy makers should 
take these unanticipated effects into account prior to the introduction of corporate 
governance reform initiatives.  
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Chapter 4: The Changing Role of the Supervisory Board Chairman:  
The Case of the Netherlands (1997-2007)4 
 
 
Abstract 
Over the last ten years, the corporate governance context in most Western countries 
has changed as a result of irregularities, increased regulation, heightened societal 
expectations and shareholder activism. This paper examines the impact of the 
changing context on the role of chairmen of supervisory boards in the Netherlands. 
Based on a combination of thirty semi-structured interviews with board members of 
leading Dutch corporations and secondary data on the position of supervisory board 
chairmen at the top-100 listed firms in the Netherlands, the study reveals that board 
chairmen have become increasingly involved in both their control and service roles. 
While the demographics (i.e., age, tenure, gender and nationality) of chairmen have 
hardly changed over the last decade, chairmen are spending considerably more time 
on boards and committees, have reduced the number of board interlocks and have 
become more active on the forefront of the corporate governance discussion. The 
paper highlights several implications for scholars and practitioners. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, the corporate governance system in most Western countries has 
changed significantly. Global mobility of capital and the spread of the Anglo-
American shareholder value model have fueled the debate on corporate governance 
practices around the globe (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2005; Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2003; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Moreover, in the wake of corporate 
governance scandals, financial markets have introduced stringent corporate governance 
regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, EU Company Law Directives and 
numerous national corporate governance codes (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Enrione et al., 2006; Sheridan et al., 2006). A communality in these reform initiatives 
has been the emphasis on (i) restoring the public’s trust and (ii) ensuring that 
                                                 
4 Article by Bezemer. P., Peij, S., Maassen, G.F. and Van Halder, H. Forthcoming in Journal of 
Management & Governance. 
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appropriate “checks and balances” are put in place in the regulatory system and 
corporations (Daily et al., 2003). Among others, the rights and duties of shareholders, 
the importance of financial transparency and risk management, and the fiduciary role 
of auditors have been addressed and redefined in these corporate governance reform 
initiatives. 
 Another key topic of debate has been the appropriate role of boards of 
directors in changing corporate governance systems (Corley, 2005; Huse, 2007; Huse 
& Rindova, 2001). Scholars have noted that expectations for boards’ involvement in 
decision-making and supervision have changed and that board roles and structures in 
most Western countries are evolving as a result (Akkermans et al., 2007; Bezemer et 
al., 2007; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Hillier & McColgan, 2006; Hooghiemstra 
& Van Manen, 2004; Long, 2006; Samuels et al., 1996; Valenti, 2008; Wintoki, 
2007). Particularly, two factors are contributing to this development. First, multiple 
corporate governance reform initiatives, in line with principles of the agency theory, 
are being introduced to strengthen board control and board independence (Daily et al., 
2003; Enrione et al, 2006; Finegold et al., 2007). Second, boards of directors have 
come under closer scrutiny of the public and shareholder activists (Cogut, 2007; 
Loring & Taylor, 2006; Wu, 2004). As a consequence, members of boards of directors 
are increasingly faced with the challenge to “demonstrate effective leadership, quality 
decision-making processes and the ability to exercise corporate controls” (Long, 
2006:547).  
 Whereas the influence of changing societal expectations on roles and 
structures at board level is fairly well-established, the consequences for the role of 
individual board members have received less scholarly attention. In this paper, we 
posit that, in particular, the chairman of the board of directors may be subject to 
changing role expectations, as he is most visible to the outside world (Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse, 2007a; 2007b; Roberts, 2002). Given the chairman’s responsibility for (i) 
counterbalancing the power of the CEO and (ii) the functioning of the board of 
directors (Hill, 1995; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), the changing role requirements 
might in fact have a far-reaching impact on the checks and balances within 
corporations. Yet, to date, relatively little is known about (i) contemporary challenges 
for chairmen, (ii) the evolution of the chairman’s role versa key organizational bodies 
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and individuals such as the CEO, and (iii) the drivers of the changing role of chairmen 
of boards of directors (e.g., Kakabadse et al., 2006; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007a, 
2007b; Roberts, 2002; Roberts & Stiles, 1999).  
 By exploring the evolving role of chairmen of boards of directors in the Dutch 
context, we contribute to the literature in three ways. First, while prior research in 
general has examined the impact of environmental change on the role of the board of 
directors as a group, we explore its influence on the role fulfillment of the board’s 
main individual actor, i.e., the chairman. Our results highlight that several 
environmental developments have significantly altered the level and scope of 
chairmen’ involvement and working styles. Interestingly, the opinions regarding the 
performance implications of the evolving role of board chairmen vary widely within 
our sample. Second, we illustrate that the changing role of board chairmen has co-
evolved with their structural position. Our empirical results illustrate that the 
chairmen’ increasing responsibilities are reflected in increased levels of cash payment, 
more turnover and fewer additional supervisory board positions (interlocks). 
Simultaneously, the demographic profile of the chairmen (i.e., age, tenure, gender and 
nationality) remained similar, suggesting a disconnection between demographics and 
role fulfillment. Third, while one-tier boards have been investigated quite extensively, 
we provide a more thorough understanding of the challenges that board chairmen face 
on two-tier boards. We illustrate that the legal separation of decision control from 
decision management in two-tier boards adds an extra layer of complexity to the 
changing societal expectations of board chairmen. Thereby, we highlight the oppor-
tunities and drawbacks chairmen face while operating in alternative board models. 
 The paper is structured as follows: section one describes recent developments, 
the two-tier board model and reform initiatives in the Netherlands. Section two 
summarizes previous research on the roles of the chairman of the board of directors in 
one-tier and two-tier boards. Section three describes the research method, i.e., a 
combination of 30 semi-structured interviews with CEOs and chairmen and archival 
data on the structural position of chairmen in top-100 listed firms in the Netherlands. 
Section four portrays the evolution of the role of the supervisory board chairman 
during the period 1997-2007 and discusses the drivers and consequences of board 
trends. Section five concludes with a discussion of our key empirical findings and 
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highlights the implications for the market for chairmen, activities of corporations, and 
the viability of the two-tier board model. 
 
4.2 The Dutch Corporate Governance System 
The roots of the contemporary Dutch open economy can be found in the glory days of 
the Golden Age. In this era, when the Netherlands were one of the largest trading 
nations, the Dutch founded the ‘Dutch United East India Company’, the first joint 
stock company in the world. With a small group of large, internationally diversified 
firms and a GDP that is dependent on foreign investment and trade (more than 60%), 
the Dutch trade origins and international orientation are still prominent. The 
Netherlands are a welfare state with a long tradition of balancing the interests of 
societal groups. The Dutch corporate governance system is unique in the sense that 
company law explicitly defines corporations as legal entities which must take into 
account the rights of all stakeholders affected by the company. The institutionalized 
stakeholder approach is supported by a two-tier board model consisting of a 
management board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board solely consists of 
non-executive directors to assure its independence and has the duty by law to 
supervise and advise the management board while acting in the best interests of the 
company and all stakeholders involved (cf. Akkermans et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 
2005; 2006; Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, 2004; Maassen, 1999; Maassen & Van Den 
Bosch, 1999). 
 Over the last decade, the corporate governance landscape in the Netherlands 
has changed dramatically with the internationalization of the shareholder base of listed 
firms. Particularly, the share of Anglo-American oriented investor groups (Abma, 
2006) and the number of foreign directors have increased (Spencer Stuart, 2006a). As 
a result, board members are more exposed to foreign investors’ corporate governance 
expectations and their willingness to actively challenge boards of directors. Examples 
of “successful” shareholder activism by foreign investors are the ABN Amro takeover 
by a consortium led by the now split up Fortis Bank, and Stork, a Dutch technology 
company, where a hedge fund forced the corporation to restructure. Corporate 
governance scandals (e.g., Ahold, Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat) also have fueled 
the Dutch debate and contributed to amendments to the Dutch company law in 2004 
and the introduction of a new corporate governance code, the Tabaksblat Code, in 
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2003, which was amended by the committee Frijns in 2008. In sum, these 
developments have contributed to a convergence of the institutionalized stakeholder 
model and the Anglo-American shareholder model in the Netherlands (Bezemer et al., 
2007). 
 
4.3 The Position of Chairmen on One-Tier and Two-Tier Boards  
Traditionally, the primary responsibility of the board of directors has been to control 
the top management team to ensure that executives act in the interests of shareholders. 
The boards’ control role is rooted in agency theory and deemed necessary for 
counteracting managerial opportunism that may arise as a result of the separation of 
corporate ownership from management (Davis et al., 1997; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In 
addition, scholars have recognized the service role of boards, i.e., board members may 
positively contribute to corporate decision-making by providing advice and counseling 
to executive directors (Huse, 2005; 2007; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Both board roles 
appear to be conflicting as the control role requires board independence, distance and 
a focus on the prevention of managerial opportunism, while the service role requires 
from directors interdependence, closeness and a focus on joint value creation (Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999; Van Hamel et al., 1998; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  
 The control and service roles of boards are organized differently in corporate 
governance systems around the globe. Most investors are familiar with the one-tier 
board model in which executives and non-executives are jointly responsible for both 
roles. In this model, executive directors provide in-depth knowledge of the daily 
operations of the corporation and may raise issues that might otherwise have been 
neglected in board meetings (Davis, 1991; Kesner & Johnson, 1990; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). The presence of executive directors enables the board to contribute 
to the decision-making process and to evaluate the outcomes (Maassen, 1999; 
Williamson, 1985) at greater speed with fewer bureaucratic hurdles (Davis, 1991; 
Muth & Donaldson, 1998). However, scholars have observed that insider dominated 
boards may overlook the opportunities that outsiders may offer in terms of alternate 
knowledge (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 
1999) and external relationships (Boyd, 1990; Mizruchi, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Westphal et al., 2001). Insider dominated boards may also jeopardize checks 
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and balances as non-executive directors may be better able to provide independent 
board control (Daily et al., 2003; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  
 While the one-tier model integrates decision management and decision control 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983), the two-tier board model provides for a formal separation of 
executive and non-executive directors who operate in separate boards with their own 
specific roles. Executive directors are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the 
firm and the supervisory board is responsible for the supervision of management and 
for providing advice and counseling to executives (Christensen & Westenholz, 1999; 
Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, 2004; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). The 
independence of the board from management is provided by law to ensure that 
“checks and balances” are in place as the supervisory board has the duty to act in the 
best interests of the firm and its stakeholders. Non-executives also may bring in useful 
resources and knowledge. For instance, directors of banks have always played an 
important role in the inter-corporate network in the Netherlands (Heemskerk, 2007). A 
disadvantage of the two-tier system, however, is the additional bureaucratic burden on 
the corporation that may hamper the speed of decision-making (Maassen, 1999; Muth 
& Donaldson, 1998) and create information asymmetries among executive directors 
and non-executive directors (Davis, 1991; Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, 2004). 
 
Scholars have observed that chairmen of boards perform their role(s) in a wide variety 
of ways in different board models (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007a; Stewart, 1991). 
However, all board chairmen are responsible for: (i) the conduct and composition of 
the board, (ii) determining the agenda of board meetings, (iii) appointing and 
dismissing the CEO, (iv) chairing the annual general meeting of shareholders and (v) 
ensuring that all board members have the necessary information to perform their job 
(Hill, 1995; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Roberts & Stiles, 1999). Furthermore, the 
chairman’s responsibility to maintain a healthy bilateral dialogue with managing 
directors is often posited as critical to the effectiveness of boards of directors and their 
contribution to a firm’s long-term survival (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007a).  
 While the basic role expectations of chairmen are shared on one-tier and two-
tier boards, the differences between both board models have a significant imprint on 
the role and position of chairmen. Whereas the role of board chairmen in the two-tier 
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model is to refrain from day-to-day management of the firm and to focus on decision 
control, chairmen of one-tier boards are often actively involved in both decision 
management and decision control. Instead of being a distant monitor, board chairmen 
in one-tier boards are often operating as “chairman-leader”. Parker (1990:35), for 
example, describes that the typical board chairman “entertained important customers 
and shareholders; that he spoke for the company in the City and elsewhere; and when 
appropriate, conducted high-level negotiations with governments and major 
customers”. Accordingly, Garratt (1999:33) argues that “CEOs need to accept that the 
chairman is the boss of the board. The managing director, or CEO, is the boss of the 
operations of the company”. Furthermore, Treadwell (2006:66) posits that the 
“chairman is the primary interface with the institutions along with the CEO and the 
finance director”. In sum, these studies highlight that while board chairmen in two-tier 
boards are mainly responsible for ensuring that the board of directors adequately 
supervises management, board chairmen on one-tier boards more often operate at the 
forefront and appear to have broader responsibilities. 
 The different role requirements also manifest themselves in the structural 
position of board chairmen. For example, in the two-tier model, chairmen cannot hold 
the position of CEO or another executive position in the firm simultaneously. 
However, CEO duality is not uncommon for one-tier boards (Faleye, 2007; Davidson 
III et al., 2008; Spencer Stuart, 2006a; 2006b; 2008). Furthermore, as a result of the 
supervisory board chairmen’ distance from daily management, the liabilities of 
chairmen in two-tier boards are generally significantly lower compared to chairmen 
who have the same legal position as executive directors. Finally, the average time 
spent on a board chairmanship is significantly higher on one-tier boards as the 
responsibilities generally appear to be broader than for chairmen of two-tier boards. 
As a consequence, board chairmen of one-tier boards generally earn significantly more 
than chairmen on supervisory boards (Spencer Stuart, 2006a; 2006b). Table 4.1 
provides a concluding summary of the main communalities and differences between 
the role and position of chairmen in both board models. In the remainder of this paper, 
we will discuss how the traditional role and position of the supervisory board 
chairman have evolved during the period 1997-2007 in the Netherlands.  
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Table 4.1: Role of the Chairman in Different Board Models* 
Board 
characteristics 
 
One-tier Board Model 
 
Two-tier Board Model 
 
Composition 
Executive and non-executive directors 
operate in one board. 
Executive and non-executive directors 
operate in separate boards. 
Committees Mandatory or recommended. Recommended. 
Orientation Shareholder/Stakeholder oriented. Stakeholder oriented. 
Countries Most countries, among others used in 
the United Kingdom and United States. 
Quite uncommon. Among others used 
in Germany and the Netherlands. 
Chairman’s 
characteristics 
  
CEO Duality Possible. Not possible. 
Independence Not necessary. Required. 
Authority, 
liability 
 
Same (legal) position as executives. 
 
Different (legal) position as executives. 
Tasks, 
responsibilities 
 
Co-directing. 
 
Supervising. 
Time spent on 
chairmanship 
 
More than in two-tier board model. 
 
Less than in one-tier board model. 
Chairman’s role   
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
governance code 
provisions 
The chairman is responsible for 
leadership of the board, ensuring its 
effectiveness of all aspects of its role 
and setting its agenda. The chairman is 
also responsible for ensuring that the 
directors receive accurate, timely and 
clear information. The chairman should 
ensure effective communication with 
shareholders. The chairman should also 
facilitate the effective contribution of 
non-executive directors in particular and 
ensure constructive relations between 
executive and non-executive directors 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2003; 
2008). 
The chairman of the supervisory board 
shall ensure the proper functioning of 
the supervisory board and its 
committees, and shall act on behalf of 
the supervisory board as the main 
contact for the management board and 
for shareholders regarding the 
functioning of the management and 
supervisory board members. In his 
capacity of chairman, he shall ensure 
the orderly and efficient conduct of the 
general meeting. (Netherlands, 
Monitoring Commission, 2008). 
* Sources: Maassen, 1999; Spencer Stuart 2006a, 2006b and 2008; Monitoring Commission, 2008; 
Financial Reporting Council, 2003; 2008. 
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4.4 Research Method 
To analyze the evolving role of supervisory board chairmen in the Netherlands 
between 1997 and 2007, we utilize two research methods. In collaboration with 
Spencer Stuart Amsterdam, thirty semi-structured interviews were held in 2007/2008 
with supervisory board chairmen and CEOs of listed firms on the NYSE Euronext in 
the Netherlands (see Appendix A). As to the selection of participants, we used conve-
nience sampling (all interviewees were contacts of Spencer Stuart Amsterdam), given 
well-known difficulties for researchers to obtain access to individuals at this level of 
analysis (Daily et al., 2003; Pettigrew, 1992). We approached both supervisory board 
chairmen (22) and CEOs (8). We chose this approach in order to ensure that we 
obtained a comprehensive overview where CEOs might highlight other environmental 
developments and related changes in role expectations of board chairmen than the 
chairmen. As the participants were asked to reflect on the developments during the 
period 1997-2007, we made sure that they already had experience with supervisory 
boards in 1997, so that all participants at least had a senior management position in 
1997. The thirty interviews lasted one to two hours and were conducted in the mother 
tongue of the interviewee (Dutch or English). Given the sensitivity and confidentiality 
of the discussions, we were not allowed to record the interviews. Notes were taken by 
two interviewers and interviewees were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. Among 
others, directors were asked to provide a top-3 of changes in their environments and a 
top-3 of implications for the role of the supervisory board chairman. 
 We also collected archival data on the structural position of the chairmen of 
supervisory boards of the top-100 listed companies at the NYSE Euronext in 
Amsterdam. The companies operate in multiple industries (construction, financial 
services, manufacturing, communication, wholesale and retail) and significantly 
contribute to the Dutch economy. Top-100 lists were created by calculating the 
average market capitalization of all corporations listed at the NYSE Euronext in 
Amsterdam during a specific year. We collected data on supervisory board chairmen 
for the years 1997, 2001 and 2005 in order to portray the position of chairmen at 
regular time intervals. The year 1997 is a natural starting point as this was when the 
first Dutch corporate governance code was published that initiated a national debate 
on corporate governance and the role of supervisory boards. The data were obtained 
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from the Spencer Stuart Netherlands Board Indexes that contain information on non-
executive directors who occupied more than 5,000 supervisory board positions in the 
Netherlands during the period 1997-2005. The data were checked and complemented 
by information obtained from annual reports and the Thompson, BoardEx and Reach 
databases.  
  To analyze the structural position of the supervisory board chairman over 
time, we tracked chairmen’ demographics, network position, board activities, remune-
ration and turnover. More specifically, we collected the following demographic 
information: (i) the age in number of years, (ii) the tenure in a focal firm in number of 
years, (iii) gender and (iv) nationality. The network position of chairmen was mapped 
with (i) the number of additional board positions of a chairman at other top-100 listed 
firms and (ii) the number of additional chairmanships at other top-100 listed firms in 
the Netherlands. To portray the board activities of chairmen, we used two indicators 
for the formal involvement of chairmen in corporate decision-making: (i) the number 
of chaired board meetings during a specific year and (ii) the number of board 
committees they worked with during a specific year. We also collected data on 
chairmen’ annual cash remuneration in Euros and turnover as the percentage of the 
chairmen whose contracts expired during a specific year. Finally, we statistically 
analyzed differences with independent-samples t-tests. 
 
4.5 Empirical Findings  
Scholars and practitioners have observed that corporate governance has been in 
transition over the last decade (Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2005; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). Yet, to date, relatively little is known about (i) which environmental changes 
are perceived as important by supervisory board chairmen, (ii) what these develop-
ments imply for their day-to-day functioning, and (iii) how their structural position 
(i.e., demographics, network position, board activities, remuneration and turnover) has 
co-evolved with changes in the environment. In the following paragraphs these aspects 
will be discussed. 
 
4.5.1 Key Developments in the Dutch Corporate Governance Context (1997-2007) 
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the five main trends that supervisory board 
chairmen and CEOs of the largest listed firms in the Netherlands observe. The most 
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significant development has been the expansion of the regulatory framework, 
including the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the second Dutch 
corporate governance code (2003) and IFRS (2005). In particular, CEOs highlight the 
significance of this development. Fifty per cent of the interviewed directors refer to 
the growing influence and rights of shareholders, heightened levels of shareholder 
activism and an increasing focus on shareholder value in the day-to-day operations of 
firms. As a third development, supervisory board chairmen (32%) and CEOs (25%) 
mention the international wave of corporate governance scandals as this has fueled the 
attention for corporate governance of regulatory bodies and society. Furthermore, 
interviewees observe (about one quarter) the convergence of the one-tier board model 
and the two-tier board model, where executives and non-executives tend to work more 
intensively together than traditionally in the two-tier model (cf. Hooghiemstra & Van 
Manen, 2004; Maassen, 1999; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). One director even 
remarked that “The Anglo-Saxon one-tier board system is in fact already the board 
system used by Dutch supervisory and executive boards”. Finally, 23% of the board 
chairmen mentioned that media attention for the functioning of supervisory boards and 
the call for more transparency and accountability have increased. Overall, supervisory 
board chairmen and CEOs seem to observe the same key environmental changes in the 
Dutch corporate governance context.  
 
Table 4.2: The Changing Institutional Context of Dutch Supervisory Boards (1997-2007) 
 Institutional Developments  
in the Netherlands 
Perceptions 
Chairmen (n=22) 
Perceptions 
CEOs (n=8) 
 
1 
Stronger focus on regulation and compliance (i.e., 
SOX, IFRS and the Dutch corporate governance 
code). 
 
13 (66.7%) 
 
 
7 (87.5%) 
 
2 
Increasing influence of (activist) shareholders and 
more espousal and implementation of a shareholder 
value orientation. 
 
11 (50.0%) 
 
 
4 (50.0%) 
 
 
3 
Corporate governance scandals (i.e. Enron, Parmalat, 
WorldCom and Ahold). 
 
7 (31.8%) 
 
2 (25.0%) 
 
4 
Increasing convergence of one-tier and two-tier 
boards. 
 
6 (27.3%) 
 
2 (25.0%) 
 
5 
Increasing media attention for the functioning of 
supervisory boards and societal claims for heightened 
levels of transparency. 
 
5 (22.7%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
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4.5.2 Key Implications for the Role of Supervisory Board Chairmen (1997-2007) 
Interviewees were asked to reflect on the implications of the changes for the 
functioning of supervisory board chairmen. Table 4.3 provides an overview of the 
most mentioned implications. First, a majority of the directors mention that super-
visory board chairmen are more in a leadership role and more visible than in the past, 
while their responsibilities have broadened (implication 1). More specifically, 44% of 
the directors emphasize that the amount of board control has significantly increased 
and that the level of discretion of executives has become more limited (implication 3). 
Two supervisory board chairmen exemplified this development as follows: “Today’s 
supervisory board chairman keeps the CEO more on his toes” and “In today’s world, 
supervisory board members are supervisors rather than sparring partners”. 
Simultaneously, 27% of the board chairmen mentioned that they have become more 
and earlier involved in strategic decision-making (implication 5). Moreover, 18% of 
the chairmen stated that they communicate more with shareholders and other 
stakeholders (implication 6). For instance, one supervisory board chairman remarked 
that in particular, “there are more contacts between the chairman and institutional 
investors. I am definitely more exposed than in the past”. Supervisory board chairmen 
report that they are struggling with new role expectations as these seem to be in 
conflict with independent board control. Two supervisory board chairmen observed 
that “capital markets expect more from the supervisory board chairman than usual in 
the two-tier system” and put forward that “supervisory board directors should not be 
afraid to step into the shoes of the CEO if necessary”. 
 The changing governance context in the Netherlands is affecting the working 
style of the supervisory board chairman as well. A majority of the interviewees (63%) 
observe that the workload of supervisory board chairmen has significantly increased 
(implication 2). Particularly, interviewees mention that the relationship between the 
chairman and CEO has intensified. A chairman phrases the potential benefit of more 
involvement as follows: “A one-tier supervisory directorship takes more time. But 
then you will be present when all important decisions are made”. Furthermore, 23% 
of the directors remarked that the changing context has led to a better understanding of 
their own role requirements and the need for more board and personal accountability 
(implication 4). One chairman put it as follows: “Self-evaluation was a bit of a joke 
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when I first put it on the agenda. Today, however, it has become a regular annual item 
on the board agenda”. Furthermore, 18% of the supervisory board chairmen also 
witness a more cautious, pro-active and formal working style as a result of the 
increasing liabilities (implication 7). Finally, 10% of the interviewees mention that the 
relationship of the chairman with the second management echelon has intensified and 
chairmen do not focus solely on the management board anymore (implication 8).  
 
Table 4.3: The Implications for the Supervisory Board Chairman (1997-2007) 
 Key Changes Role  
Supervisory Board Chairmen 
Perceptions 
Chairmen (n=22) 
Perceptions 
CEOs (n=8) 
 
1 
The supervisory board chairman has become more 
visible to society; more in a leadership role than in 
the past. 
 
19 (86.4%) 
 
4 (50.0%) 
 
2 
The workload of the supervisory board chairman 
has increased significantly; more intensive 
relationship with the CEO. 
 
16 (72.7%) 
 
 
3 (37.5%) 
 
3 
Stronger focus on board control and monitoring; 
less room for intuition and chairman as a sparring 
partner/trusted advisor. 
 
8 (36.4%) 
 
 
5 (62.5%) 
 
 
4 Better understanding of role expectations, involved risks and need for board/personal accountability.  
 
6 (27.2%) 
 
1 (12.5%) 
 
5 More and earlier involvement in key strategic decision making processes. 
 
6 (27.2%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
6 More intensive communication with shareholder groups and other stakeholders 
 
6 (27.2%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
7 
Working style has become more cautious, formal 
and pro-active; as reputation risks have increased 
significantly. 
 
4 (18.2%) 
 
 
1 (12.5%) 
 
 
8 Increased attention for the second echelon; next to attention for the management board. 
 
3 (13.6%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
 Although supervisory board chairmen observe the benefits of the increased 
level and scope of their involvement, they are outspoken on potential disadvantages as 
well. For instance, fifty per cent of the supervisory board chairmen consider laws and 
regulations as an obstacle that may lead to risk-avoiding behavior: “I observe that 
increasingly responsibilities are put on the plate of supervisors; I observe that 
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supervisors increasingly consult lawyers for legal advice”, ”SOX is a disaster and the 
Dutch corporate governance code relies too much on the UK Combined Code” and 
“the focus on legal responsibilities is too strong; governing is no longer self-evident”. 
The remaining fifty per cent and most CEOs consider regulations to be a useful 
guideline for the improvement of corporate governance. Furthermore, directors 
mentioned that the intensified relationship between CEOs and chairmen “is based on a 
delicate balance” and that “there is of course a risk that matters will be dealt with 
between the CEO and the supervisory board chairman too much on a bilateral basis”. 
One chairman summarized the impact of the increased challenges and tensions as 
follows: “The best way to throw a magnificent career away is to become chairman of 
a supervisory board”. To conclude, it is noteworthy that CEOs and chairmen seem to 
hint at different key implications. While CEOs emphasize the stronger focus on board 
control and more limited space for sparring with board chairmen, chairmen emphasize 
their increasing involvement in multiple areas, the increasing work load and the 
professionalization of the supervisory board as a key organizational body. 
 
4.5.3 The Structural Position of Supervisory Board Chairmen (1997-2005) 
As discussed in the previous two paragraphs, both CEOs and supervisory board 
chairmen have witnessed significant changes in the Dutch corporate governance 
context that have had a profound impact on the role of the supervisory board 
chairmen. This raises the question as to how the structural position of board chairmen 
(such as demographics, network position, board activities, remuneration and turnover) 
has changed in the light of the environmental developments. Table 4.4 provides an 
overview of the evolving structural position of board chairmen. As shown, the 
demographics of supervisory board chairmen have, in fact, not significantly changed: 
a supervisory board chairman is typically around 65 years old, has a tenure of some 9 
years on the board, is male and is likely to have Dutch nationality. However, the 
network position of supervisory board chairmen has changed significantly: while 
chairmen on average held 1.94 other supervisory board positions in 1997, this number 
decreased to 1.10 in 2005 (-43%). Similarly, the average number of additional 
supervisory board chairmanships decreased from 0.58 in 1997 to 0.38 in 2005 (-35%).  
 At the organizational level, several structural changes are visible. First, the 
number of board activities in which board chairmen are involved has significantly 
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changed over time: the number of board meetings has increased from 6.5 a year in 
1997 to 8.3 a year in 2005 (+27%) and the number of board committees of the board 
has increased from 0.7 in 1997 to 2.0 in 2005 (+193%). The increasing workload is 
reflected in the remuneration policies of companies as the average cash salary of board 
chairmen has increased from €25,400 in 1997 to €56,000 in 2005 (+82%; inflation-
adjusted). Simultaneously, the average level of turnover among supervisory board 
chairmen increased significantly: while 6 supervisory board chairmen were replaced in 
1997, 18 board chairmen left their company in 2005 (+200%) in the top 100 listed 
corporations. In sum, the empirical results suggest that while the ongoing develop-
ments in the Dutch corporate governance context have coincided with increased levels 
of cash payment, more turnover and less additional supervisory board positions, board 
chairmen demographics, such as their age, tenure, gender and nationality, remained 
quite stable during our observation horizon. 
 
Table 4.4: The Structural Position of the Supervisory Board Chairman (1997-2005) 
Chairman’s demographics 1997 2001 2005 % change 
Average Age (years) 63.95 64.02 65.60 +2.6% (p=.145) 
Average Tenure (years) 9.84 9.68 9.03 -8.2% (p=.246) 
Gender (% male) 99% 100% 100% +1.0% (p=.320) 
Nationality (% Dutch) 96% 92% 94% -2.1% (p=.312) 
Chairman’s network     
Number of other supervisory 
board positions at top-100 listed 
firms 
 
1.94 
 
1.45 
 
1.10 
 
-43.4%* (p=.000) 
Number of other chairmanships 
at top-100 listed firms 
 
0.58 
 
0.44 
 
0.38 
 
-34.5%* (p=.002) 
Chairman’s board activities     
Number of board meetings 6.51 7.50 8.27 + 27.0%* (p=.000) 
Number of board committees 0.67 1.04 1.96 +192.5%* (p=.000) 
Miscellaneous     
Average amount of cash 
remuneration 
 
€25.350 
 
€34.580 
 
€56.000 
 
+120.9%*A (p=.001) 
Average level of turnover (%) 6% 12% 18% +200.0%* (p=.000) 
* T-test shows that the difference is statistically significant (p<.05; two-tailed; n=100). 
A Inflation-corrected % change in cash remuneration = 81.9%*. 
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Over the last decade, the corporate governance context in most Western countries has 
been changing rapidly and intensively (e.g., Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2005; Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Generally, scholars have shown that these 
changes had a significant impact on the “checks and balances” and role of different 
stakeholders. In this paper, we have discussed the impact of institutional change on the 
role and position of the chairman on Dutch supervisory boards. A combination of 
thirty semi-structured interviews with supervisory board chairmen and CEOs, and 
archival data on the structural position of chairmen within the top-100 listed firms in 
the Netherlands, revealed that their role has been in transition during the period 1997-
2007. Triggered by more regulation, greater influence of (activist) shareholders, 
corporate governance scandals and increasing convergence of the one-tier and two-tier 
board models, supervisory board chairmen have become more involved in their 
control and service roles. Interestingly, the opinions regarding the desirability of the 
evolving role of board chairmen varied widely within our sample. This development 
has also coincided with an increased workload (more board committees and meetings) 
resulting in fewer other board positions (interlocks), more cash remuneration and 
higher levels of chairman turnover during our observation window. At the same time, 
the demographic profile of chairmen has remained unaltered during the last decade. 
 The changing level and scope of the involvement of supervisory board 
chairmen has three major implications. First, greater societal expectations pose new 
challenges to board chairmen as they operate beyond their traditional roles and legal 
requirements in the two-tier model. In particular, supervisory board chairmen are 
increasingly challenged to combine the seemingly conflicting demands of control 
(such as independence, distance, focus on the prevention of managerial opportunism) 
and service (i.e., interdependence, closeness, focus on value creation) in their role 
fulfillment (cf. Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Van Hamel 
et al., 1998). However, Dutch corporate law does not provide clear guidance on this 
matter. As a consequence, supervisory board chairmen increasingly operate in a grey 
area in which their independent non-executive position is at stake. The tensions 
between the new expectations of chairmen and the regulatory context manifest 
themselves especially in the ongoing national debate whether or not to employ the 
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one-tier board model as a legal alternative to the two-tier board model in the 
Netherlands.  
 Second, the combination of increased workloads and liabilities for supervisory 
board chairmen is putting more pressure on supervisory board chairmen and the pool 
of willing and qualified future candidates. While the unchanged demographics suggest 
that firms are still searching for supervisory board chairman with the same background 
and demographic profile, the developments may provide opportunities for executive 
search firms. Their services may become more valuable as it may be more difficult for 
corporations to find qualified candidates who are able to perform multiple roles. The 
need for such firms to provide aid in educating and evaluating supervisory board 
chairmen may increase as well. In this context, it can be expected that the market for 
directors will lead to a professionalization of the function of the board chairman (Peij, 
2005; Schilling, 2001).  
 Third, while the growing involvement of the supervisory board chairman may 
have a positive impact on the functioning of the board of directors and corporate 
performance, this development may also have negative consequences. The emphasis 
on board control, compliance, and shareholder value may result in more risk-averse 
behavior, more focus on short term efficiency and less a focus on innovation, R&D 
and strategic renewal (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). 
Furthermore, the decreasing network connectivity of supervisory board chairmen may 
limit the number of learning opportunities for firms. Both social network theory and 
resource dependency theory have emphasized that board ties are an important learning 
vehicle through which firms can tap into the knowledge base of interlocking partners 
(cf. Boyd, 1990; Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal et al., 2001) and are useful devices to co-
opt resources from the environment on which corporations are dependent (cf. 
Mizruchi, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Board chairmen and regulatory bodies 
should be aware of these positive and negative consequences of the contemporary 
corporate governance developments and should take them into account in their role 
fulfillment. 
 
The study has several limitations, but also provides avenues for future research. First, 
this study has treated all supervisory board chairmanships similarly in order to 
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establish a general trend. However, the changing role of the supervisory board 
chairman may be contingent on the specifics of a firm’s internal and external context. 
For example, future studies could investigate how a firm’s size, ownership structure 
(family versus dispersed ownership), network structure (peripheral versus central 
network position) and international exposure affect the extent to which the role of the 
supervisory board chairman has changed as a result of national and international 
corporate governance developments. Furthermore, in line with our choice for the 
individual as the unit of analysis, the evolving role of the board chairman might be 
contingent on a chairman’s background, i.e., his/her status, professional training and 
experience.  
 Second, the study has remained silent on the impact of the changing role of 
the board chairman on board processes, boards’ task performance and corporate 
performance (Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse, 2005; 2007; Pugliese et al., 2009). Ideally, 
future research could examine these issues by taking a longitudinal and multi-level 
approach, i.e., an in-depth investigation of the individual and group behavior of 
directors during an extensive time period.  
 Third, the evolving role of the supervisory board chairman may be contingent 
on the Dutch context. Future research studies could examine to which extent the 
similar developments are observable in other countries with a two-tier board model 
(for instance, Austria and Germany) and in countries with mixed board models (for 
instance, Denmark, France, Italy and Macedonia). The growing popularity and use of 
‘lead directors’ on one-tier boards suggest that the observed trend may actually be part 
of a two-way convergence of board models.  
 Fourth, given the exploratory nature and relatively limited number of study 
participants, a total of thirty board members were selected through convenience 
sampling, our empirical findings should be interpreted with care. Future research at a 
larger scale is necessary to confirm the observed developments. 
 
Our study has shown that the role of the supervisory board chairman is undergoing 
significant changes in the Netherlands. The changing role expectations pose new 
challenges and provide new opportunities for managers and supervisory board 
members, shareholders, regulators and executive search firms. In particular, regulators 
 81 
are being confronted with shareholder and societal expectations that go beyond the 
legal possibilities that exist in the two-tier board model. And last but not least, 
supervisory board chairmen are facing the challenge to manage the increasing 
complexity and conflicting stakeholder expectations. The future will show how 
supervisory board chairmen will cope with these tensions and to what extent their role 
will converge to that of the “one tier board chairman”. 
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Chapter 5: Assessing Corporate Responses to Changing Board Network 
Expectations in the Netherlands: An Institutional Theory Perspective5 
 
 
Abstract 
While scholars often emphasize a positive relationship between board ties and corpo-
rate performance, financial market regulators are increasingly being concerned that 
board ties create a social insular elite network in which members are loyal towards 
each other and not necessarily seek to maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, corpo-
rate governance reform initiatives seek to limit board connectivity among listed firms. 
However, little is known about how listed corporations cope with societal expectations 
to reform their board networks. We adopt an institutional theory perspective to exa-
mine the extent to which companies have broken board ties. Using longitudinal data 
on 75 top-100 listed corporations in the Netherlands from 2001 to 2005, we find that 
firms with large board networks have been affected most. Meanwhile, the largest and 
most prestigious firms have become structurally disconnected from the rest. More-
over, we observe that companies with exposure to international financial markets and 
participation in board reform initiatives partially nullified the perceived negative 
influence of market regulation. In conclusion, our study indicates the need for studies 
that go beyond mere compliance, i.e., research that unravels the complex processes 
associated with firm responses to board reforms and changing governance expectations.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Scholars and practitioners have discussed the benefits and disadvantages of corporate 
board networks to a great extent (e.g. Daily et al., 2003; Huse, 2007; Mizruchi, 1996). 
Proponents of resource dependency theory have emphasized that board ties are valu-
able tools to obtain access to resources on which corporations depend. Prior studies 
suggest that companies indeed use board connections to secure access to financial 
resources and expertise (Pfeffer, 1972) and that corporate board structures are adjusted 
to cope with environmental turbulence (cf. Boyd, 1990; Hillman et al., 2000). Others 
                                                 
5 Paper by Bezemer. P., Maassen, G.F., Van den Bosch, F.A.J. and Volberda, H.W. Earlier 
versions of this paper have been presented at the Norefjell Workshop (2008) and EURAM 
Conference (2008). 
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have pointed to the opportunities board ties offer to tap into the knowledge base of 
network partners. For instance, past evidence suggests that network ties influence the 
merger and acquisition activities (Haunschild, 1993) and strategic renewal behavior of 
companies (Westphal et al., 2001).  
 Nonetheless, recent institutional developments and financial market reform 
seem to turn connections at the board level into serious liabilities for corporations 
while it used to be common practice for non-executive directors to serve on numerous 
boards. Thereby, they constituted an elite network in which non-executive directors 
were loyal towards each other and social distancing was used as control mechanism 
(Westphal & Khanna, 2003). However, over the last years, board networks of 
companies have increasingly been scrutinized by the public and policy makers 
(Heemskerk, 2007). Well-known corporate governance scandals (i.e., WorldCom, 
Enron, Parmalat and Ahold) have changed the opinion and expectations of the public. 
The media have paid more attention to corporate governance issues and renowned 
non-executive directors’ have been accused of acting as rubber stamps. Numerous 
corporate governance reforms have attempted to strengthen the control task and 
independence of non-executive directors internationally and nationally (Daily et al., 
2003; Enrione et al., 2006; Sheridan et al., 2006). For instance, the German Cromme 
Code (2002), the English Combined Code (2002) and the Dutch Tabaksblat Code 
(2003) have provisions aimed at limiting the number of positions a non-executive 
director may have on boards of directors of listed corporations and limiting the 
presence of non-executive directors who had a business relationship with the 
corporation prior to their appointment. 
In the Dutch financial market, both scholars and policy makers have generally 
observed that corporations comply with these provisions in the latest corporate 
governance code (Akkermans et al., 2007; Monitoring Commission, 2006) and as a 
result a decline of the Dutch corporate board network is noticeable (Bezemer et al., 
2007; Heemskerk, 2007). However, it remains a puzzle why certain corporations have 
been affected more strongly by the changing institutional environment than others, and 
what strategies firms have employed to counterbalance the influence of institutional 
pressure to reform their board networks. By addressing these two questions, this paper 
makes three contributions. First, in line with institutional theory, we explore whether 
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larger listed companies have been affected more strongly by the boardroom reform 
efforts than smaller firms due to their higher visibility and closer monitoring by the 
public. Second, we investigate whether corporations with foreign listings and with ties 
to regulatory bodies are better positioned to nullify pressures to reform their corporate 
board networks than less connected and nationally oriented companies. Third, by 
conducting our empirical study in a traditional two-tier board context in the 
Netherlands, we provide a more thorough understanding of the role of board networks 
in this setting. 
The study is structured as follows: Section one provides a short description of 
the Dutch corporate governance context, i.e. the two-tier board system, corporate 
governance reforms and changing societal expectations with regard to corporate board 
networks. In section two we use the institutional theory to develop three working 
hypotheses. The first one addresses the impact of changing societal expectations and 
the societal visibility of firms on corporate board networks. The last two address how 
exposure to international financial markets and ties with regulatory bodies may assist 
firms to reduce the impact of regulatory reform. Section three of the paper provides an 
overview of our methodology, sample and measures. Section four portrays the 
evolution of board networks of 75 top-100 listed companies at the Euronext in 
Amsterdam between 2001 and 2005, and we test our three working hypotheses 
statistically. Section five concludes with a discussion of our key findings and their 
implications for corporate governance scholars and practitioners. 
 
5.2 The Dutch Corporate Governance Landscape: Board Networks  
The Netherlands is a welfare state with a long political tradition of balancing the 
interests of societal groups. Key national issues, such as wage negotiations and labor 
relations, the protection of the environment and racial tensions, are solved through 
institutionalized collective bargaining between the government, businesses, unions and 
non-governmental organizations. Dutch company law explicitly defines listed 
corporations as legal entities which must take into account the rights and preferences 
of stakeholders affected by the corporation. This institutionalized stakeholder approach 
is supported by the Dutch two-tier board system with its independent supervisory 
board. Under Dutch company law, the supervisory board has the duty to supervise and 
advice the management board while acting in the best interests of the company and all 
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the company’s stakeholders (cf. Akkermans et al., 2007; Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, 
2004; Maassen, 1999; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). 
 Traditionally, two intertwined groups of actors have been very influential in 
the Dutch corporate governance context. First, the top-three Dutch banks (ABN Amro, 
ING and Fortis) used to possess large ownership stakes of top-100 listed firms and 
occupied a central position in corporate board networks (Heemskerk, 2007). For 
instance, ABN Amro and ING maintained respectively 34 and 18 supervisory board 
ties with other top-100 listed corporations in the Netherlands in 1997. Second, an elite 
group of directors (referred to as the ‘old-boys network’) occupied the central positions 
in the corporate board networks. In 1997, more than ten percent of the supervisory 
board positions of top-100 listed firms in the Netherlands were occupied by thirteen 
individuals (Spencer Stuart, 1997). Elite membership was often associated with highly 
prestigious functions in interest groups, such as the employers’ organization (VNO-
NCW) and ‘society of friends of the Concertgebouw’, and membership of exclusive 
dining clubs, such as ‘De Pijp’ and ‘De Schoorsteen’. 
 In the wake of corporate governance scandals, the institutional context has 
changed in the Netherlands. The Dutch media and public policy makers have become 
critical of the role of corporate elite networks and societal debate has altered national 
beliefs about corporate board networks over the last five years (Bezemer et al., 2007; 
Van Hezewijk & Peij, 2006). Critics have pointed to the fact that the centralization of 
power in the hands of a small group of elite members could create a social insular 
system in which board members are loyal to each other only, protect their mutual self 
interests and prevent the inflow of new talent. Furthermore, the presence and involve-
ment of board members affiliated with Dutch banks might give rise to conflicts of 
interests and jeopardize the independence of boards of directors. Therefore, the latest 
Dutch corporate governance code, the Tabaksblat Code (2003), has attempted to break 
open the old boys network (De Monchy & Legein, 2004). The Tabaksblat Code intro-
duced a limitation of the total number of positions a supervisory board member may 
have on boards of other listed corporations: a maximum of five board positions; chair 
positions count as two positions. Furthermore, the Tabaksblat Code limits the presence 
of representatives of financial institutions on boards of directors if both firms have a 
business relationship.   
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 Although the Tabaksblat Code is based on soft law (comply or explain 
principle), the development and introduction of the code highlights key societal issues 
and may have influenced corporate board networks. As the code provisions signal to 
corporate boards how they may enhance their legitimacy in the wake of corporate 
governance scandals and media criticism (Dacin, 1997; Ocassio, 1999; Oliver, 1997). 
Given the fierceness of the Dutch contemporary corporate governance debate, it can 
be expected that listed companies have been sensitive to changing board network 
expectations and have reduced the size of their corporate board networks. Tentatively, 
prior empirical studies provide support for the presence of this trend in the Dutch 
context (Bezemer et al., 2007; Heemskerk, 2007; Van Hezewijk & Peij, 2006). In the 
remainder of this paper, we adopt an institutional theory perspective to investigate the 
drivers behind broken board ties in the time period surrounding the development and 
introduction of the Tabaksblat Code (2001-2005), and to investigate whether listed 
firms have tools at their disposal to mitigate the perceived negative effects of market 
regulation and changing governance expectations. 
 
5.3 Board Networks and Institutional Theory  
Institutional theory examines at multiple levels how values, norms and beliefs 
constitute reality and influence practice. At the corporate level, scholars have 
examined how societal values, norms and beliefs constrain and enable corporate 
practices (D’Aunno et al., 1991; Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). According 
to its proponents, firms pursue close alignment with societal expectations, because this 
enhances organizations’ legitimacy: their license to operate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1997; Vermeulen et al., 2007). Among others, one of the key benefits of 
legitimacy is that it fosters societal support: it enables companies to acquire resources 
at more favorable terms (Deephouse, 1999), it helps corporations to circumvent legal 
charges, it reduces exposure to liabilities and it opens up opportunities for firms to 
cooperate with other prestigious corporations (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). 
 
5.3.1 Pressures for Change 
Scholars have noted that the perceived amount of institutional pressure differs among 
firms (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In particular, large 
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companies might be more vulnerable to institutional pressures, because of their 
prominent role in society and because they are more closely monitored by a variety of 
stakeholders, media and the public. Large listed corporations are often expected to be 
frontrunners in the development and implementation of best practices. As a result, the 
risks and related costs associated with nonconformance with institutional values, 
norms and beliefs, significantly increase with organizational size (Finkelstein & Boyd, 
1998; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Thus, regarding changing societal beliefs about 
the appropriate design of board networks, larger corporations should display greater 
response to corporate board reform initiatives than smaller firms. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Due to their higher visibility and exemplary roles in society, 
larger listed firms are more likely to respond to national institutional pressures 
to reform their board networks than smaller listed firms. 
 
5.3.2 Corporate Tools to Counterbalance Pressures for Change 
Recent studies on institutional entrepreneurship reveal that companies are not 
necessarily guided by prevailing norms and beliefs. Moreover, scholars have started to 
examine how firms in turn enact changes in institutional templates (Dacin et al., 2002; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002). For example, studies suggest that 
firms initiate self regulatory reforms as protection against competition and as a means 
to obtain preferred access to key resources (D’Aunno et al., 2000; Edelman & 
Suchman, 1997). In this study, we examine in the context of corporate board ties how 
exposure to international financial markets and the participation in regulatory initia-
tives might give companies a competitive advantage. 
 Exposure to international financial markets might enable corporations to 
mitigate national institutional pressures in two ways. First, scholars have argued that 
firms become less vulnerable to field-level institutional pressures (i.e., national 
governance expectations) when corporations operate beyond the boundaries of a field, 
i.e., in multiple international markets (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 
2002), because corporate nonconformance with national institutional values, norms 
and beliefs can be legitimately explained by referring to best practices elsewhere. 
Second, awareness of international corporate governance developments and expec-
tations might provide companies with a more profound understanding and anticipation 
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of the drivers and impact of new board regulations, enabling corporations to design 
their board network in advance. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Listed firms with exposure to international financial markets 
exposure are less likely to respond to national institutional pressures to reform 
their board networks than those without exposure to international financial 
markets. 
  
 Furthermore, the participation of a board member in a committee responsible 
for the drafting of board reform initiatives might provide companies with 
opportunities to nullify national institutional pressures for three reasons. First, 
companies’ directors may influence new regulation and advance their own corporate 
best practices, i.e., recommend regulations that will challenge competitors while their 
firms already comply with these regulations (D’Aunno et al., 2000; Edelman & 
Suchman, 1997). Second, the mere involvement in board reform committees may 
already signal to society that a company takes its responsibilities seriously, i.e., 
thereby being a substitute for actions aimed at the disintegration of board networks. 
Third, companies involved in regulatory reform may be more able to assess the 
intensity of institutional pressures and the consequences of nonconformance for the 
legitimacy of firms. Therefore, they may respond less strongly than corporations that 
are not able to assess properly when their responsive actions will be sufficient.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Listed corporations with ties to regulatory bodies are less likely 
to react to institutional pressure to reform their board network than firms which 
are not tied to reform bodies. 
 
5.4 Methods and Sample 
The empirical research focuses on board networks of the top-100 listed corporations at 
the Euronext Stock Exchange in Amsterdam between 2001 and 2005. The top-100 
listed companies for each year were selected based on their average market capita-
lization. Given several new entrants and delistings during our observation window, we 
decided to focus on the 75 corporations that were part of the top-100 lists for each 
year. Data was collected for two years prior and two years after the introduction of the 
Tabaksblat Code (2003). This approach enables us to control for corporations that 
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have anticipated board reform provisions in the Tabaksblat Code and to take into 
account corporations’ response time to the code. Corporate board network data were 
obtained from multiple sources to make sure that our data were accurate and complete. 
We used the Spencer Stuart Netherlands Board Indexes, annual reports, and the 
BoardEx, Reach and Worldscope databases. Overall, this resulted in a database cove-
ring network developments of 75 firms over a five year period. 
 
5.4.1 Dependent Variables 
To portray developments in the board network of listed corporations in the 
Netherlands, we use the following two indicators: (1) the number of lost board ties of 
a focal company with other top-100 companies and (2) the number of lost board ties of 
a focal company with the top-3 listed banks (ABN Amro, ING and Fortis). Both 
measures were calculated by subtracting the number of board ties (with banks) in 2005 
from the number of board ties (with banks) in 2001. International board ties were not 
included in our study, because societal debate has focused solely on national elite 
networks. Moreover, the number of international board ties remained approximately 
the same during our observation horizon: from 4.24 international ties in 2001 to 4.10 
international ties in 2005 (t=.13; p>.10). 
 
5.4.2 Independent Variables 
To examine our working hypotheses, we created the following three additional 
variables: societal visibility, international financial market exposure and participation 
in regulatory bodies. As societal visibility is closely linked to organizational size, our 
measure is based on the classification used by the Euronext Stock Exchange: AEX 
traded companies have the largest market capitalization and market turnover 
(approximately the top-25), AMX traded companies are the runner-ups (approxi-
mately the remaining part of the top-50) and other indices (AscX and “other corpo-
rations as they are known at the Euronext) include corporations with a relatively small 
market capitalization and market turnover. We coded all corporations for each year 
(i.e. AEX=3, AMX=2 and other=1) and used the weighted average over our five year 
window as our measure. International market exposure was operationalized using a 
dummy variable capturing the presence of a secondary listing at a leading international 
stock exchange (i.e. London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ and NYSE) in one of the 
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years of our observation window. Finally, participation in regulatory bodies was 
operationalized by a count variable indicating the number of board reform initiatives 
in which a board member(s) of a focal corporation participated. In the Dutch context, 
two corporate governance initiatives have been important: the Peters’ Committee 
(1997) which came up with 40 best practice provisions, and the Tabaksblat Committee 
(2003) which developed and implemented the first Dutch corporate governance code 
(Akkermans et al., 2007; Bezemer et al., 2007). Given the fact that both committees 
have expressed concerns about the role of elite networks, we used the participation in 
either one or both reforms. 
 
5.4.3 Control Variables 
By including various additional variables, we controlled for possible confounding 
effects. First, as the code provisions apply to corporations with an extended board 
network only, we controlled for the initial size of the corporate board network by 
including three count variables: a) the number of board ties with top-100 listed 
corporations, b) the number of board ties with the top-3 listed banks (ABN Amro, ING 
and Fortis), and c) the number of international board ties. Second, resource 
dependency theory suggests that the amount of debt determines the extent to which 
firms will establish board ties with banks (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Therefore, we included the log of the average amount of debt of firms during the 
period 2001-2005. Third, extensive experience with corporate governance mechanisms 
and practices might make companies more resistant to change. We included organi-
zational age, i.e., the number of years passed after founding, to control for this effect. 
 
5.5 Empirical Findings 
As noted earlier, the Dutch media, public and policy makers have recently become 
more critical about corporate board networks. In particular, the Tabaksblat Code (2003) 
has attempted to break open the old-boys network with several limitations on board 
connectivity. From an institutional theory perspective, we expected that listed firms 
would be sensitive to changing institutions and would realign their corporate board 
networks with emerging societal expectations. A first indicator that listed corporations 
have indeed changed their board networks is the significant increase in the level of 
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supervisory board turnover after the introduction of the Tabaksblat Code (2003): from 
8.3% of the non-executives leaving the supervisory board in 2001 to 13.0% in 2003 
and 2005. Moreover, Table 5.1 provides an overview of developments with regard to 
the Dutch corporate board network and presents descriptive statistics for ally study 
variables. As shown, the average number of board ties with other top-100 listed 
companies decreased during our observation window: on average with 1.53 ties per 
company (-21.4%). Likewise, the average number of board connections with the top-3 
listed banks significantly decreased: on average with 0.55 ties per company (-38.2%). 
Overall, this indicates that companies have been reforming their board network during 
the period surrounding the Tabaksblat Code, in line with institutional theory. 
 To test our hypotheses regarding antecedents of broken board ties, a series of 
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted. The first five models examine all bro-
ken ties (see Table 5.2), while the next five models investigate broken ties with the top-
3 banks (see Table 5.3). To examine the issue of multicollinearity, we calculated vari-
ance inflation factors (VIF) for each of the models. The maximum VIF was not higher 
than 3.0 in any model, which is well below the rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10.  
 
5.5.1 Societal Visibility and Broken Board Ties 
Scholars have emphasized that the amount of perceived institutional pressure depends 
on the societal visibility of corporations. As larger corporations are more visible and 
more closely monitored by society, these companies are expected to have stronger 
incentives to conform to prevailing expectations and norms (hypothesis 1). Tables 5.2 
and 5.3 reveal that our first hypothesis is not supported. Contrary, less visible, smaller 
corporations have responded more strongly to institutional pressures to break board 
ties with other top-100 firms and banks (p<.05). Interestingly, a closer examination 
reveals that this effect can be explained by the fact that the most prestigious and 
largest corporations (AEX firms) have broken board connections with less prestigious 
corporations (AMX, AscX and other companies), while they retained their collective 
ties (see Table 5.4). This suggests that the corporate board networks among the most 
heavily interlocked companies have been maintained despite the board reform efforts 
in the Netherlands, while the interconnectivity with lower tier corporations has been 
reduced as a result of the development and introduction of the Tabaksblat Code (2003). 
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However, it is important to note, that in absolute terms, companies with larger board 
networks prior to the introduction of the Code have more broken ties (p<.001). 
 
Table 5.4: Broken Board Ties Ordered by Company Size 
* T-tests show that the difference is statistically significant (p<.05; two-tailed).  
 
 Similarly, less visible, smaller firms have responded more strongly to institu-
tional pressures to break board ties with the top-3 banks (p<.05). While the largest 
corporations (AEX firms) did not react at all to code’s provisions aimed at limiting the 
presences of board members affiliated with the three Dutch banks (+2.9%), medium-
sized and smaller listed companies lost respectively 81.4% and 67.5% of their board 
ties with ABN Amro, ING and Fortis. One explanation of this result may be that the 
benefits of board ties with top-3 banks (i.e. access to up-to-date financial information 
and resources), may outweigh the costs associated with nonconformance (i.e., loss of 
legitimacy if a firm does business with this bank) when firms become larger and have 
access to international capital markets. The negative impact of the number of inter-
national board ties (p<.05) tentatively supports this view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
2005 
% change 
2001-2005 
Board ties – AEX firms with other AEX firms 5.24 5.13 -2.01% 
Board ties – AEX firms with AMX firms 2.62 1.35 -48.5%* 
Board ties – AEX firms with AScX and other firms 3.57 2.17 -39.2%* 
    
Board ties – AMX firms with AEX firms 3.38 1.63 -51.8%* 
Board ties – AMX firms with other AMX firms 2.00 1.53 -23.5% 
Board ties – AMX firms with AScX and other firms 2.31 2.21 -4.3% 
    
Board ties – AScX firms with AEX firms 1.13 0.88 -22.1% 
Board ties – AScX firms with AMX firms 0.58 0.97 +67.2% 
Board ties – AScX firms with other AScX and other firms 2.84 1.79 -37.0%* 
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5.5.2. International Financial Market Exposure and Broken Board Ties 
As argued, one way to nullify national pressures to reform corporate board networks is 
having a presence at leading international financial markets (hypothesis 2) as this may 
provide corporations timely insights in the spread of new corporate governance best 
practices. Moreover, their nonconformance with national norms can be explained by 
referring to best practices abroad. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 reveal that our second hypothesis 
is partially supported. Corporations without international financial market exposure 
display stronger institutional responses, i.e. the have more broken board ties with other 
top-100 corporations (p<.05). Contrary, the number of broken board ties with the top-
3 listed banks was unaffected by international financial market exposure (p>.05). 
Overall, this indicates that international financial market exposure assists corporations 
in certain areas in dampening the impact of national institutional forces. 
 
5.5.3. Participation in Regulatory Bodies and Broken Board Ties 
Another way to counteract national pressure to reform board networks is to stimulate 
the participation of a board member in a corporate governance committee responsible 
for the development and implementation of board reforms (hypothesis 3). Because 
participation signals to society that a company takes it responsibilities seriously, it 
offers opportunities to influence the new institutional regime, and it provides useful 
insights in the intentions behind provisions. As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, we find 
partial support that firms with ties to regulatory bodies have been disintegrating their 
board networks to a lesser extent, i.e., generally the have less broken ties with other 
top-100 corporations (p<.05). On the contrary, they have more broken ties with the top-
3 banks also (p<.05). An explanation might be that companies with participating board 
members in regulatory bodies have been particularly sensitive to specifics of board 
independence provisions and their exemplary role, and have responded more strongly. 
Thus, participation in regulatory bodies proved a useful tool to prevent disintegration 
in certain areas, while being a disadvantage in others. 
 
5.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
Over the last years, public policy makers, media and the public have become 
concerned about the presence and influence of corporate board networks. In the wake 
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of corporate governance scandals, worldwide corporate governance reform initiatives 
have introduced provisions aimed at limiting connections between boards of listed 
companies. Drawing upon institutional theory, we developed a framework to examine 
the responses of listed firms on changing societal expectations and beliefs about the 
appropriate design of board networks. We hypothesized that institutional responses of 
corporations would depend on company characteristics and entrepreneurial attitude, 
i.e. societal visibility, international financial market exposure and participation in 
regulatory bodies. Archival data on 75 top-100 listed corporations in the Netherlands 
from 2001 to 2005 reveal that the structure of the Dutch corporate network has been 
altered as a result of board reform initiatives and the changing institutional context. 
Our main observations are the following: 
 
x The number of board ties with top-100 listed corporations (-21%) and the number 
of board ties with top-3 banks (-38%) have significantly decreased during the 
period surrounding the implementation and introduction of the Tabaksblat Code 
(2003).  
x Corporations with larger board networks have been affected more heavily by natio-
nal pressure to reform their board network. 
x Larger and more visible companies have been relatively successful in maintaining 
their central board network position by reducing their interconnectivity with lower 
tier companies. As a result the Dutch board network has become more structurally 
stratified. 
x Corporations with international market exposure and ties with regulatory bodies 
have been able to partially counteract national pressure to reform board networks. 
 
5.6.1 Implications 
The changing structure of the Dutch board network has three important implications 
for companies and public policy makers. First, while board network provisions in the 
Tabaksblat Code (2003) appear to be successful in terms of disintegrating the overall 
corporate board network, negative side effects exits for medium-sized and smaller 
firms. Our results indicate that the top-3 banks in particular have broken board ties 
with medium-sized and smaller companies. Moreover, the largest and most prestigious 
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companies have become disconnected through diminishing board ties with medium-
sized and smaller listed companies. Policy makers should take these unanticipated 
effects for smaller firms into account prior to the introduction and midterm adjustment 
of corporate governance reform initiatives. 
 Second, our study reveals that firms are not necessarily guided by corporate 
governance reform initiatives, but, instead, are able to influence institutional templates 
or to nullify their impact. Thus, it may be beneficial to conceptualize changing societal 
expectations as a strategic question and opportunity that may give a firm a competitive 
advantage. In our research setting, several (larger) corporations in the Netherlands 
have proven to be good at this game, as their foreign listings and their participation in 
key regulatory bodies buffered them against certain institutional pressure within the 
Netherlands. Thereby, our results support the recent literature on institutional entre-
preneurship. Further examination of opportunities, consequences and limitations of 
specific corporate tools with regard to institutional entrepreneurship in the context of 
corporate governance may shed light on successful strategies and actions that firms 
could deploy to maintain their status quo in a changing institutional environment or, 
even, benefit from future board reform initiatives. 
 Third, the changing structure of the corporate board network in the Nether-
lands may adversely affect the strategic and financial performance of listed companies. 
Prior studies have revealed that board ties are useful communication mechanisms that 
spread information about innovation, mergers and acquisitions, and board connections 
constitute mechanisms to manage resource dependencies (i.e., legal expertise, political 
lobbying power and financial resources) in the light of environmental turbulence (cf. 
Mizruchi, 1996). To get a first insight in the relationship between broken ties and 
financial performance, we calculated the correlations of our dependent variables with 
the ROA, ROE and EPS of firms in 2005. The number of lost board ties (all) proved to 
be negatively correlated with ROA (r=-.269; p<.05) and the number of lost board ties 
with the top-3 banks proved to be negatively correlated with ROE (r=-.268; p<.05). 
This tentatively suggests that firms should carefully manage their board connections 
and have to search for new mechanisms to secure their overall position. Furthermore, 
this finding fuels ongoing debate whether it is still beneficial to have a listing at a stock 
exchange, as non-listed companies face far less stringent corporate governance regu-
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lations. Future longitudinal research is necessary to entangle the exact chain of cau-
sality and strategic and financial consequences.  
 
5.6.2 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The study has several limitations, but provides avenues for future research also. First, 
in the study we have solely focused on formal board connections between top-100 
listed in the Netherlands. This raises the question how informal connections between 
members of the corporate elite relate to formal board connections, i.e., we have to 
examine the impact of informal meetings between board members during football 
matches, at golf courts and during diners in exclusive elite clubs. Scholars have sug-
gested that informal networks actually may be more influential and insular than formal 
networks (Ghoshal et al., 1994; Tsai, 2002). Future studies could investigate whether 
the development of these informal networks follows the same pattern as the develop-
ment of formal board networks (see for example Heemskerk, 2007) and whether the 
initiatives of the Tabaksblat Code (2003) have been successful in this respect. 
 Second, the network measures we used provide no direct evidence of the 
quality and importance of board connections. While corporations may have responded 
to societal expectations to limit their board network, they might have eliminated non-
vital board ties only, i.e., they might be symbolically complying with the provisions in 
the Tabaksblat Code without actually altering their board network practices. The per-
sistence of board ties between the 25 largest corporations (AEX corporations) tenta-
tively supports this view. Furthermore, corporations might have swapped board ties 
with top-100 corporations for board connections with large non-listed companies and 
banks, such as Rabobank, Maxeda and VolkerWessels, i.e., thereby retaining their 
board network position without violating the provisions in the Tabaksblat Code. Future 
research could assess to which extent corporations have really adopted new societal 
expectations and what the consequences are of real versus symbolic adoption. Because 
listed firms in the Netherlands are obligated to “comply or explain” their compliance 
with provisions of the Tabaksblat Code, analyzing their self-reported statements in 
annual reports might be a useful starting point. 
 Third, the described network developments might be contingent on the speci-
fics of the Dutch corporate governance context. Future cross-country research studies 
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could investigate to which extent the same patterns are observable in other countries 
with two-tier board systems (e.g., Germany and Austria), in countries with one-tier 
board systems (e.g., Great Britain and the United States) and in countries with mixed 
board systems (e.g., France). 
 
5.6.3 Concluding Remarks  
While scholars emphasize the benefits of board ties, societal attention has shifted to 
their disadvantages more recently. Although corporate governance reform initiatives 
have been successful to open corporate board networks, our findings reveal complex 
sociopolitical and institutional processes that guide companies and their board mem-
bers in maintaining and breaking corporate connections. For instance, international 
financial market exposure and participation in reform bodies support corporations in 
counterbalancing the negative of corporate governance reform initiatives, while they 
become liabilities in other areas at the same time. Furthermore, existing corporate elite 
networks associated with larger listed corporations have been relatively successful in 
maintaining their network position, while medium-sized and small listed companies 
have become more disconnected from the elite and financial institutions. Policy 
makers should take these unintended consequences into account prior to the intro-
duction of new corporate governance reform initiatives or mid-term adjustments of the 
Tabaksblat Code. 
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Chapter 6: Change from Without: The Dutch  
Response to Pressures for Shareholder Value6 
 
“There are of course competing claims about the meaning of a paradigm,  
indeed, about the meaning and significance of any body of beliefs. But none is 
correct, and which among them secures local “hegemony” is a matter of social, 
political, economic and other sorts of power”  
(Rosenberg, 2005:177) 
 
Abstract 
During the last decades, scholars and practitioners have witnessed a worldwide 
increase in the attention for the Anglo-American shareholder model. However, the 
antecedents and performance implications of a firm’s referral to this model in a 
stakeholder oriented context, are topic of societal debate. Using a sociopolitical 
perspective, we investigate how the technical and cultural preferences of major owners 
influenced a firm’s inclination to espouse a shareholder value orientation. A panel of 
top-100 listed corporations in the Netherlands from 1992 to 2006 shows that change 
has been primarily instigated from without, i.e., by major Anglo-American owners and 
financial institutions. We also find evidence that the political context in which firms 
are embedded constrains the influence of outsiders. Surprisingly, our findings indicate 
a negative relationship with performance, although this effect becomes less strong if 
companies demonstrate a visible commitment to this new logic and managers align a 
firm’s goals with the preferences of major owners. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the public corporation is topic of debate among scholars and prac-
titioners around the world (Freeman et al., 2004; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). 
Historically, coordinated market economies (e.g., Germany and Japan) used to 
conceptualize corporations as communities of interests whose stakeholders should be 
served. Liberal market economies (e.g., the United States) used to view corporations 
                                                 
6 Paper by Bezemer. P., Zajac, E.J., Van den Bosch, F.A.J. and Volberda, H.W. Earlier 
versions of this paper have been presented at the Academy of Management (2008) and SMS 
Conference (2008 and 2009).  
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as instruments to create value for its shareholders (De Wit & Meyer, 2004; Letza et 
al., 2004; Stadler et al., 2006). There is, however, growing evidence that the systems 
are converging (Gamble & Kelly, 2001; Morris et al., 2008; Thomsen, 2003) and that 
executives in contexts with a historical emphasis on stakeholder value, ranging from 
Germany (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003) 
and France (Morin, 2000) to Japan (Jackson, 2003; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; 
Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008) and Sweden (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000), are 
struggling with pressures for the espousal of a shareholder value orientation. 
The rationale of a firm’s referral to a shareholder value orientation in a 
national context with a competing logic is subject to academic inquiry (Fiss & Zajac, 
2004; 2006; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007; Yoshikawa et al., 
2007). Scholars have suggested that the rise of the shareholder value model is driven 
by capital- and product-market pressures, i.e., that a firm’s espousal of a shareholder 
value orientation is the result of a quest for enhanced legitimacy in these markets 
(Aglietta, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2004; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Yoshikawa & 
Rasheed, 2009). Others have pointed to the impact of sociopolitical processes and the 
institutional context. For instance, Fiss and Zajac (2004; 2006) illustrate how the 
varying preferences of major domestic owners influenced the espousal of a share-
holder value orientation among German firms. Furthermore, Sanders and Tuschke 
(2007) describe how a company’s exposure to multiple institutional contexts in which 
contested shareholder value practices are more legitimate, promotes their diffusion 
across national boundaries. 
In this study we contribute to this debate in three ways. First, building upon 
prior studies using a sociopolitical perspective (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 
1998; 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 1995; 2004), we examine how the varying preferences 
of major owners affect a firm’s inclination to espouse a shareholder value orientation 
in a national context with an alternative logic. While prior research on institutional 
change has generally examined the influence of “insiders” (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009), we investigate the impact of “outsiders” (cf. Ansari et al., 
2010). We posit that a firm’s referral to a shareholder value orientation is more likely 
to be stimulated from without, i.e., by powerful owners who can associate themselves 
technically and culturally with this alternative model, then from inside, i.e., by 
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powerful owners who identify themselves technically and culturally with the status 
quo in a particular corporation. Taking this into consideration, we expect that Anglo-
American oriented investors and financial institutions will be primary instigators of 
the shift towards a shareholder value orientation in a stakeholder oriented context 
(Jürgens et al., 2000; Lane, 2003; Vitols, 2004; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). 
Second, while the drivers of institutional change have been examined 
extensively in prior studies, the sources of a firm’s refusal to refer to contested 
shareholder value practices have received scant attention. Scholars have noted that 
institutionalized practices are often highly resistant to change, as they are embedded in 
social phenomena such as national belief systems (Granovetter, 1985; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2005) and reflect the distribution of power in societies 
(Jürgens et al., 2000; Lane, 2003; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). As a result, several 
scholars have argued that the shift towards the shareholder value model should not be 
overstated (Deakin, 2005; Morris et al., 2008), that symbolism plays an important role 
as companies might decouple espousal from implementation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004) and 
that the Anglo-American push towards a shareholder orientation may actually result in 
“hybrid models” in which core elements of the old logic are being preserved (e.g., 
Ponssard et al., 2005; Vitols, 2004; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Yoshikawa & McGuire, 
2008). To examine the resistance that contested beliefs might encounter, we extend 
our central argument by simultaneously incorporating inhibitors of change. 
Particularly, we illustrate that contexts in which practices diffuse are far from neutral 
(Ansari et al., 2010), i.e., they are often highly political (Cyert & March, 1963; Davis 
& Thompson, 1994). As such, we expect that the influence of “outsiders” will be 
constrained by macro and micro political factors. 
Third, we contribute to contemporary literatures by analyzing and discussing 
the performance implications of a company’s referral to the shareholder value model. 
While provocative statements such as “End shareholder value tyranny: Put the 
corporation first” (Raynor, 2008) and “So if others are stupid enough to do it 
[adopting a shareholder value orientation], that will only help North American 
businesses” (Mintzberg, 2000:38) suggest a negative relationship between the espousal 
a shareholder value orientation and performance in a stakeholder oriented context, 
there exists little empirical evidence. In fact, Fiss and Zajac (2006), as one of the few 
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studies, find a positive relationship between a firm’s espousal and market perfor-
mance. As the performance implications of espousal might be contingent on the extent 
to which contested practices are actually put into practice and are supported by the 
dominant coalition of major owners (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 2006), we also incor-
porate these effects in our analysis. 
We conduct our research within the Netherlands, a small and open economy 
that is heavily reliant on the global economy. While prior research in this area has 
mainly focused on larger economies, such as Germany (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; 2006; 
Sanders and Tuschke, 2007; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003) and Japan (Jackson, 2003; 
Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008), we expect that sociopolitical 
tensions and resulting struggles between “outsiders” and “insiders” will be closer to 
the surface in this setting, as companies are less buffered against international capital 
market pressures. In doing so, our study cautiously touches upon the question whether 
observed sociopolitical forces are idiosyncratic or whether they bridge national 
boundaries. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section one briefly 
introduces the Dutch context and discusses its main particularities. In section two, 
using a sociopolitical perspective, we develop our hypotheses regarding the drivers 
and inhibitors of a company’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation and its 
performance implications. Section three describes our methods, i.e., we use panel data 
on top-100 listed Dutch firms from 1992 to 2006 to assess their (non)response to 
international pressures for shareholder value. In section four we discuss the results 
emerging from our study and in section five we elaborate on our findings, their 
implications and avenues for future research. 
 
6.2 The Dutch Corporate Governance Context 
The roots of the contemporary Dutch open economy can be found in the glory days of 
the Golden Age (1600-1700). In this era, when the Netherlands were one of the largest 
trading nations, the Dutch founded the “Dutch United East India Company (VOC)”, 
the first joint stock company in the world (Maassen, 1999). With a small group of 
large, internationally diversified firms and a GDP that is earned abroad for more than 
60 per cent, the Dutch trade origins and its international orientation are still prominent. 
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The Netherlands are a welfare state with a long tradition of balancing the interests of 
societal groups. The Dutch corporate governance system is unique in the sense that 
company law explicitly defines publicly listed firms as legal entities that must take 
into account the rights of all stakeholders affected by the firm. The institutionalized 
stakeholder approach is supported by a two-tier board model consisting of a manage-
ment board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board consists of non-executive 
directors to assure its independence and has the duty by law to supervise and advice 
the management board while acting in the best interests of the company and its 
stakeholders (Akkermans et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2005; 2006; Hooghiemstra & 
Van Manen, 2004; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). 
 Within the Dutch institutionalized stakeholder model, it has been put forward 
that management basically holds “the control rights of the firm” instead of the 
shareholders (Van Ees et al., 2003:92; Van Veen & Elbertsen, 2008). Hostile 
takeovers have been rare for a long period (Groot, 1998; Kabir et al., 1997) and, until 
more recently, shareholders have not been pursuing their own agendas actively 
(Chirinko et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2006). Three distinct features of the Dutch 
corporate governance system largely explain the entrenched position of management. 
First, while the market for corporate control is active in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000), the Dutch market for corporate 
control used to be severely constrained by several anti-investor protection measures 
(Chirinko et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2005; Kabir et al., 1997; Van Ees & Postma, 
2005). Examples include preference shares and tradable depository receipts. Prefe-
rence shares are shares with normal voting rights that can be issued against 25% of the 
nominal value to a “friendly” holder in case management feels threatened, thereby 
increasing their voting power for a limited period. Tradable depository receipts are 
shares with normal cash flow rights, but without any voting power, i.e., the voting 
rights reside with a trust office that is usually “friendly” to the board of directors. 
 Second, while dispersed ownership is common in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (La Porta et al., 1998), the Dutch context used to be characterized by 
large blockholdings by domestic institutional investors. In particular, financial 
institutions, such as banks, insurance companies and pension funds, used to have large 
ownership stakes in Dutch listed companies (Van Ees et al., 2003). Scholars have 
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proposed that their presence may alleviate agency problems that remain due to the 
(in)active market for corporate control, as institutional investors have the power and 
incentives to actively monitor managers in the light of the limited liquidity of their 
investments (Dharwadkar et al., 2008; Schnatterly et al., 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). The majority of these domestic institutional investors, however, used to have a 
rather “passive attitude” (De Jong et al., 2005:482) and has been characterized as 
“long-term, patient investors” (Chirinko et al., 2004:125). The rather passive attitude 
of institutional investors is illustrated by low attendance rates at annual general 
meetings of shareholders and the limited number of rejected proposals which were 
sponsored by the management (cf. De Jong et al., 2006).  
 Third, the entrenched position of managers is supported by a small elite 
community of board members, referred to as the “old-boys network”, which used to 
occupy a central position in the Dutch network of board interlocks. In particular, the 
top-three listed banks (ABN Amro, Fortis and ING) played a central role in this 
network during the nineties (Bezemer et al., 2007; Heemskerk et al., 2003). Elite 
membership was often associated with highly prestigious functions in societal interest 
groups and membership of exclusive dining clubs (Heemskerk, 2007). An important 
characteristic of this elite has been their support for the institutionalized stakeholder 
model which resulted in various efforts to reinforce this model in the Dutch board-
rooms. 
 So far, our discussion of the Dutch corporate governance context has 
illustrated the institutionalized nature of the stakeholder model in the Dutch society 
and the resulting entrenched position of managers. However, over the last decade, 
Dutch financial markets have seen dramatic changes. The globalization and 
liberalization of the financial market, (self)regulatory initiatives, corporate governance 
scandals and societal pressure have led to broadened shareholder rights, increased 
shareholder activism, abolished anti-investor protection devices and disintegrating 
managerial elite networks (Bezemer et al., 2007; Heemskerk et al., 2003; Heemskerk, 
2007; Van Veen & Elbertsen, 2008). Among others, these developments have 
contributed to pressure on the institutionalized stakeholder model and to increasing 
commonalties between the one-tier board model and the two-tier board model (Collier 
& Mahbub, 2005; Maassen & Van Den Bosch, 1999). It is in this evolving research 
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setting that we to aim to enhance our understanding of the spread of a shareholder 
value orientation among large listed firms in a small and open economy. 
 
6.3 Theoretical Framework 
Over the last decade, a growing body of research on institutional change has 
emphasized the importance of sociopolitical processes driving the diffusion of 
organizational practices (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; 2001; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1995; 2004), i.e., companies do not only need to deal with demands from 
their technical environments, but also with demands from their cultural environments. 
Accordingly, the interpretations of organizational and societal actors about “the way 
things are” and “the way things are to be done” (Scott, 1987:496; Suchman, 1995) 
have a significant imprint on their responses to new beliefs, logics and practices. In 
fact, corporations may adopt practices, structures or strategies for motives of societal 
legitimacy rather than efficiency (Davis, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1994) or even with the knowledge that the practice, structure or strategy is 
technically inefficient (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 
2009). Moreover, scholars have shown that symbolism, i.e., espousing the adoption of 
new normative beliefs without implementing them, may already generate market reac-
tions, because prevailing financial market logics also tend to be socially constructed 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
 Given that corporate practices are embedded in social phenomena such as 
national belief systems (Granovetter, 1985; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Witt & Redding, 
2009) and reflect the distribution of power in societies (Jürgens et al., 2000; Lane, 
2003; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009), the sociopolitical perspective posits corporate 
control as the outcome of the struggle between varying preferences and motivations of 
involved actors. While several actors have an interest to be involved in this process 
(Jensen & Warner, 1988; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009), in particular, controlling 
shareholders have incentives to participate in the light of the limited liquidity of their 
investments (Dharwadkar et al., 2008; Schnatterly et al., 2008; Tuschke and Sanders, 
2003). Accordingly, several studies have indicated that the dispositions of major 
owners are reflected in a firm’s value orientation. For example, Brouthers et al. (2007) 
describe that government ownership has a significant imprint on a company’s strategic 
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orientation and managers’ leadership style. Furthermore, Fiss and Zajac (2004) 
illustrate that varying preferences of major domestic owners influenced the espousal 
of a shareholder value orientation among German firms. In the next section, we build 
on this argument while discussing the varying predispositions major owners may have 
towards contested institutional change. 
 
6.3.1 Technical Fit, Cultural Fit and Contested Institutional Change 
With regard to the spread of the shareholder value model, we expect that a firm’s 
espousal is most likely to be stimulated from without, i.e., by powerful owners who 
identify themselves technically and/or culturally with the shareholder value model. 
They may stimulate the adoption in several ways. First, these owners might acquaint a 
firm with alternative logics, mental models and norms, thereby educating managers 
about the merits of the shareholder value model (cf. Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Hillman 
et al., 1999; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007). Second, these 
owners might put more pressure on managers to reflect on their current logics, mental 
models and norms, and to pay more attention to the creation of shareholder value 
(Jürgens et al., 2002; Vitols, 2004; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Accordingly, Kraatz & 
Moore (2002) argue that the entrance of a powerful actor with a different background 
is often necessary to overthrow prevailing institutions. Third, managers might monitor 
the ownership composition of their company and symbolically or substantively react 
to meet the expectations of their (new) owners and reassure their long-term 
commitment (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Lane, 2003). 
 However, while outsiders might have the willingness and incentives to act as a 
change agent, they may encounter embedded norms and values, and power 
constellations that are highly resistant to change (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Yoshikawa 
& Rasheed, 2009). In particular, “insiders” might have an interest in resisting the 
spread of contested beliefs (Anand & Peterson, 2000; Fiol and O’Connor, 2002; 
Munir, 2005). As contested change resembles the disruption of taken for granted 
norms, values and practices, it often tends to threaten the vested interests and identities 
of insiders (Fiol & O’Connor, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Hannan et al., 
2006). Some scholars have highlighted that insiders may also function as champions 
of change (Lane, 2003; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) as they have a better understanding 
of how to apply and adapt new practices in the prevailing institutional context 
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(Greenwood et al., 2002; Lee & Pennings, 2002). Insiders, however, have generally 
been associated with resistance to change (Pardo Del Val & Martinez Fuentes, 2003). 
Accordingly, we expect that a firm’s espousal is most likely to be opposed from the 
inside, i.e., by owners who identify themselves technically and/or culturally with the 
status quo in a particular firm and its governance practices. 
 Following prior work on the diffusion of practices (Ansari et al., 2010; Zeitz, 
et al., 1999), two different accounts can be given for the identification of major 
owners with the shareholder value model: a technical and a cultural one. Regarding 
the first account, scholars have referred to the shareholder value model in technical 
terms, i.e., as an “instrument of corporate control” (Pfeiffer, 2000:68) and as a 
“product and promise that purposive management action will be rewarded” (Froud et 
al., 2000:80). Originating from the field of economics, the shareholder value model 
emphasizes the profit-maximizing function of a firm and is generally associated with 
legitimacy in global financial markets (cf. Aglietta, 2000; Ghoshal, 2005; Khanna & 
Palepu, 2004; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Mintzberg et al., 2002). Given the roots 
of the shareholder value model, financial institutions should be more predisposed 
towards the espousal of a shareholder value orientation, as managers in these 
companies daily operate in line with the market logic. Not surprisingly, recent 
evidence suggests that private equity and hedge funds are among the frontrunners 
striving for a stronger emphasis on shareholder value in financial markets around the 
globe (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Kahan & Rock, 2007; Klein & Zur, 2009). 
While financial institutions, as “technical outsiders”, may be most inclined to 
stimulate change, two groups of “technical insiders” might be particularly resistant to 
their initiatives. First, non-financial corporations might oppose pressures for 
shareholder value, as they may have a better understanding of the risks and 
implications associated with a disruptive change in the value orientation of a company 
(Fiol & O’Connor, 2002; Hannan et al., 2006). Furthermore, non-financial 
corporations might also anticipate contagion effects in their own context, i.e., they 
might expect to become the next “target” if the new logic increasingly gets a foothold. 
Second, family blockholders might resist change, as the long-term survival and 
prosperity of the family seems to be at odds with short-term shareholder value. 
Accordingly, scholars have illustrated that family owners often have a more 
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traditionalist, long-term orientation and often act as “protective stewards” of a firm 
(Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; Fiss & Zajac, 2004:509). In conclusion, using a 
sociopolitical perspective, the technical account suggests that a firm’s espousal of a 
shareholder value orientation is the product of the balance of power between technical 
outsiders and technical insiders. More formally, this suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A firm is more likely to espouse a shareholder value orientation when the 
technical fit between a firm’s major owners and this orientation is larger. 
 
A second stream of research has referred to the shareholder value model in cultural 
terms, arguing that this model is deeply embedded in national economic systems, i.e., 
in the ways in which actors derive their identity within a national context (Zeitz et al., 
1999) and give meaning to the public corporation and its main purposes (Ansari et al., 
2010). Particularly, literature on economic nationalism suggests that the differences 
between nations are quite profound and persistent (e.g., Jordana et al., 2006; Levi-
Faur, 1997) and that domestic actors are likely to respond to foreign contested 
practices by “strong assertions of national differences and identity” (Yoshikawa & 
Rasheed, 2009:394). Therefore, in the context of the spread of a shareholder value 
orientation, we expect that “cultural insiders”, i.e., major owners that have applied the 
stakeholder model in their own domestic context, will strongly oppose the new logic. 
Being confronted with a new logic that threatens their vested interests, identities and 
taken-for-granted norms and values, these owners are most likely to act as “protective 
stewards” of the traditional stakeholder logic. Conversely, we expect that “cultural 
outsiders”, i.e., owners from abroad that have the shareholder value logic as taken for 
granted in their domestic context, might, in particular, contribute to this development. 
They may educate managers by sharing their experiences with the alternate logic or 
force managers to reflect on the appropriateness of the current logic (Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). As the shareholder model has it historical 
origins in the United States (cf. Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000) we expect that Anglo-
American oriented major owners will be prime propagators of the shift towards a 
shareholder value orientation. In conclusion, using a sociopolitical perspective, the 
cultural account suggests that a company’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation 
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is the product of the balance of power between cultural outsiders and cultural insiders. 
More formally, this suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A firm is more likely to espouse a shareholder value orientation when the 
cultural fit between a firm’s major owners and this orientation is larger. 
 
6.3.2 Political Fit - Micro Level 
The push for a shareholder value orientation by cultural and technical outsiders might 
not only be threatening to other major owners, but also to other organizational actors. 
Scholars have noted that the contexts in which practices diffuse are far from neutral 
(Ansari et al., 2010) and often highly political (Cyert & March, 1963; Davis & 
Thompson, 1994). As a result, major owners for change might encounter internal 
political resistance. With regard to the shareholder value model, the new logic may, in 
particular, endanger the position of top managers. For decades they have operated 
according to taken for granted logics of the stakeholder model, and the new logic 
basically implies that they are expected to relinquish a part of their discretion and 
power to the market. 
 Scholars, however, have noted that managers’ sensitivity to external pressures 
depends on the extent to which they have managed to obtain an entrenched position 
(Jiraporn & Chintrakarn, 2009; Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993; Sundaramurthy, 2000), 
i.e., the extent to which they possess “the control rights of the firm” (Van Ees et al., 
2003:92). Due to the separation of ownership and control in public companies, 
managers have a certain amount of discretion to determine a company’s direction and, 
as a result, leeway to act opportunistically (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Scholars have noted that 
managers may further strengthen their position by adopting takeover defenses (Kabir 
et al., 1997; Jiraporn & Chintrakarn, 2009; Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993), smoothing a 
firm’s income streams and colluding with non-shareholder stakeholders (Surroca & 
Tribo, 2008). While the performance implications of managerial entrenchment are 
topic of debate, a growing body of literature shows that it often comes at the expense 
of the shareholders (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Hu & Kumar, 2004; Hughes et al., 
2003; Sundaramurthy, 2000; Surroca & Tribo, 2008). 
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 In the Dutch context, two entrenchment mechanisms might be of particular 
importance regarding the spread of the shareholder value model. First, scholars have 
noted that major ownership stakes by managers shield them from the market for 
corporate control (Gugler et al., 2008; Morck et al., 1988; Surroca & Tribo, 2008), i.e., 
it enables them to act more opportunistically as the chances of repercussion are much 
smaller (De Miguel et al., 2004). Moreover, ownership of managers may create a 
stronger bond with a firm and its stakeholders, which is often illustrated by a more 
traditionalist and long-term orientation (Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; Fiss & 
Zajac, 2004). Therefore, we expect that managers with major ownership stakes will be 
less inclined to sense and respond to pressures for shareholder value. This suggests the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3a (3c): The positive relationship between technical fit (cultural fit) and a 
firm’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation is negatively moderated by major 
ownership stakes of its directors.  
 
Second, in addition to holding major ownership stakes, managers in stakeholder 
oriented contexts can often alleviate capital market pressures via anti-investor 
protection measures (De Jong et al., 2005; Surroca & Tribo, 2008; Van Ees & Postma, 
2005). As explained before, two widely applied devices in the Netherlands are 
preference shares and tradable depository receipts. While scholars have illustrated that 
anti-investor protection measures generally have a negative effect on a corporation’s 
performance in the Dutch setting (Chirinko et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2005; Kabir et 
al., 1997), Groot (1998) also showed that managers experience less short-term 
pressures when shielded by tradable depository receipts. Taken this into consideration, 
we expect that anti-investor protection devices will lessen a firm’s inclination to 
respond to claims, made by technical and cultural outsiders, in favor of a shareholder 
value orientation. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3b (3d): The positive relationship between technical fit (cultural fit) and a 
firm’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation is negatively moderated by the 
presence of anti-investor protection measures. 
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6.3.3 Political Fit - Macro Level 
Given that human action takes place in a broader, ongoing system of social 
relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; 1999), a firm’s (non)response to 
international pressures for shareholder value is also determined by a company’s 
embeddedness in the domestic context, i.e., the extent to which a firm is infused with 
national values, norms and beliefs. Scholars have noted that the extent to which firms 
derive their identity from their national context differs (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) and that, as a result, the risks and costs related with nonconformance 
to taken for granted national values, norms and beliefs vary. Moreover, the more that a 
firm’s identity originates from a national context, the less likely will it be that a firm 
observes alternative models and logics, and will have a motive to pursue change 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
 With regard to the espousal of contested beliefs, two mechanisms might be 
particularly powerful in reinforcing national identities. First, Gamson et al. (1992:374) 
argue that “media messages can act as teachers of values, ideologies, and beliefs and 
that they can provide images for interpreting the world”. As such they have a 
significant imprint on the ways in which both companies and stakeholders construct 
social reality and act upon it (Deephouse, 2000; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Hoynes & 
Croteau, 2005). As a result, firms that are highly visible in the domestic media might 
be more hesitant to refer to contested beliefs in response to pressure from technical 
and cultural outsiders, as they are more closely monitored by a variety of stakeholders 
and might be afraid of reputation losses. Accordingly, Fiss and Zajac (2006) illustrate 
that more visible corporations often weaken their espousal of a shareholder value 
orientation by also highlighting the interests of other stakeholders. Taken this into 
consideration, we expect that a firm’s media exposure will lessen the influence of 
outsiders on the value orientation of a corporation. More formally, this suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4a (4c): The positive relationship between technical fit (cultural fit) and a 
firm’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation is negatively moderated by attention 
for the firm in the national media.  
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Second, while a large body of research has shown that board networks contribute to 
the diffusion of practices (Davis, 1991; Davis and Greve, 1997; Haunschild, 1993; 
Palmer et al., 1993; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007), others have highlighted that these 
networks create and shape social identities (Ibarra et al., 2005). Through interaction 
with other directors, norms, values and beliefs are conferred that influence the images 
directors have of themselves, and their corporation and its environment. In this regard, 
Westphal and Khanna (2003) have illustrated that US directors conveyed norms and 
values regarding appropriate board behavior through board ties, and reinforced them 
through punishing non-conforming directors. Particularly, the more central 
organizations and actors may be involved in this process, as they are more aware of 
the prevailing logics and have a larger interest in maintaining the status quo 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Taken this into consideration, we expect that more 
central companies, in a board network in which norms and values associated with the 
stakeholder model predominate, will have stronger incentives to oppose technical and 
cultural pressures for change. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4b (4d): The positive relationship between technical fit (cultural fit) and a 
firm’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation is negatively moderated by a firm’s 
centrality in the domestic board network.  
 
6.3.4 Performance Implications 
While the introduction of the Anglo-American shareholder model in stakeholder 
oriented contexts has been criticized extensively (cf. Freeman et al., 2004; Froud et al., 
2000; Ghoshal, 2005; Mintzberg, 2000; Raynor, 2008), the empirical evidence 
regarding the performance implications is rather mixed. On the one hand, scholars 
have highlighted that identity changes are hazardous (Hannan et al., 2006) and that the 
espousal of a shareholder value orientation is associated with disturbed labor and 
industrial relationships (Lane, 2003), underinvestment and a short-term optimization 
of a firm’s performance (Ghoshal, 2005; Mintzberg et al., 2002; Stadler et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, scholars have reported that stakeholder and shareholder oriented 
corporations perform evenly well (Omran, et al., 2002) and that the espousal of a 
balanced version of a shareholder value orientation results in positive abnormal 
returns (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). 
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 In this study, we posit that the espousal of a shareholder value orientation will 
have a positive impact on a firm’s financial performance, because “associations 
around value creation are powerful, because they suggest focused, effective 
management, delivering improved performance in the interests of shareholders” 
(Froud et al., 2000:85). By referring to shareholder value, listed companies may signal 
their commitment to the interests of shareholders and, as such, enhance their legiti-
macy in international capital markets and become a more attractive investment target. 
Moreover, espousing companies may be more focused on the bottom line as they 
might be more sensitive to the preferences and wishes of shareholders, being the 
actors that have the strongest incentives to maximize total firm value as residual 
claimants (Mintzberg et al., 2002; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Given the signaling 
function of the espousal of a shareholder value orientation and criticism that this 
orientation might hurt other elements of a firm’s performance, we expect that the 
positive performance implications will the strongest for a firm’s market returns. More 
formally, this differential effect on performance suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: The positive performance effect of the espousal of a shareholder value 
orientation will be larger for market returns than for accounting returns.  
 
While a growing body of literature points out that the symbolic adoption of practices 
(i.e., referring to practices without implementing them) might already generate 
abnormal returns (Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004), the actual 
implementation of practices might further improve a company’s performance. The 
shareholder value model has often been associated with practices such as stock option 
compensation schemes, buy-back programs, value-based management tools, and 
internationally accepted accounting standards (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Froud et al., 
2000; Jürgens et al., 2000; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
Although the performance implications of these practices are topic of debate in 
stakeholder oriented contexts (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003), their 
implementation may signal to the global capital markets that a company’s directors are 
dedicated to put their money where their mouth is, thereby publicly displaying their 
inclination to serve shareholders’ interests and confirming their efforts to align their 
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own goals with those of shareholders. Accordingly, we expect that corporations that 
both espouse and implement a shareholder value orientation will obtain higher 
performance returns than companies only referring to it. More formally, this suggests 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5b: The positive relationship between a firm’s espousal of a shareholder value 
orientation and financial performance (market and accounting returns) is positively 
moderated by the implementation of practices associated with this orientation.  
  
Furthermore, the positive performance implications of the espousal of a shareholder 
value orientation may be affected by the extent to which it aligns the goals of share-
holders and managers. Notwithstanding the likelihood that major cultural and technical 
outsiders might stimulate the espousal of a shareholder value orientation (see hypo-
heses 1 and 2), there is a question of how well the orientation of managers resonates 
with the preferences of these major owners (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). In other words, when 
companies engage in contested institutional change while major owners, either tech-
nically or culturally, are unprepared to support such a change, we expect that it will be 
more difficult to produce the intended performance improvements. By providing the 
wrong signal to current major shareholders, managers might jeopardize their support 
and disturb their relationship with them. Furthermore, companies might get stuck in 
the middle, as scholars have noted that the presence of multiple goals and expectations 
leads to confusion, friction and indecisive decision-making (Jensen, 2001; Sundaram 
& Inkpen, 2004). In conclusion, this suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5c (5d): The positive relationship between a firm’s espousal of a shareholder 
value orientation and financial performance (market and accounting returns) is negatively 
moderated by a lack of technical fit (cultural fit). 
 
6.4 Methods 
The empirical research focuses on the top-100 listed corporations at the Euronext 
Stock Exchange in Amsterdam during the period 1992-2006. The top-100 listed 
companies were selected based on their average market capitalization and sales. Given 
new entrants, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies and delistings, 201 companies 
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made it to either one of the lists during the observation window. Of these, 17 firms 
were excluded as their annual reports were unavailable. Overall, this resulted in an 
unbalanced panel of 184 listed firms for which a total of 1414 complete firm-year 
observations were available during the period 1992-2006. Together, these firms 
represent seven industries (construction, manufacturing, transport and communication, 
wholesale, retail, financial services, and other services) and constituted the backbone 
of the Dutch economy during this time. While several companies already espoused a 
shareholder value orientation in 1992, the availability of annual reports and data on 
their ownership structure restricted us from further going back in time and capturing 
the dynamics during the initial phase. 
 
6.4.1 Dependent Variables 
In this study, we use two dependent variables: the espousal of a shareholder value 
orientation and a firm’s financial performance. Following prior research (Fiss & 
Zajac, 2004; 2006), data on the espousal of a shareholder value orientation were 
collected through a content analysis of companies’ annual reports (Coffey & Atkinson, 
1996; Krippendorff, 2004), still one of the major corporate tools in use to commu-
nicate with shareholders in the Dutch context. As such, the language used inside these 
reports regarding shareholder value will be an important reflection of managerial pre-
dispositions towards this “normative governance paradigm” (Fiss & Zajac, 2004:512; 
Pye, 2002) and of the way in which a company publicly presents itself to the capital 
markets. Two independent raters, both native speakers, coded the available 1414 
annual reports by searching for the terms “shareholder value” and its Dutch equivalent 
(“aandeelhouderswaarde”). There appeared to be a high overlap in the ratings of the 
coders: the percent agreement (96.2%) and Cohen’s Kappa (0.924) were both above 
the acceptance threshold (Cohen, 1960; Dewey, 1983). Table 6.1 provides illustrative 
examples of statements indicating espousal in the Dutch context. 
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Table 6.1: Examples of Espousal of a Shareholder Value Orientation
 
Wessanen (1999:1): “Our key objective is to increase shareholder value (…). Wessanen’s goal 
in the coming five years is to realize at least 10% profit growth annually, resulting in a related 
structural increase in shareholder value (…). The key theme throughout our activities is 
creating shareholder value. This has been embedded in the organization through our value 
based management system (…). We will continue to improve the strategic positions of our 
business groups and of Wessanen as a whole. Our aim to increase shareholder value, both in 
the short and the long term will be the cornerstone of our strategy”.  
 
KLM (2001:5): “Its goal is to be the first-choice passenger and cargo airline and provider of 
maintenance services while consistently enhancing shareholder value, providing a stimulating 
and dynamic working environment and participating in mutually beneficial relationships with 
its partners”.  
 
AEGON (2006:47): “Going forward, we will continue to identify opportunities in emerging 
markets that offer growth potential consistent with AEGON’s requirements of long-term 
profitability and the creation of shareholder value”. 
 
 
To investigate the performance implications of the espousal of a shareholder value 
orientation, we use two widely used performance indicators: return on assets (ROA) 
and total shareholder return (TSR). ROA is one of the most often used accounting-
based measures of performance that provides insight in the shorter term, historical 
profitability of a company (Anderson et al., 2004; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). TSR 
is one of the most often used market-based measures of performance that also 
incorporates the long-term profitability expectations (Anderson et al., 2004; Fiss & 
Zajac, 2006). The financial data were collected via the databases Thomson One 
Banker Worldscope and Reach. As ROA and TSR might be influenced by the industry 
in which a firm operates (Tuschke & Sanders, 2003), we also calculated the industry-
adjusted ROAs and TSRs. As we obtained similar results, we only report the 
unadjusted measures. 
 
6.4.2 Independent Variables 
Data on ownership by cultural and technical outsiders and insiders were collected via 
the “Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen”, an annual publication that provides an 
overview of the major owners of Dutch listed companies. According to the “Law on 
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the Disclosure of Shareholdings”, these firms are legally obliged to disclose ownership 
stakes above 5.0% to the regulator of the Dutch financial markets (AFM). Ownership 
by cultural outsiders was calculated by summing up the blockholdings by major 
owners from contexts in which the shareholder value model is generally accepted, i.e., 
the United States and the United Kingdom (e.g., Cernat, 2004; Groot, 1998; Lazonick 
& O’Sullivan, 2000). Ownership by cultural insiders was calculated by summing up 
the blockholdings by major owners from Continental European countries, i.e., share-
holders that have the strongest association with the Dutch stakeholder oriented model. 
Subsequently, ownership by technical outsiders was calculated by summing up the 
major blockholdings by financial institutions (e.g., hedge funds, private equity firms 
and investment funds), owners are used to apply the economic logic associated with 
the shareholder value model (e.g., Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Banks were omitted from this category as these firms may be hesitant to support 
initiatives that put more emphasis on short-term profits, as this might jeopardize their 
other financial interests (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Van Ees & Postma, 2004). Ownership by 
technological insiders was determined by summing up the major blockholdings by 
non-financial corporations and family ownership, i.e., owners that can identify 
themselves, for a variety of reasons, with a corporation’s business. As the concept of 
power is core to our arguments and the rights of major owners increase when certain 
ownership thresholds are reached, we use the same ordinal measure as Fiss & Zajac 
(2004; 2006): 0 if that category owned less than 5.0%, 1 if that category owned more 
than 5.0% but less than 25.0%, 2 if that category owned more than 25.0% but less than 
50.0%, 3 if that category owned more than 50.0% but less than 75.0%, and 4 if that 
category owned more than 75.0%. Finally, we subtracted the scores of cultural and 
technical insiders from those of cultural and technical outsiders respectively, to obtain 
our scores for cultural and technical fit. 
 In this study, managerial entrenchment by a firm’s directors was measured by 
two indicators. First, scholars have noted that ownership by directors shields them 
from the market for corporate control (e.g., Gugler et al., 2008; Morck et al., 1988; 
Surroca & Tribo, 2008). Data on managerial ownership were obtained from the 
“Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen”, and checked and complemented by data from 
annual reports. As managerial power is central to our arguments, we applied the same 
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ordinal transformation as previously described. Second, scholars have noted that anti-
investor protection devices alleviate pressures from the market for corporate control 
(De Jong et al., 2005; Surroca & Tribo, 2008). We created a dummy variable for the 
presence of either preference shares and/or tradable depository receipts, two widely 
applied devices in the Dutch context.  
 A firm’s embeddedness in the national context was measured by two 
indicators. First, following Fiss & Zajac (2006), media attention was measured by a 
count variable of the number of Dutch newspaper articles containing the name of a 
particular company. Data were collected from the four largest daily newspapers in the 
Netherlands: “De Volkskrant”, “Het Algemeen Dagblad”, “Het NRC Handelsblad” en 
“De Telegraaf”. Together these newspapers embody the whole sociopolitical variety 
of the Dutch context, ranging from relatively left-winged (“De Volkskrant”) to 
relatively right-winged (“De Telegraaf”) sociopolitical stances. All data were obtained 
via de database LexisNexis and databases of public libraries, and our search yielded 
more than 350,000 hits during our observation window. We conducted a principal 
component analysis and all four newspapers positively loaded on a single factor which 
explained 88% of the variance (Cronbachs’ α = .86). As the resulting count variable 
for media attention turned out to be heavily skewed, we used its natural logarithm in 
our analyses. Second, national board network centrality was calculated by counting 
the number of direct board ties with other Dutch listed firms, a measure that is often 
used as an indicator of power (Mariolis & Jones, 1982; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
The data were obtained from the “Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen” and the 
“Spencer Stuart Netherlands Board Indexes” that contain information on directors who 
occupied positions on boards and TMTs in the Netherlands during the period 1992-
2006. As this distribution was skewed, we used its logarithm in our analyses. 
  Finally, the implementation of a shareholder value orientation was measured 
by a formative scale of four practices that have often been associated with such a 
logic: share buy-back programs, stock option compensation schemes, value-based 
management tools and internationally accepted accounting standards (Aglietta, 2000; 
Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 2006; Froud et al., 2000; Jürgens et al., 2000; Lane, 2003; 
Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007; Thomsen, 2003; Zajac & 
Westphal, 2004). All practices either align the interests of managers and shareholders 
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or provide benefits to shareholders such as more transparency or a stronger focus on 
economic value. All data were collected trough a content analysis of the annual 
reports. Two other independent raters, both native speakers, coded the available 1409 
annual reports by searching for terms related to these four practices. There appeared to 
be enough overlap in the ratings of the two coders: the percent agreement varied 
between 85.6% and 96.3%, and the Cohen’s Kappa’s ranged from 0.712 to 0.925 for 
the varying practices. 
 
6.4.3 Control Variables 
By including various additional variables, we controlled for possible confounding 
effects. As scholars have suggested that the diffusion of the shareholder value model is 
driven by capital- and product-market pressures (Aglietta, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 
2004; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000), we included a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, using 
the amount of equity raised externally (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004). Furthermore, we 
included the ratio of foreign-sales to total sales to control for international product-
market pressures, i.e., by operating abroad firms may become more sensitive to 
alternate corporate governance models and/or more acquainted with the merits of 
these models (Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). Finally, as the espousal of a shareholder 
value orientation might also depend on the dynamics of the market for corporate 
control, we included the percentage of dispersed shares to control for the disciplining 
role this market might fulfill (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004). 
 Scholars have also noted that prior experience with contested practices 
increases the likelihood that a company will adopt another contested practice (Sanders 
& Tuschke, 2007; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Related, the referral to the shareholder 
value model may, in fact, be part of an emergent strategy, i.e., a company’s post-hoc 
rationalization of the implementation of practices that are associated with a 
shareholder value orientation (i.e., stock option schemes, share buy-back programs, 
value-based management tools and internationally accepted accounting standards). To 
control for this possible effect, we included a count variable capturing a firm’s prior 
experience with these practices. 
 Finally, we added several firm level controls. First, as larger companies might 
be less dependent on the financial markets and, as a result, perceive less short-term 
pressures (Groot, 1998), we included the natural logarithm of the total sales during a 
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year. Second, poorly performing firms might be more inclined to espouse a 
shareholder value orientation to restore their public reputation. Therefore, we added a 
lagged measure of TSR and ROA to our models. Third, prior studies have shown that 
older corporations may have higher cumulative experience enhancing change; 
however, they might also encounter problems in keeping abreast with new develop-
ments (Sorensen and Stuart 2000). We included firm age which was operationalized as 
the number of years passed after founding to control for these age effects. Fourth, 
while Dutch listed companies usually operate a two-tier board, several of them have 
adopted the one-tier board, i.e., a structure that is more common around the globe. As 
these firms may be more responsive to international developments, we included a 
dummy variable capturing the (non)presence of a two-tier board. Fifth, to account for 
industry-specific and time-specific effects, we included dummy variables for the 
company’s two-digit BIK code (i.e., the Dutch equivalent of the SIC codes) and for 
the years of our observation window, in all our models. Given the large number of 
variables, the industry-specific and time-specific effects are not reported in the tables. 
 
6.4.4 Analysis  
To examine the antecedents of company’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation, 
we employed random-effects logistic regression models, as our dependent variable is a 
dummy capturing (non)espousal (Maddala, 2005). A Hausman test indicated that the 
random-effects model is the appropriate choice to analyze our data (χ2 = 17.99; df = 
18; p> .05). Furthermore, to examine the performance implications of the espousal of 
a shareholder value orientation, we ran several random-effects pooled time series 
regression models for ROA. A Hausman test showed that the random-effects model is 
the appropriate way to examine our data (χ2 = 31.17; df = 27; p>.05). To investigate 
the impact on a firm’s TSR, we conducted several fixed-effects pooled time series 
regression models. A Hausman test indicated that this model was most appropriate (χ2 
= 78.09; df = 27; p<.05). Finally, all the independent and control variables were one 
year lagged in our analyses. 
 
6.5 Results 
Using explicit statements referring to a shareholder value orientation in annual reports 
of the top-100 listed corporations in the Netherlands, Figure 6.2 illustrates the extent 
125
to which these firms have espoused this orientation during the period 1992-2006. As 
depicted, a gradual and significant increase is visible, revealing the advance of this 
alternative orientation in a traditionally stakeholder oriented context: while 13% of the 
top-100 listed firms referred to the shareholder value model in 1992, 74% of them did 
in 2006. 
Figure 6.2: Espousal of a Shareholder Value Orientation among Dutch Firms 
Table 6.3 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of our panel of 184 listed 
firms in the Netherlands during the period 1992-2006. Table 6.4 reports the random 
effects logistic models predicting the espousal of a shareholder value orientation 
among listed firms in the Netherlands. The results generally support our view that a 
firm’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation is the result of the balance of power 
between outsiders for change and insiders for the status quo. In accordance with 
hypothesis 1, our empirical results indicate that the predominance of owners that can 
technically associate themselves with a shareholder value orientation (i.e., financial 
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institutions), increases the likelihood that a corporation will refer to this orientation. 
Moreover, in accordance with hypothesis 2, our findings also highlight that the 
predominance of owners that can culturally associate themselves with the shareholder 
value model (i.e., Anglo-American investors), positively influences a firm’s inclination 
to espouse such an orientation. Taken together, these findings suggest that the spread of 
the shareholder value model is both a cultural and a technical phenomenon in the 
Dutch corporate governance context.  
 Furthermore, we find considerable support for the notion that the macro and 
micro political contexts in which contested beliefs diffuse have a constraining impact 
on the role of cultural and technical outsiders. Regarding the technical dimension, our 
results indicate that the positive relationship between technical fit and espousal is 
negatively moderated by a firm’s exposure to the national media (hypothesis 4a). 
Simultaneously, we find that managerial ownership (hypothesis 3a), board protection 
devices (hypothesis 3b) and a firm’s centrality in the national board network 
(hypothesis 4b) did not affect this relationship. Regarding the cultural dimension, our 
results highlight that the positive relationship between cultural fit and espousal is 
negatively moderated by a company’s exposure to the national media (hypothesis 4c) 
and managerial ownership (hypothesis 3c). Furthermore, we did not find any signify-
cant influence of board protection devices (hypothesis 3d) and a company’s centrality 
in the national board network (hypothesis 4d) on this relationship. In sum, these 
results highlight two important macro and micro level sources of resistance that actors 
may encounter while pursuing contested change. 
 Regarding the control variables, prior experience with practices associated 
with a shareholder value orientation positively influences the likelihood that a firm 
refers to this logic. This suggests that listed firms in the Netherlands, in contrast to a 
body of research on symbolic management (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994; 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004), seem to put their money where their mouth is. 
Moreover, it suggests that espousal may actually be part of an emergent strategy of 
listed corporations, i.e., that companies for strategic purposes decide to explicitly 
integrate already implemented practices in their rhetoric while communicating with 
global financial markets. 
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Table 6.5 provides our results for the random effects regressions predicting the 
accounting performance implications of the espousal of a shareholder value orien-
tation. In contrast to hypothesis 5a, our results indicate that a firm’s espousal has a 
negative impact on ROA, suggesting that the referral to contested beliefs is not bene-
ficial to a corporation in a stakeholder oriented context. Furthermore, in accordance 
with hypothesis 5b, the main relationship between a company’s espousal and ROA is 
positively moderated by the implementation of practices associated with the new 
logic. It is also noteworthy that implementation itself has a negative impact on ROA. 
In accordance with hypothesis 5c, we also find that technical fit positively moderates 
the relationship between the espousal of a shareholder value orientation and ROA. In 
contrast, we do not find any evidence that cultural fit similarly affects this relationship 
(hypothesis 5d). In sum, our findings illustrate that a firm’s espousal has a negative 
impact on ROA, although this performance effect becomes less strong if coupled with 
visible commitments to the new orientation and if aligned with the technical prefe-
rences of major owners. 
 Table 6.6 reports our findings for the fixed effects regressions predicting the 
market performance implications of the espousal of a shareholder value orientation. 
Surprisingly, none of the relationships between a company’s espousal and TSR is 
supported, suggesting that the market has been rather skeptical and unresponsive to 
the espousal and implementation of a shareholder value orientation in the Dutch 
context during the period 1992-2006. 
 
6.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
6.6.1 Results and Theoretical Implications 
In this study we have examined the antecedents and consequences of the diffusion of a 
shareholder value orientation among listed companies in the Netherlands. First of all, 
our results highlight that beliefs regarding shareholder value have strongly affected the 
practices of listed firms in the Netherlands, i.e., while 13% of the top-100 listed firms 
referred to shareholder value in 1992, 74% espoused a shareholder value orientation in 
2006. While scholars have argued that the movement towards the shareholder value 
model should not be overstated (Deakin, 2005; Morris et al., 2008) and that symbolism 
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plays an important role as corporations may decouple espousal from implementation 
(Fiss & Zajac, 2004), our empirical results highlight that companies practice what they 
preach, i.e., espousal is positively correlated with the prior implementation of practices 
associated with the shareholder value model. As such, this deep compliance suggests 
that espousal may actually be part of an emergent strategy of listed firms, i.e., that they 
for strategic purposes decide to explicitly integrate already implemented practices in 
their rhetoric while communicating with global financial markets. 
 Regarding the antecedents of contested institutional change, scholars have de-
bated whether change is driven by the economic and technical benefits offered by new 
practices or by social factors, i.e., “the way things are” and “the way things are to be 
done” (Scott, 1987:496; Suchman, 1995). Our study highlights the influence of both the 
technical context, and the cultural and political contexts in which firms reside. Using a 
sociopolitical perspective, we found support for the notion that the balance of power 
between technical and cultural “outsiders for change” and “insiders for the status quo” 
explains the diffusion of contested beliefs in the Netherlands. Moreover, our empirical 
results indicate that the macro and micro political contexts in which beliefs diffuse has 
a significant imprint on the available maneuvering space of outsiders to stimulate con-
tested change. Particularly, managerial ownership and a firm’s exposure to the national 
media limited the opportunities to stimulate a shareholder value orientation. As such, 
our study highlights that the technical, cultural and political dimensions of a firm’s 
context are intertwined and jointly shape a company’s response to pressures to adopt 
contested beliefs, such as the Anglo-American shareholder value model (cf. Ansari et 
al., 2010). Thereby, we bridge prior studies that have examined the diffusion of the 
shareholder value model either as a phenomenon driven by capital- and product-
market pressures (cf. Aglietta, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2004; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 
2000) or by social and institutional processes (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 2006; Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007). 
 Regarding the consequences of a company’s referral to a shareholder value 
orientation, our results support criticism that the adoption of this model hampers firm 
performance (Mintzberg, 2000; Raynor, 2008), i.e., espousing companies displayed a 
significantly weaker accounting performance than non-espousing firms. Interestingly, 
this negative relationship was positively moderated by the implementation of substan-
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tive practices associated with the shareholder value model and the presence of technical 
fit between the composition of a firm’s shareholder base and the shareholder value 
model. Nonetheless, these empirical findings suggest that almost all listed firms in the 
Netherlands have been unable to materialize on the referral to the contested shareholder 
value model. The observed negative relationship of prior implementation of practices 
associated with a shareholder value orientation adds to this. While this might support 
prior studies that have noted that beliefs and practices can still diffuse when they are 
technically inefficient (cf. Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 
2009), it might also indicate that only a very limited number of listed corporations may 
actually benefit from contested change. Future research could assess this notion by 
examining to which extent the timing of adoption (Tuschke & Sanders, 2003; Zajac & 
Westphal, 2004) and the tailoring of practices to the national context (Ansari et al., 
2010; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009) affect a firm’s subsequent 
financial performance.  
 Finally, regarding the institutional context in which beliefs diffuse, our results 
tentatively indicate that profound national differences exist in company’s responses to 
contested practices. While our study highlights that the diffusion of the shareholder 
value model has been stimulated from without in the Dutch context, Fiss and Zajac 
(2004) illustrate that major domestic owners for change initiated change in the German 
context. As both countries are exemplars of the Rhineland stakeholder model and use 
two-tier boards, the witnessed differences are quite striking. In particular, because the 
responses in the German context, in contrast to our Dutch findings, turned out to be 
more symbolic than substantive. Future multi-country studies could examine these 
differences more structurally, and compare and contrast the processes through which 
beliefs diffuse in various technical, political and cultural contexts (Aguilera et al., 2008; 
Ansari et al., 2010; Hambrick et al., 2008; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). 
 
6.6.2 Managerial Implications 
Our main empirical findings have two important implications for practitioners. First, 
the study highlights that the technical, political and cultural contexts in which listed 
firms reside, have a significant imprint on which corporate governance model “secures 
local hegemony” (Ansari et al., 2010; Rosenberg, 2005:177). Using a sociopolitical 
perspective, we have shown that both the heterogeneous preferences of major owners 
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and macro and micro political factors affect a corporation’s (non)openness to contested 
corporate governance beliefs. While corporations might only have a limited amount of 
influence on these factors, listed firms can partially determine their own direction by 
attracting certain types of major owners, rewarding directors by means of stock options 
and stimulating domestic media exposure. Moreover, we have highlighted that the tech-
nical, cultural and political dimensions of a firm’s context are intertwined and jointly 
affect the leeway that directors have in influencing a firm’s direction. This suggests 
that optimizing a firm’s positioning and choices along all three dimensions is essential 
in the wake of the spread of new contested corporate governance beliefs. 
 Second, while scholars have argued that the role of contextual factors is rather 
ill-understood in corporate governance research (cf. Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev 
& Boyd, 2009; Hambrick et al., 2008), our study highlights the importance of these 
factors regarding the diffusion of contested beliefs. They do not only seem to affect a 
company’s (non)espousal of a shareholder value orientation, but also the performance 
consequences. Our results suggest that a corporation’s referral to a shareholder value 
orientation in a context with a competing logic, negatively influences its performance. 
Basically, this implies that directors should be very careful in transferring and applying 
new corporate governance beliefs in other contexts without critically analyzing their 
institutional fitness. Furthermore, foreigners should be aware of these context specifi-
cities while operating in an alternative institutional setting. 
 
6.6.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The study has several limitations, but provides avenues for future research also. First, 
in this study we applied a dichotomous approach, i.e., we investigated why companies 
did or did not espouse a shareholder value orientation. Scholars, however, have noted 
that processes associated with the adoption of (contested) corporate governance beliefs 
often are more subtle (cf. Ansari et al, 2010). Studies have suggested that firms may 
actually adopt “hybrid models” in which new beliefs are adapted and tailored to the 
specifics of a company’s context (Ponssard et al, 2005; Vitols, 2004; Yoshikawa et al., 
2007; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Applied to our study, this implies that we did not 
capitalize on the nuances in the rhetoric that listed companies use while espousing a 
shareholder value orientation in a stakeholder context (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2006). Future 
research could investigate these more subtle diffusion processes and examine how these 
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processes vary over time (Ansari et al., 2010). In terms of methodology, it would also 
be interesting to apply more fine-grained tools to analyze a company’s discourse, and 
observe boardroom discussions when a company’s response to (contested) institutional 
change is being socially constructed.  
 Second, while our decision to investigate the diffusion of a shareholder value 
orientation in the Netherlands contributes to our understanding of communalities and 
differences between institutional contexts, it also constrains the generalizability of our 
findings. The Dutch context has several particularities (i.e., the two-tier board model, a 
focus on collective bargaining and an international orientation), that may have affected 
the observed diffusion pattern. In fact, the espousal of a shareholder value orientation 
might simply be a corporate strategy to satisfy Anglo-American investors and financial 
institutions as two important groups of stakeholders. Future studies could examine to 
which extent firms balance (i) their rhetoric by referring to other groups of stakeholders 
(cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2006) and (ii) their activities by implementing stakeholder oriented 
practices (e.g., social responsibility reports and non-financial performance targets tied 
to executive remuneration) (cf. Harrison et al., 2010).  
 Third, the observation window in this study covers the period 1992-2006 as the 
availability of annual reports and data on firms’ ownership structures restricted us from 
further going back in time. As a result, we were not able to capture the dynamics during 
the initiation phase, i.e., why the first 11% of firms adopted a shareholder value orien-
tation. Moreover, over the last years the Anglo-American shareholder value model has 
progressively been criticized in the wake of the global financial crisis, i.e., a journalist 
in the United States even referred to it as “The revenge of Karl Marx” (The Atlantic, 
2009). While the burst of the internet bubble and corporate governance scandals around 
the beginning of this century only resulted in a temporal decline in the diffusion of a 
shareholder value orientation in the Netherlands (see Figure 6.2), the backlash resulting 
from the current global financial crisis may be more significant. Future research could 
examine how listed firms relate to contested beliefs in periods of financial crisis. 
 
6.6.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this study we have examined in-depth how the corporate governance landscape in the 
Netherlands has substantively changed as a result of pressures for a shareholder value 
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orientation. Particularly, we have highlighted that the technical, cultural and political 
contexts in which listed corporations reside, have a significant imprint on the diffusion 
of contested beliefs, such as a shareholder value orientation in a stakeholder oriented 
context. Contextual factors do not only influence a company’s inclination to (non)adopt 
a shareholder value orientation, they also have an impact on the performance implica-
tions of a company’s (non)espousal. This suggests that directors should be careful in 
transferring and applying new corporate governance beliefs in other contexts without 
critically analyzing their institutional fitness (cf. Ansari et al., 2010).  
 To conclude, it may be interesting to examine whether the observed develop-
ment in the Netherlands is part of a two-way convergence of governance models, i.e., 
to investigate whether Anglo-American oriented firms have also started to incorporate 
elements of the stakeholder value model in response to the internationalization of their 
shareholder base and the global financial crisis. Preliminary evidence suggests that 
Anglo-American oriented countries are indeed slowly moving in the direction of the 
stakeholder model (cf. Thomsen, 2003; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). For instance, 
the latest version of the UK company law emphasizes that the public corporation should 
operate in the best interest of all stakeholders. As the diffusion of corporate governance 
models is an ongoing process, the future will show to which extent national differences 
will persist and to which extent governance models will converge. We believe that our 
theoretical perspective on diffusion, with its emphasis on the joint impact of technical, 
cultural and political factors, is supportive in understanding where and when contested 
corporate governance change is more likely to happen. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
We started this thesis by noting that differences in corporate governance practices are 
quite profound across nations (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera et al., 
2008; Witt & Redding, 2009; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Yet, globalization and 
liberalization of financial markets are contributing to an increasing exchange of corpo-
rate governance beliefs and associated practices across the globe. Over the last decades, 
particularly, pressures for board independence and shareholder value have proliferated 
in most Western economies. To date, however, scholars debate the antecedents of the 
diffusion of these corporate governance beliefs, the performance consequences of a 
company’s adherence to these beliefs, and the influence of contextual factors on the 
diffusion process (see Table 7.1 for an overview). 
 
Table 7.1 Major debates regarding the diffusion of corporate governance beliefs 
Debates Main research issues Key contributions 
 
 
 
Debate 1: 
Antecedents 
of Diffusion 
 
 
x Do technical, cultural and/or 
political antecedents explain the 
diffusion of new beliefs? 
 
x Is the diffusion of new beliefs 
insider-driven or outsider-
driven? 
Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; 
Ansari et al., 2010; Davis, 1991; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
Ansari et al., 2010; Fiol & O’Connor, 
2002; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Sanders & Tuschke, 
2007; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
 
 
Debate 2: 
Performance 
Consequences 
x How does the adoption of new 
beliefs affect a company’s 
performance?  
x Do firms respond symbolically 
or substantively to new beliefs? 
Dalton et al., 1998; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Tuschke 
& Sanders, 2003; Westphal, 2002. 
Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994; 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004. 
 
 
Debate 3: 
Impact of  
Contextual 
Factors 
x Is the diffusion of new beliefs a 
global or a nation-specific 
development? 
 
x Do firms simply adopt new 
beliefs or do they adapt them? 
Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev & 
Boyd, 2009; Hambrick et al., 2008; 
Pugliese et al., 2009. 
Ansari et al., 2010; Aguilera et al., 
2008; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Yoshikawa et 
al., 2007; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
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 This thesis has contributed to these three debates by examining the diffusion 
of two corporate beliefs (i.e., board independence and a shareholder value orientation), 
among listed firms in the Netherlands. To this end, we conducted five studies (see 
Table 7.2) using multiple theoretical lenses (social network, resource dependency, 
resource based view, institutional and sociopolitical perspectives), multiple levels of 
analysis (paper, firm, board of directors and individual board members) and multiple 
methods (archival data, content analysis and interviews). The next paragraphs discuss 
our main empirical results and theoretical implications, followed by the managerial 
implications. We conclude with discussing some of the limitations of this study and 
avenues for future research. 
 
7.1.1 Results and Theoretical Implications of Studies Relating to Boards 
The first four studies investigated the (changing) role and tasks of supervisory board of 
directors. The first study, a literature review of 150 management articles on the board-
strategy relationship during the period 1972-2007, highlighted two theoretical needs. 
First, our results reveal the need to understand the role of context at multiple levels as 
(i) most of the contemporary wisdom originates from US-samples of large public firms 
and (ii) comparative corporate governance studies are sparse. As a result, the impact 
of the national setting (e.g., the legal system, culture and economic conditions) and 
firm characteristics (e.g., the ownership structure, board structure, firm performance 
and lifecycle) on the relationship between boards and strategy is not fully understood 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Hambrick et al., 2008; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). 
Second, our results highlight the need to go beyond structuralism and to examine 
board processes, board behavior and directors’ cognition. This movement encourages 
scholars to investigate what boards and their members actually do, think and perceive 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; Lawrence, 1997; Pettigrew, 1992).  
 The next three empirical studies build upon these observations by examining 
the role and tasks which supervisory board members have been performing over time 
in the Dutch context, using archival and interview data. Table 7.3 provides an overview 
of our empirical results regarding the board of directors, grouped by four categories: (i) 
impact of beliefs regarding board independence on the practices of boards of directors, 
(ii) antecedents and (iii) performance consequences of a company’s adherence to 
these beliefs, and (iv) influence of contextual factors. Overall, our empirical results
13
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have four important contributions. First, as shown in table 7.3, these studies illustrate 
that corporate governance beliefs regarding board independence and control have had a 
significant impact on the role and tasks that boards of directors and supervisory board 
chairmen perform in the Dutch context. More specifically, our results illustrate that 
boards and their chairmen seem to have simultaneously become more involved in their 
control task and internal service task, i.e., in providing advice and counseling to TMTs 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). Interestingly, this finding 
supports the notion that the control and service tasks are not necessarily conflicting 
opposites requiring a trade-off decision. Instead, it highlights the paradoxical nature of 
the control-service relationship, i.e., both conflicting demands may actually be comple-
mentary, non-substitutable and interrelated (cf. Lewis, 2000; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003). On the contrary, our empirical results also highlight that boards of directors and 
supervisory board chairmen have become less involved in their external service task, 
i.e., creating value by providing access to resources on which firms are dependent 
(Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972; 1973) and tapping into the knowledge base of interlock 
partners (Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal et al., 2001). The disintegrating Dutch board net-
work suggest that not all tensions in the control-service relationship are paradoxical, 
but that real trade-offs exist as well. Future research could investigate in which areas 
boards of directors and board chairmen are able to unleash the power associated with 
paradox and which boards and chairmen are most able to reconcile the seemingly 
contradictory demands associated with the control task and parts of the service task. 
 Second, our three studies illustrate that several macro level developments seem 
to have contributed to the diffusion of beliefs regarding board independence and 
control in the Netherlands. In particular, the three studies highlighted the influence of 
(self)regulatory initiatives as reflections of societal norms and values, and expecta-
tions of key stakeholders in the wake of international and national corporate gover-
nance scandals. Yet, our results also indicated that listed companies vary in the extent 
to which they are affected by these macro-developments, i.e., due to their positioning 
in terms of societal visibility, international market exposure and involvement in (self)-
regulatory initiatives, several listed firms turned out to have more leeway to counteract 
pressures to reform the board’s external service task (see study 4). In sum, a company’s 
response appears to be the product of external pressures and managerial initiatives. 
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Table 7.3 Theoretical Implications of Studies Relating to Boards of Directors  
Impact: Control task and service task as a trade-off and a paradox. 
x Beliefs regarding board independence and control have affected the tasks that board of 
directors perform, i.e., these beliefs seem to hamper the external service task, while 
reinvigorating the internal service task (study 2). 
x Beliefs regarding board independence and control have affected the role of the chairman 
of the board of directors (study 3), i.e., these beliefs seem to have increased the involve-
ment and visibility of chairmen as well as their working style (study 3).  
x Beliefs regarding board independence and control have affected board network, i.e., 
these beliefs seem to have contributed to the disintegration of board networks (studies 2 
and 4). 
Antecedents: Deterministic and voluntaristic pressures for change. 
x Four developments at the macro level seem to have contributed to the diffusion of 
corporate governance beliefs regarding board independence and control: (i) regulatory 
initiatives (ii) shareholder activism, (iii) scandals and (iv) societal attention for corporate 
governance (studies 2 and 3). 
x Corporations vary in the extent to which they are affected by new governance beliefs, as 
their corporate positioning varies in terms of societal visibility, international exposure 
and involvement in (self)regulatory initiatives (study 4). 
Consequences: Institutional change as a phenomenon with unintended outcomes. 
x The emphasis on board independence and control seems to have resulted in several 
unintended consequences regarding the value creating potential of boards of directors, 
i.e., listed firms, and in particular, smaller ones, have become less connected (studies 2 
and 4).  
x The emphasis on board independence and control seems to put pressure on board 
members as (i) boards’ responsibilities, risks and requirements broaden and (ii) boards 
progressively struggle with the tension between involvement and independence (studies 
2 and 3). 
Context: Global developments and nation-specific developments. 
x Our results highlight that national differences are profound, i.e., the legal separation of 
decision control and decision management in two-tier boards adds an extra layer of 
complexity to changes in the role and tasks of boards of directors (studies 2 and 3). 
x Yet, our results also highlight that these changes are affected by the interaction with 
different institutional contexts, i.e., the increasing exchange of beliefs across the globe 
creates tensions within nations (study 3). 
x The joint effect of both developments seems to lead to more convergence of board roles 
in different board models (studies 2, 3 and 4). 
  
 A third implication of our three studies is that the emphasis on board indepen-
dence and control has been associated with unintended consequences regarding the 
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value creation potential of boards (cf. Huse, 2007). For example, corporations, and in 
particular SMEs, have become disconnected from the Dutch board network. Further-
more, as the boards’ responsibilities, risks and requirements broaden, the pressures on 
non-executives might increase and result in a more limited pool of willing and well-
qualified non-executives. Moreover, the focus on the prevention of failures and 
formality, might result in more risk-averse behavior and less focus on innovation, 
R&D and strategic renewal (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). In 
conclusion, while governance recommendations and best practices regarding board 
independence may have improved the control task of boards, this might have come at 
the expense of other tasks related to the value creating potential of boards.  
 Finally, our studies illustrate that the Dutch two-tier board model is progress-
sively exposed to institutional contexts with alternative demands and role expectations, 
i.e., the majority of countries use one-tier boards. While our results tentatively suggest 
that, as a result of these forces, the Dutch two-tier board model is converging with the 
one-tier board model, international differences appear to be persistent. In particular, 
the fact that company law still prescribes a formal separation of decision-management 
and decision-control creates tensions as boards of directors and their chairmen often 
(are expected to) operate beyond their traditional roles and legal requirements. Future 
comparative corporate governance studies could investigate the process through which 
nations adopt and adapt internationally accepted governance practices (Ansari et al., 
2010; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009) and whether the witnessed development is part of 
a two-way convergence or not. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine the per-
formance implications of (mis)fit between board practices and the national institutional 
context as well as international institutional contexts in which firms operate. 
 
7.1.2 Results and Theoretical Implications of Study Relating to Shareholder Value 
The fifth study examined the diffusion of a shareholder value orientation among firms 
in the Netherlands, using archival data and a content analysis of annual reports. Table 
7.4 provides an overview of our empirical results, grouped by the aforementioned 
categories, i.e., (i) impact, (ii) antecedents, (iii) consequences and (iv) context. Overall, 
these empirical results highlight four important contributions. First, as summarized in 
Table 7.4, corporate governance beliefs regarding shareholder value have strongly 
affected the practices of listed firms in the Netherlands, i.e., while 13% of the top-100 
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listed firms referred to shareholder value in 1992, 74% espoused a shareholder value 
orientation in 2006. While scholars have argued that the movement towards the share-
holder value model should not be overstated (Deakin, 2005; Morris et al., 2008) and 
that symbolism plays an important role as corporations might decouple espousal from 
implementation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004), our empirical results highlight that companies 
practice what they preach, i.e., espousal is positively correlated with the substantive 
implementation of practices associated with the shareholder value model. 
   
Table 7.4 Theoretical Implications of Study Relating to Shareholder Value Model  
Impact: Substantive instead of symbolic contested change. 
x Beliefs regarding a shareholder value orientation have strongly affected the practices of 
corporations in a stakeholder oriented context, i.e., the majority of the Dutch listed firms 
have started to espouse and implement this contested orientation during the last two 
decades. 
Antecedents: Contested change from without instead of from within. 
x The fit between the cultural and technical preferences and dispositions of a firm’s major 
owners and the shareholder value orientation has a positive influence on a firm’s inclination 
to refer to this orientation. 
x The macro and micro political context in which a company operates, moderates these 
positive relationships, i.e., TMT/board ownership, national media attention and board 
protection devices negatively moderate these relationships.  
Consequences: Contested change as a negative instead of a positive phenomenon. 
x The espousal of a shareholder value orientation in a context with an alternate logic has a 
negative impact on a firm’s accounting performance. 
x The negative relationship between a firm’s espousal of a shareholder value orientation and 
accounting performance is positively moderated by (i) the presence of technical fit and (ii) 
the actual implementation of practices associated with this orientation. 
Context: Global development and nation-specific development. 
x Our results tentatively highlight that national differences exist in firm responses to 
contested beliefs, i.e., while our fifth study illustrates that contested change is most likely to 
be stimulated from without, Fiss & Zajac (2004) show that German firms adopted the 
shareholder value model from within (by major domestic owners). 
 
 Furthermore, regarding the antecedents of the diffusion of a shareholder value 
model, our study highlights the impact of the technical, cultural and political contexts 
in which companies reside. Using a sociopolitical perspective, we found support for the 
notion that the balance of power between technical and cultural “outsiders for change” 
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and “insiders for the status quo” explains the diffusion of contested beliefs in the Dutch 
setting. Moreover, our empirical results indicate that the macro and micro political 
contexts in which beliefs diffuse has a significant imprint on the available maneuvering 
space of outsiders to stimulate contested change. As such, our study highlights that the 
technical, cultural and political dimensions of a firm’s context are intertwined and 
jointly shape a company’s response to pressures to adopt contested beliefs, such as the 
Anglo-American shareholder value model (cf. Ansari et al., 2010). Thereby, we bridge 
prior studies that have examined the diffusion of the shareholder value model either as 
a phenomenon driven by capital- and product-market pressures (cf. Aglietta, 2000; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2004; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000) or by social and institutional 
processes (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 2006; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007).  
 Moreover, regarding the performance consequences of the diffusion of the 
shareholder value model, our results support criticism that the adoption of this model 
hampers firm performance (Mintzberg, 2000; Raynor, 2008), i.e., espousing companies 
displayed a significantly weaker accounting performance than non-espousing compa-
nies. Interestingly, this negative relationship was positively moderated by (i) the imple-
mentation of substantive practices associated with the shareholder value model and (ii) 
the presence of technical fit between the composition of a firm’s shareholder base and 
the shareholder value model. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that almost all listed 
firms in the Netherlands have been unable to materialize on the referral to the contested 
shareholder value model. While this might support prior studies that have noted that 
beliefs and practices can still diffuse when they are technically inefficient (Abrahamson 
& Rosenkopf, 1993; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009), it might also indicate that only a 
very limited number of companies may actually benefit from contested change. Future 
research could examine to which extent the timing of adoption (Tuschke & Sanders, 
2003; Zajac & Westphal, 2004) and the tailoring of practices to the national context 
(Ansari et al., 2010; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009) affect a firm’s 
subsequent financial performance.  
 Finally, regarding the national context in which beliefs diffuse, our results 
tentatively indicate that profound national differences exist in firms’ responses to 
contested practices. While our study highlights that the diffusion of the shareholder 
value model has been stimulated from without in the Dutch context, Fiss and Zajac 
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(2004) illustrate that major domestic owners for change initiated change in the German 
context. As both countries are exemplars of the Rhineland stakeholder model and use 
two-tier boards, the witnessed differences are quite striking. In particular, because the 
responses in the German context, in contrast to our Dutch findings, turned out to be 
more symbolic than substantive. Future multi-country studies could examine these 
differences more structurally, and compare and contrast the processes through which 
beliefs diffuse in various technical, political and cultural contexts (Aguilera et al., 2008; 
Ansari et al., 2010; Hambrick et al., 2008; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). 
 
7.2 Managerial Implications 
Besides theoretical implications, the findings of this dissertation also have implications 
for directors and regulators (see Table 7.5). First, our studies have shown that the 
corporate governance context in which listed companies and their boards of directors 
and their chairmen operate, has significantly changed over the last two decades. More 
specifically, corporate governance beliefs regarding board independence and control, 
and shareholder value have strongly affected the practices of companies and boards. 
Profoundly understanding and adequately managing these developments seems to be 
important for (i) firms wishing to comply and anticipate to national corporate 
governance trends, (ii) regulatory bodies reflecting on the impact of their initiatives and 
(iii) prospective board members searching for a position on a Dutch two-tier board.  
 Furthermore, while our findings indicate that almost all firms and boards have 
been affected by regulation, shareholder activism, scandals and increased societal 
attention for corporate governance, differences exist between listed companies. These 
differences seem to stem from two main sources. First, our third study highlighted that 
corporations can partially nullify institutional pressures by engaging in activities such 
as (self)regulatory initiatives. As such, our third study shows that anticipating to new 
developments and approaching them as opportunities seems to pay-off. Furthermore, 
our fifth study indicated that a firm’s positioning in its technical, cultural and political 
contexts influences the likelihood that a firm will be affected by contested institutional 
change. Particularly, a firm’s embeddedness in the old prevailing institutional logic 
appears to be an inhibitor to change. In conclusion, firms and boards of directors seem 
to have a certain amount of maneuvering space and organizational buffers to shape 
their own direction in the context of (contested) institutional change. 
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 Table 7.5 Managerial Implications 
Impact: Substantive changes have altered the Dutch corporate governance landscape. 
x Corporate governance beliefs regarding board independence and shareholder value have 
substantially altered the role and tasks of boards and their chairman as well as the practices 
of companies, resulting in new challenges for firms and their boards (studies 2, 3, 4 and 5). 
Antecedents: Deterministic change and opportunities for entrepreneurship. 
x While corporate governance beliefs regarding board independence have altered the Dutch 
corporate governance landscape, companies have several means to partially nullify these 
pressures or use them to their own advantage (study 3). 
x While corporate governance beliefs regarding shareholder value have altered the Dutch 
corporate governance landscape, the specifics of a company’s technical, political and 
cultural contexts have an imprint on its openness for these macro developments (study 5). 
Consequences: Institutional change as a positive and a negative phenomenon. 
x Practitioners should be careful and selective in applying and promoting beliefs regarding 
board independence and shareholder value in alternative contexts, as our study highlights 
several unintended consequences (studies 2, 3 and 5) and negative performance implica-
tions (studies 4 and 5). 
x Simultaneously, these developments may offer opportunities for other corporations, such 
as consultancy companies and executive search firms (studies 2 and 3). 
Context: Global developments and nation-specific developments 
x Practitioners should be aware that most of our contemporary wisdom originates from a 
limited number of national contexts (study 1). 
x Practitioners should be aware of the impact of context specificities, as our study tentatively 
highlights that they may have a significant imprint on diffusion processes within a nation.  
 
 Third, as shown in Table 7.5, the performance implications of the diffusion of 
new beliefs seem to be rather negative in the Dutch context. Both the referral to a 
shareholder value orientation (study 5) and the disintegrating board network (studies 
2, 3 and 4) seemed to result in a hampered performance and unintended consequences. 
Thus, managers and regulators should be aware that the introduction of new corporate 
governance beliefs in a national context with an alternative logic does not automa-
tically results in enhanced firm performance. Accordingly, practitioners should be 
careful and selective in applying and promoting new corporate governance beliefs in 
their own national context. However, at the same time, these developments may offer 
new market opportunities for other types of firms. For instance, executive search firms 
and consultancy companies might benefit from increasing pressures on board members 
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by developing and providing services in the area of board succession, board reviews, 
and training and education of (potential) board members. 
 Finally, our literature review (study 1) highlighted that the impact of context 
is rather ill-understood (cf. Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Hambrick 
et al., 2008) as most of our contemporary knowledge originates from prior studies in 
the US context relating to logics associated with the agency theory (Pugliese et al., 
2009). Using multiple theoretical lenses, this dissertation explored the diffusion of new 
beliefs in a small and open economy, and illustrated that the specifics of the national 
context may have a significant impact on the diffusion process. Examples include the 
extra layer of complexity that is added due to the use of the two tier board model 
(study 3) and the role of the national media (study 5). Basically, this implies that 
managers and regulators should be careful in transferring and applying beliefs in other 
contexts without critically analyzing their institutional fitness. Furthermore, foreigners 
should be aware of these context specificities while operating in an alternative institu-
tional setting. 
 
7.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
We recognize that this dissertation has several limitations, but also provides avenues 
for future research. Here, we will focus on overarching limitations and research themes, 
as we already discussed the specifics of each study in the preceding chapters. First, our 
study mainly focused on general trends, such as the disintegration of the Dutch board 
network and the diffusion of the shareholder value model in the Netherlands. In doing 
so, we applied a rather dichotomous approach, i.e., we investigated why companies 
did or did not break board network ties and why firms did or did not adopt a share-
holder value orientation. Scholars, however, have noted that processes associated with 
the adoption of (contested) corporate governance beliefs often are more subtle (cf. 
Ansari et al, 2010). Studies in the symbolic management tradition have suggested that 
companies might to a certain context decouple what they “preach” from what they 
“practice” (cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
Moreover, several studies have suggested that firms may actually adopt hybrid models 
in which new beliefs are adapted and tailored to the specifics of a company’s context 
(Ponssard et al, 2005; Vitols, 2004; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 
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2009). Applied to our study, this implies that we may have actually captured the 
symbolic dismantlement of redundant ties in the board network, and did not capitalize 
on the nuances that firms use while espousing a shareholder value orientation in a 
stakeholder context (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). Future research could investigate these more 
subtle diffusion processes and examine how these processes vary when time proceeds 
(cf. Ansari et al., 2010). In terms of methodology, it would also be interesting to apply 
more fine-grained tools to analyze a company’s discourse, and observe boardroom 
discussions when a firm’s response to (contested) institutional change is being socially 
constructed.  
 Second, relating to the previous issue, we mainly focused on formal corporate 
governance structures and practices, i.e., communication mechanisms (study 2), board 
network ties (study 4) and the espousal and the implementation of a shareholder value 
orientation (study 5). As such, exempt of our third study, we refrained from directly 
examining board processes, board behavior and directors’ cognitive maps as well as 
related changes in boardroom culture and directors’ beliefs, values and norms. As 
these informal corporate governance structures and practices might be more influential 
and insular than their formal counterparts, we may have reported more change than is 
taken place at a more fundamental level in the Dutch corporate governance landscape. 
Following prior studies highlighting the need to open up the “black box” of research at 
the apex of the organization (cf. Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Lawrence, 1997; Pettigrew, 
1992), future research could investigate these (changing) informal structures and prac-
tices. To reach this purpose, longitudinal research designs aimed at exploring processes 
over an extensive time period through collecting primary data via interviews, surveys 
and participant observations, seem most appropriate (cf. Pettigrew et al., 2002; Huse, 
2005; Pugliese et al., 2009).  
 Third, while discussing the performance implications of the adoption of corpo-
rate governance beliefs in the Dutch context, this dissertation solely focused on the 
(short-term) financial consequences. The adoption and implementation of these beliefs, 
however, may have important consequences beyond financial ones alone. For instance, 
while the growing involvement of boards of directors in their control role may have a 
positive impact, the emphasis on board independence may also result in more risk-
averse behavior, a stronger focus on short term efficiency and less focus on inno-
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vation, R&D and strategic renewal (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003). Similarly, the decreasing network connectivity of boards may limit the number 
of learning opportunities to tap into the knowledge base of interlocking partners and 
co-opt resources from the environment on which corporations are dependent. Further-
more, corporations adopting a shareholder value orientation might become more short-
term oriented and more risk-averse in their strategic decision making. Future research 
could examine the long-term strategic implications of these trends in more detail. 
 Fourth, while our decision to investigate the diffusion of new beliefs in the 
Dutch context cautiously contributes to our understanding of communalities and differ-
rences between different institutional contexts, it also constrains the generalizability of 
our findings. The Dutch context has several particularities, i.e., it is a small, open eco-
nomy with a two-tier board model, board protection devices and patient major owners, 
that might have strongly affected the described diffusion patterns. Future comparative 
studies could, for instance, investigate to which extent similar board developments are 
observable in other countries with two-tier board systems (e.g., Germany and Austria), 
in countries with one-tier board systems (e.g., Great Britain and the United States) and 
in countries with mixed board systems (e.g., France). Futhermore, future multi-country 
studies could compare and contrast the processes through which corporate governance 
beliefs regarding shareholder value diffuse in various technical, political and cultural 
contexts (cf. Ansari et al., 2010; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). 
 Fifth, while our pluralistic approach in terms of theoretical lenses highlights the 
notion that “disciplines do not constitute different parts of reality; they are different 
aspects of reality, different points of view” (Ackoff, 1999: 426). At the same time, this 
notion hints at the possibility that other theories may provide alternative explanations. 
While this does not alter the existence of such phenomena as the diffusion of a share-
holder value orientation and the increasing emphasis on board independence in the 
Netherlands, the explanations provided in this dissertation are bound by our choice of 
theories (i.e., social network, resource dependency, resource based view, institutional 
and sociopolitical perspectives). To advance our insights regarding diffusion process-
ses, we recommend the use of other theories in future studies in this area. In particular, 
applying the behavioral theory of the firm, stewardship theory and stakeholder theory 
to our issues might prove valuable to further explain director’s motives and responses.  
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 Finally, while our study highlighted that macro, mesa and micro levels of ana-
lysis interact in the context of the diffusion of corporate governance beliefs, we did not 
apply multilevel techniques to model and control for the nestedness of our data (Klein 
&Kozlowski, 2000). Future research could, for example, examine more thoroughly 
how the technical, political and cultural contexts in which corporations reside, affect 
the value creating potential of boards of directors and the contributions of individual 
board members. Moreover, multilevel techniques might be useful in investigating the 
contextual factors that trigger firms to adapt new normative beliefs and tailor them to 
their specific institutional context. At least, the various multiple level interactions we 
have highlighted in this dissertation, reveal the available potential in this area. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The main aim of this study was “to enhance our understanding of the antecedents and 
consequences of the diffusion of corporate governance beliefs (board independence and 
a shareholder value orientation) in the context of a small and open economy”. Through 
a series of five different studies, utilizing multiple theoretical lenses, levels of analysis 
and methods, we thoroughly investigated the diffusion of corporate governance beliefs 
regarding board independence and shareholder value in the Netherlands. In doing so, 
we enriched our understanding of key changes in the Dutch corporate governance 
context. We showed (i) that substantive change is taken place, (ii) that the technical, 
political and cultural contexts in which companies reside explains their (non)response 
to beliefs, (iii) that change is often associated with unintended consequences and 
negative performance implications, and (iv) that national specificities have a significant 
imprint on the aforementioned processes.  
 Our findings highlight important avenues for further research and provide 
managers, board members and shareholders new insights in key corporate governance 
developments in the Netherlands. Given the current turmoil in global financial markets 
and the societal debate on the “checks and balances” in corporate governance systems, 
this study is topical. Hopefully it inspires scholars and practitioners to reflect on the 
next wave of corporate governance beliefs that may already have been triggered by the 
global financial crisis and societal debates. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (STUDY 3) 
 
Overview Interviewed Supervisory Board Members* 
 
Willy Angenent Chairman of the supervisory boards of Vedior NV and FMO. 
Adri Baan Chairman of the supervisory boards of AFM, Hagemeyer NV, Wolters Kluwer 
NV and Volker Wessels BV. 
Jan-Diederik Bax Chairman of the supervisory boards of Vopak NV and Smit Internationale NV. 
Rob van den Bergh Former CEO of VNU NV and multiple supervisory board positions. 
Henk Bodt Former CEO of ASML NV and multiple supervisory board positions. 
Rene Dahan Chairman of the supervisory board of Ahold NV. 
J. Fokko van Duyne Chairman of the supervisory boards of Gamma NV, OPG NV and De 
Nederlandsche Bank. 
Cor Herkströter  Chairman of the supervisory board of DSM NV. 
Paul van den Hoek Chairman of the supervisory boards of ASMI NV, Buhrmann NV, Robeco NV 
and Wavin NV. 
Jan Hommen Chairman of the (supervisory) boards of ING NV, TNT NV and Reed Elsevier 
NV. 
Jan Kalff Chairman of the supervisory boards of Stork NV and Schiphol Group NV. 
Wim de Kleuver Chairman of the supervisory board of Philips NV. 
Gert-Jan Kramer Former CEO of Fugro NV and multiple supervisory board positions. 
Cees van Lede Chairman of the supervisory board of Heineken NV and Sare Lee/De 
International BV. 
Aarnout Loudon Former chairman of the supervisory boards of ABN Amro NV and Akzo Nobel 
NV. 
Floris Maljers Former chairman of the supervisory boards of Philips NV and VendexKBB NV. 
Rinus Minderhoud Chairman of the supervisory board of Getronics NV. 
Ton Risseeuw Chairman of the supervisory boards of KPN NV and Intergamma BV. 
Willem Stevens Multiple supervisory board positions. 
Jaap Vink Chairman of the supervisory board of Samas NV. 
Rob Zwartendijk Chairman of the supervisory boards of Numico NV, Nutreco NV and Blokker 
BV. 
* One non-executive director is not identified by name. Not all current and former board positions of 
participants are listed. 
 
Overview Interviewed CEOs* 
 
Rudy de Becker CEO of Hagemeyer NV. 
Rijkman Groenink Former CEO of ABN Amro NV. 
Guus Hoefsloot CEO of Heymans NV. 
Rokus van Iperen CEO of OCE NV. 
Frans Koffrie CEO of Corporate Express NV. 
Zach Miles CEO of Vedior NV. 
Ad Scheepbouwer CEO of KPN NV and supervisory board chairman of Havenbedrijf 
Rotterdam NV. 
Joop van Oosten CEO of BAM Groep NV. 
* Not all current and former board positions of participants are listed. 
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 Nederlandse Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
Introductie 
Gedurende de afgelopen twee decennia is de maatschappelijke aandacht voor corporate 
governance sterk toegenomen. Mede door toedoen van verscheidene bedrijfsschandalen 
(zoals Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat en Ahold), zijn onderwerpen als (i) de rechten en 
plichten van aandeelhouders, (ii) financiële transparantie en risicomanagement, (iii) de 
vertrouwensrol van de accountant, (iv) de hoogte van topsalarissen en (v) de stabiliteit 
van het bancaire stelsel steeds belangrijker geworden. Met name de toenemende mon-
dialisering en liberalisering van de financiële markten en de groeiende internationale 
concurrentie lijken corporate governance-vraagstukken gecompliceerder gemaakt te 
hebben. Beursgenoteerde ondernemingen worden immers in toenemende mate gecon-
fronteerd met internationale corporate governance-wet- en regelgeving, en variërende 
verwachtingspatronen van buitenlandse belanghebbenden. Een diepgaand inzicht in de 
(inter)nationale dynamiek van corporate governance-vraagstukken lijkt derhalve van 
groot belang voor zowel de wetenschap als de praktijk. 
 In dit proefschrift staan twee belangrijke internationale corporate governance- 
ontwikkelingen centraal. Allereerst zijn gedurende de afgelopen tien jaar in de meeste 
westerse landen verscheidene corporate governance-hervormingen geïnitieerd zoals 
de introductie van Sarbanes-Oxley, Europese richtlijnen en diverse nationale corporate 
governance-codes. Deze hervormingen zijn voornamelijk gebaseerd op de logica van 
de Agency-theorie en richten zich onder meer op het versterken van de onafhankelijk-
heid en toezichthoudende rol van commissarissen om zo nieuwe bedrijfsschandalen te 
voorkomen (Daily et al., 2003; Enrione et al., 2006). Ten tweede heeft er in de meeste 
Europese landen een verschuiving richting het Anglo-Amerikaanse aandeelhouders-
waardemodel plaatsgevonden. In gecoördineerde markteconomieën als Duitsland (Fiss 
& Zajac, 2004; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003), Zweden (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000) en 
Frankrijk (Morin, 2000) worstelt men dan ook in toenemende mate met invloeden 
vanuit dit Anglo-Amerikaanse model. De maatschappelijke debatten in Europa rondom 
de rol van hedgefondsen en participatiemaatschappijen, de rechten van aandeelhouders 
en prestatieafhankelijke beloningsstructuren zijn hiervan goede illustraties. 
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Onderzoeksdoelstelling en Onderzoeksvragen 
Dit proefschrift beoogt een bijdrage te leveren aan de wetenschappelijke literatuur, de 
praktijk en het maatschappelijke debat door de impact van de toenemende focus op de 
toezichthoudende rol en onafhankelijkheid van commissarissen alsmede op aandeel-
houderswaarde te analyseren binnen de Nederlandse context. De navolgende onder-
zoeksvragen staan daarbij centraal (zie Tabel 1 voor een gedetailleerd overzicht): 
 
(1) Welke (f)actoren stimuleren en/of belemmeren de verspreiding van corpo-
rate governance-opvattingen? 
(2) Welke consequenties heeft het verwijzen en/of implementeren van corporate 
governance-opvattingen voor de prestaties van een onderneming? 
(3) Welke rol spelen omgevingskarakteristieken van bedrijven bij de verspreiding 
van corporate governance-opvattingen? 
 
Tabel 1: Debatten m.b.t. de verspreiding van corporate governance-opvattingen 
Debatten Belangrijke onderzoeksvragen Belangrijke eerdere bijdragen 
 
Debat 1: 
Determinanten 
van de 
verspreiding van 
opvattingen 
 
x Verklaren technische en/of sociale 
factoren de verspreiding van 
corporate governance-opvattingen?  
 
 
x Wordt de verspreiding van corporate 
governance-opvattingen met name 
van binnenuit of van buitenaf 
geïnitieerd en/of gestimuleerd?  
Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; Ansari 
et al., 2010; Davis, 1991; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 
Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
 
Ansari et al., 2010; Fiol & O’Connor, 
2002; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007; 
Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
 
Debat 2: 
Impact op de 
prestaties van 
ondernemingen 
x Op welke wijze beïnvloedt de keuze 
voor zich verspreidende corporate 
governance-opvattingen de 
prestaties van ondernemingen? 
 
x Implementeren bedrijven de opvat-
tingen waarnaar ze refereren?  
Dalton et al., 1998; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Tuschke 
& Sanders, 2003; Westphal, 2002. 
 
 
Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994; 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004. 
 
 
Debat 3:  
Rol van 
omgevings-
factoren 
x Is de verspreiding van corporate 
governance-opvattingen een 
generiek of contextafhankelijk 
proces? 
 
x Nemen bedrijven nieuwe opvat-
tingen over of passen zij deze aan? 
Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev & 
Boyd, 2009; Hambrick et al., 2008; 
Pugliese et al., 2009. 
 
Ansari et al., 2010; Aguilera et al., 2008; 
Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Yoshikawa et al., 
2007; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009. 
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Ter beantwoording van deze onderzoeksvragen is een vijftal deelstudies uitgevoerd (zie 
Tabel 2 voor een gedetailleerd overzicht). De vijf deelstudies benaderen de verspreiding 
van corporate governance-opvattingen vanuit verschillende theoretische invalshoeken 
en analyseniveaus en met behulp van diverse methoden om zodoende een breed inzicht 
te verschaffen in ons onderzoeksfenomeen. In de komende vijf paragrafen worden de 
onderzoeksopzet en bevindingen van de verschillende deelstudies verder uiteengezet. 
 
Tabel 2: Beoogde bijdragen van de vijf onderzoekstudies in dit proefschrift 
Studie Onderwerp Beoogde bijdragen van de onderzoekstudies. 
 
 
 
1 
Overzicht en 
analyse van 
artikelen over de 
strategische 
bijdrage van 
commissarissen. 
x Ontwikkeling laten zien in de wetenschappelijk literatuur m.b.t. de 
verhouding tussen commissarissen en strategisch management. 
x Eerdere overzichtsartikelen aanvullen alsmede reflecteren op de 
voortgang die men sindsdien heeft geboekt.  
x Bestuurders informeren over de stand van zaken in het strategie-
commissarissendebat, alsmede de hoofdthema’s daarin belichten. 
 
 
2 
De veranderende 
rol van de 
commissaris in 
Nederland. 
x Analyseren op welke wijze de focus op de toezichthoudende rol 
van commissarissen hun adviserende rol heeft beïnvloedt.  
x Het functioneren van raden van commissarissen in het Nederlandse 
duale systeem belichten. 
 
 
 
3 
 
De veranderende 
rol van de voor-
zitter van de raad 
van commissaris-
sen in Nederland. 
x Analyseren op welke wijze macro-economische veranderingen een 
impact hebben gehad op de rol van de voorzitter. 
x Analyseren op welke wijze dit heeft geresulteerd in een aangepast 
demografisch profiel en een aangepaste positie van de voorzitter. 
x Het functioneren van de voorzitter van de raad van commissarissen 
in het Nederlandse duale systeem belichten. 
 
 
4 
Institutionele 
factoren die 
bijdragen aan de 
desintegratie van 
het commissaris-
sennetwerk in 
Nederland. 
x Onderzoeken welke bedrijven meer zijn geraakt door de focus op 
de toezichthoudende rol van commissarissen. 
x Onderzoeken welke mechanismen bedrijven hanteren om het effect 
van nieuwe wet- en regelgeving (gedeeltelijk) te neutraliseren. 
x Het belichten van de wijze waarop het commissarissennetwerk in 
Nederland is veranderd, mede als gevolg van corporate 
governance- hervormingen zoals de Code Tabaksblat. 
 
 
 
5 
 
Determinanten en 
consequenties van 
de toenemende 
focus op aandeel-
houderswaarde in 
Nederland. 
x Onderzoeken op welke wijze de variërende preferenties van grote 
aandeelhouders de keuze voor een aandeelhouderswaardeoriëntatie 
heeft beïnvloedt in de Nederlandse context. 
x Onderzoeken op welke wijze de politieke context waarin corporate 
governance-opvattingen zich verspreiden, dit proces beïnvloedt.  
x Belichten op welke wijze de focus op aandeelhouderswaarde de 
prestatie van Nederlandse ondernemingen heeft beïnvloedt.  
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Studie 1: De bijdrage van commissarissen aan strategievorming 
In de eerste studie van dit proefschrift verschaffen we een overzicht van eerder onder-
zoek naar de verhouding tussen raden van commissarissen en strategisch management. 
De rol van commissarissen hierin is zowel internationaal als nationaal onderwerp van 
debat. Zowel de aard als de wenselijkheid van de strategische bijdrage van commissa-
rissen staan ter discussie. Met het oog op het theoretisch pluralisme en het onbeslechte 
empirische bewijs in dit onderzoeksterrein analyseren we in de eerste studie 150 
wetenschappelijke artikelen over dit onderwerp die sinds 1972 in managementtijd-
schriften zijn verschenen. Zodoende is de ontwikkeling van het onderzoeksterrein in 
kaart gebracht en werden onontgonnen onderzoeksterreinen belicht 
 De resultaten van onze analyse belichten een aantal belangrijke aspecten. Ten 
eerste laat onze studie zien dat een bepaalde groep onderwerpen, theorieën, contexten 
en methoden, onderzoek naar de verhouding tussen commissarissen en strategie heeft 
gedomineerd gedurende specifieke perioden. Wat hierbij met name opvalt, is dat de 
meeste kennis over dit onderwerp afkomstig is van onderzoek dat (i) een Agency-
perspectief hanteert, (ii) Amerikaanse data gebruikt en (iii) zich richt op determinanten 
en implicaties van strategische betrokkenheid van commissarissen. Ten tweede laat 
onze studie zien dat de wetenschappelijke aandacht in de loop van de jaren langzaam 
is verschoven van de invloed van commissarissen op de inhoud van strategieën naar de 
manier waarop commissarissen proces- en gedragsmatig bijdragen aan strategische 
vraagstukken. Ten derde belicht onze studie de noodzaak voor onderzoeken die (i) de 
rol van de context op meerdere analyseniveaus uitsplitst, (ii) zich richt op strategie als 
een proces en (iii) op de gedragsmatige aspecten van de raad van commissarissen als 
een team, en (iv) longitudinale en nieuwe methodieken gebruikt om de black box van 
de (eventuele) strategische bijdrage van commissarissen verder te openen. 
 
Studie 2: De veranderende rol van de commissaris  
In de tweede studie van dit proefschrift analyseren we de veranderende rol van de raad 
van commissarissen gedurende de periode 1997-2005. Recente corporate governance-
initiatieven, zoals Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) en corporate governance-codes (zoals de 
Nederlandse Code Tabaksblat in 2003), hebben voornamelijk de onafhankelijkheid en 
de toezichthoudende rol van commissarissen benadrukt. Deze focus zou echter een 
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negatieve invloed kunnen hebben op de adviserende rol van commissarissen, namelijk 
op hun vermogen om: (i) externe afhankelijkheidsrelaties te managen (Boyd, 1990; 
Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), (ii) kennis op te doen via het commissarissen-
netwerk (Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal et al., 2001) en (iii) leden van de raad van bestuur 
van advies te voorzien (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). 
Data van de top-100 beursgenoteerde bedrijven in Nederland gedurende de periode 
1997-2005 tonen aan dat mede door de twee Nederlandse corporate governance-codes 
(de Code Peters en de Code Tabaksblat) de adviserende rol van commissarissen inder-
daad is veranderd. De afnemende verwevenheid van ondernemingen door overlappende 
commissariaten en de afnemende rol van financiële instellingen in het commissarissen-
netwerk duiden erop dat het belang van de externe adviesrol van commissarissen (i en 
ii) lijkt te zijn afgenomen. Gegeven de toenemende betrokkenheid van commissarissen 
door middel van gezamenlijke vergaderingen met bestuursleden en het gebruik van 
adviserende en toezichthoudende commissies, lijkt het belang van de interne adviesrol 
daarentegen te zijn toegenomen (iii).  
 De accentverschuiving van de externe adviesrol naar de interne adviesrol als 
gevolg van beide corporate governance-codes heeft drie belangrijke consequenties 
voor commissarissen en beursgenoteerde bedrijven. Allereerst worden door deze ver-
schuiving de verantwoordelijkheden van commissarissen verbreed en hun werklast 
verzwaard. Samen met de toegenomen wettelijke aansprakelijkheid van commissarissen 
zorgt deze ontwikkeling mogelijk voor druk op de markt voor beschikbare en goed-
gekwalificeerde commissarissen. Ten tweede heeft de toegenomen nadruk op de 
interne adviesrol mogelijk consequenties voor de selectie van nieuwe commissarissen. 
In plaats van benoeming op basis van hun netwerk, lijken de kennis en competenties 
van individuele commissarissen en de mate waarin zij passen binnen de gehele raad 
belangrijker te worden. Ten derde heeft deze accentverschuiving wellicht negatieve 
gevolgen voor de financiële prestaties van bedrijven en hun capaciteit tot strategische 
vernieuwing. De potentie voor kennisverspreiding en het managen van afhankelijk-
heden via overlappende commissariaten lijkt namelijk te zijn afgenomen door de 
introductie van de onafhankelijkheidsbepalingen in beide corporate governance-
codes. Dit plaatst beursgenoteerde ondernemingen voor de uitdaging om alternatieve 
netwerkmechanismen te zoeken.  
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Studie 3: De veranderende rol van de voorzitter van de raad van commissarissen 
De derde studie in dit proefschrift borduurt voort op de tweede studie door de verande-
rende rol van de voorzitter van de raad van commissarissen te analyseren. Hoewel de 
voorzitter maatschappelijk het meest zichtbaar is en hoofdverantwoordelijk is voor het 
functioneren van de raad (Hill, 1995; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007a; 2007b; 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Roberts, 2002), is er weinig bekend over de veranderingen 
waaraan het voorzitterschap onderhevig is. Door middel van een combinatie van 30 
semigestructureerde interviews met voorzitters en CEO’s, en gegevens over de struc-
turele positie van voorzitters van de top-100 beursgenoteerde bedrijven in Amsterdam, 
analyseren we in deze studie welke veranderingen zijn opgetreden in de rol en positie 
van de voorzitter alsmede welke omgevingsfactoren hierbij bepalend waren. 
 Uit de interviews kwam naar voren dat nieuwe regelgeving, meer activistische 
aandeelhouders en corporate governance-schandalen er met name voor gezorgd hebben 
dat voorzitters van raden van commissarissen actiever betrokken zijn geraakt bij de 
uitvoering van hun toezichthoudende en adviserende taken. Deze ontwikkeling in de 
rol van voorzitters is samengegaan met een toegenomen werkbelasting (zoals meer 
commissiewerk en bijeenkomsten), bezoldiging en verloop, alsmede een afname in het 
aantal additionele commissariaten. Tegelijkertijd is het demografische profiel (leeftijd, 
geslacht, nationaliteit en gemiddelde zittingsduur) van de voorzitter gelijk gebleven 
tijdens deze periode. Een interessante observatie in dit kader is dat voorzitters en 
CEO’s erg verschillen in hun mening met betrekking tot de wenselijkheid van deze 
verandering van het voorzitterschap van de raad van commissarissen. 
 Deze bevindingen hebben een drietal belangrijke implicaties. Ten eerste laten 
onze resultaten zien dat er van de voorzitter van de raad van commissarissen in 
toenemende mate verwacht wordt dat hij meer op de voorgrond opereert. Daarmee 
lijkt de spanning tussen de schijnbaar tegenstrijdige eisen aan de toezichthoudende rol 
(onafhankelijkheid en aftand) en de adviserende rol (betrokkenheid en nabijheid) een 
grotere rol te gaan spelen. Te meer omdat het wettelijk kader in Nederland hierin geen 
duidelijk uitsluitsel geeft. Ten tweede zorgt de uitbreiding van de verantwoordelijkheid 
van voorzitters van raden van commissarissen mogelijk voor druk op de markt voor 
beschikbare en gekwalificeerde voorzitters. Hoewel het demografische profiel van de 
voorzitters onveranderd is gebleven, biedt deze ontwikkeling mogelijk op termijn goede 
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kansen voor headhunters en trainingsinstituten. Ten derde laat onze studie zien dat de 
rol van de voorzitter daadwerkelijk veranderd is als gevolg van een aantal economische 
en maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen. De impact hiervan op de prestaties van bedrijven 
is echter nog steeds onderwerp van discussie, aangezien met name de sterkere nadruk 
op toezicht en onafhankelijkheid zou kunnen resulteren in een kortetermijnvisie en in 
risicomijdend gedrag (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Zowel 
voorzitters als regelgevers zouden zich bewust moeten zijn van zowel de positieve als 
negatieve consequenties tijdens hun omgang met deze ontwikkeling. 
 
Studie 4: Het veranderende commissarissennetwerk in Nederland 
In de vierde deelstudie van dit proefschrift staat het desintegrerende commissarissen-
netwerk centraal. Hoewel eerdere onderzoeken de mogelijke voordelen van netwerk-
verbanden regelmatig hebben belicht (zie Mizruchi, 1996), is de publieke opinie de 
afgelopen jaren steeds kritischer geworden. Belangrijke kritiekpunten waren dat (i) het 
centraliseren van macht een gesloten systeem creëert waarin de leden elkaar kunnen 
beschermen en (ii) dat de aanwezigheid van afhankelijkheden in verhoudingen tussen 
commissarissen en bedrijven (zoals een voormalige CEO die fungeert als commissaris) 
het onafhankelijke toezicht in gevaar zou kunnen brengen. In de meeste Europese 
corporate governance-codes zijn dan ook bepalingen opgenomen om deze relaties 
enigszins te beperken (Daily et al., 2003; Enrione et al., 2006; Sheridan et al., 2006). 
Er is echter weinig bekend over de wijze waarop bedrijven zijn omgegaan met deze 
bepalingen. In dat kader onderzoeken we in deze vierde studie hoe beursgenoteerde 
ondernemingen in Nederland omgegaan zijn met de bepalingen in de Code Tabaksblat 
(2003) gedurende de periode 2001-2005. 
 Allereerst laten onze resultaten zien dat de netwerkbepalingen in de Code 
Tabaksblat succesvol zijn: ondernemingen hebben in de periode 2001-2005 21% van 
hun netwerkverbanden verloren, alsmede 38% van hun netwerkverbanden met grote 
banken. In tegenstelling tot onze verwachting blijkt uit onze resultaten dat, relatief 
gezien, met name kleinere beursfondsen hun netwerkverbanden zijn verloren. Boven-
dien lijken de bepalingen te hebben bijgedragen aan een sterkere structurele scheiding 
tussen beursfondsen van verschillende omvang. Een interessante observatie is dat (i) 
ondernemingen waarvan commissarissen betrokken waren bij één van de Nederlandse 
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corporate governance-codes en (ii) ondernemingen met een buitenlandse beursnotering 
minder last hebben gehad van druk om hun commissarissennetwerk te hervormen. Dit 
lijkt erop te duiden dat ondernemingen enige speelruimte hebben in hun omgang met 
de netwerkbepalingen in de Code Tabaksblat. 
 Deze empirische bevindingen hebben twee belangrijke implicaties voor weten-
schappers, ondernemingen en beleidsmakers. Ten eerste lijken de netwerkbepalingen 
in de twee Nederlandse corporate governance-codes de gewenste veranderingen in het 
commissarissennetwerk te bewerkstelligen. Een kritische kanttekening hierbij is dat 
kleinere beursfondsen hiervan meer hinder lijken te ondervinden gezien hun verlies 
aan netwerkverbanden met de grotere bedrijven. Ten tweede laten onze data zien dat 
ondernemingen minder vatbaar zijn voor bepalingen in nationale codes als ze betrokken 
zijn bij de totstandkoming van deze codes en/of internationaler georiënteerd zijn. Deze 
bevindingen dagen ondernemingen uit om hun omgang met veranderende corporate 
governance-verwachtingen als een strategisch vraagstuk te benaderen. Aangezien onze 
post-hoc analyse lijkt te indiceren dat het verlies aan netwerkverbanden een negatief 
effect heeft op de bedrijfsprestaties, lijkt zo’n aanpak goed te rechtvaardigen.  
 
Studie 5: De verspreiding van een aandeelhouderswaardeoriëntatie in Nederland 
De vijfde studie in dit proefschrift onderzoekt de verspreiding van Anglo-Amerikaanse 
managementopvattingen in de Nederlandse economie. Net als in andere Europese 
landen die van oudsher gewend zijn om hun economische activiteit te organiseren 
volgens het Rijnlandmodel (Heemskerk, 2007), is er in Nederland een toenemende 
druk waarneembaar om zicht te richten op het creëren van aandeelhouderswaarde. Dit 
is bijvoorbeeld goed terug te zien in het maatschappelijke debat rond de rol van 
participatiemaatschappijen en hedgefondsen). Er is echter weinig bekend over de mate 
waarin dit gedachtegoed zich binnen het Nederlandse poldermodel heeft verspreid. 
Bovendien is niet bekend welke motieven bedrijven hebben om naar aandeelhouders-
waarde te verwijzen en of ze er daadwerkelijk financieel profijt van hebben. Door 
middel van een inhoudsanalyse van de jaarverslagen van de top-100 beursgenoteerde 
bedrijven in Nederland gedurende de periode 1992-2006 proberen we in deze laatste 
studie antwoord te geven op deze vragen. 
 Allereerste laten onze empirische resultaten een verspreiding van het Anglo-
Amerikaanse model zien in Nederland: daar waar 13% van de ondernemingen in 1992 
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aandeelhouderswaarde of een equivalent noemt in het jaarverslag, is dit percentage in 
2006gestegen naar 74%. Hoewel eerder onderzoek heeft laten zien dat het gunstig kan 
zijn voor een onderneming om niet te implementeren wat men beweert (Fiss & Zajac, 
2004; Westphal & Zajac, 2001), is er in de Nederlandse context een positieve samen-
hang tussen zeggen en doen waar te nemen: ondernemingen die verwijzen naar een 
focus op aandeelhouderswaarde maken meer gebruik van managementsystemen met 
een nadruk op economische waardeconcepten, internationale accountancystandaarden, 
optieregelingen en inkoopprogramma’s voor eigen aandelen.  
 Onze data laten verder zien dat de technische, culturele en politieke omgeving 
waarin een bedrijf functioneert bepalend is voor het al dan niet aannemen van Anglo-
Amerikaanse managementopvattingen. Met name als een bedrijf grote aandeelhouders 
heeft met een financiële achtergrond (bijvoorbeeld banken, participatiemaatschappijen 
en hedgefondsen) of met een Anglo-Amerikaanse culturele achtergrond, bestaat er een 
grotere kans dat een onderneming een focus op aandeelhouderswaarde heeft. Overigens 
wordt de invloed van beide groepen aandeelhouders kleiner als (i) de onderneming veel 
zichtbaarheid heeft in de nationale media en (ii) managers meer aandelen bezitten. Tot 
slot ondersteunen onze resultaten de maatschappelijke kritiek dat een focus op aandeel-
houderswaarde juist waarde vernietigt. Dit negatieve effect wordt echter minder sterk 
naarmate bedrijven deze nieuwe focus meer implementeren en aandeelhouders hebben 
die deze alternatieve oriëntatie ondersteunen. 
Deze bevindingen belichten twee belangrijke implicaties. Ten eerste tonen ze 
aan dat de technische, culturele en politieke dimensies waarin bedrijven opereren 
gezamenlijk invloed hebben op de openheid van een beursgenoteerde onderneming 
voor nieuwe corporate governance-opvattingen. Hoewel een bedrijf in de praktijk 
maar beperkt invloed kan uitoefenen op deze dimensies, heeft haar positionering wel 
degelijk invloed op de mate van vernieuwingsdruk door externe partijen. Ten tweede 
laten onze empirische bevindingen zien dat het hanteren van een aandeelhouders-
waardeoriëntatie in de Nederlandse poldercontext een negatieve invloed heeft op de 
financiële prestaties van een bedrijf. Dit lijkt erop te duiden dat ondernemingen erg 
voorzichtig moeten zijn met het aannemen en verspreiden van corporate governance-
opvattingen die niet stroken met de gangbare logica in hun nationale context. 
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Conclusie 
De hoofddoelstelling van dit proefschrift was om inzicht te verschaffen in de determi-
nanten en consequenties van de verspreiding van corporate governance-opvattingen, 
te weten denkbeelden met betrekking tot de toezichthoudende rol van commissarissen 
en aandeelhouderswaarde, in een relatief kleine en open economie. Hieraan is vorm-
gegeven door een vijftal studies met verschillende theoretische perspectieven, metho-
den en analyseniveaus uit te voeren in de Nederlandse context. Onze bevindingen laten 
zien dat: 
 
(i) de rol van de raad van commissarissen alsmede de economische oriëntatie van 
bedrijven in Nederland substantieel zijn veranderend gedurende de laatste 
twee decennia,  
(ii) de technische, politieke en culturele contexten waarin ondernemingen opereren, 
een grote invloed hebben op de openheid van bedrijven voor veranderingen 
alsook hun mogelijkheden om externe invloeden te neutraliseren,  
(iii) corporate governance-veranderingen onbedoelde gevolgen hebben gehad en 
de prestaties van beursgenoteerde ondernemingen niet per definitie positief 
beïnvloeden en 
(iv) nationale omgevingskarakteristieken een aanzienlijke invloed hebben op de 
manier waarop beursgenoteerde ondernemingen omgaan met internationale 
corporate governance-ontwikkelingen. 
 
 Deze empirische bevindingen belichten een aantal belangrijke mogelijkheden 
voor toekomstig onderzoek en geven bestuurders, regelgevers en andere actoren inzicht 
in een tweetal belangrijke corporate governance-ontwikkelingen in Nederland. Gezien 
de huidige turbulentie in de mondiale financiële markten en in het maatschappelijke 
debat in Nederland over de checks and balances in ons nationale systeem, zijn onze 
resultaten zeer actueel. Hopelijk stimuleren deze bevindingen bestuurders, regelgevers 
en wetenschappers om te reflecteren op de huidige ontwikkelingen en de volgende 
verspreidingsgolf van corporate governance-opvattingen die ongetwijfeld door de 
huidige crisis geïnitieerd wordt. 
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l)DIFFUSION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BELIEFS:
BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE ORIENTATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
The globalization and liberalization of national economies have contributed to an
increasing diffusion of Anglo-American corporate governance practices worldwide. In this
dissertation, we examine the spread of two types of corporate governance beliefs: the
emerging focus on board independence and a shareholder value orientation. Through a
series of five studies, utilizing multiple theoretical lenses, levels of analysis and methods,
we analyze developments in the formal independence of supervisory boards and a greater
focus on shareholder value in the Netherlands, and examine the antecedents and conse -
quences of these phenomena.
In doing so, we contribute to the enrichment of theories on diffusion processes as well
as to the understanding of key changes in the Dutch corporate governance landscape. We
show that (i) substantive change has taken place in the governance of listed corporations,
(ii) the technical, political and cultural contexts in which firms operate explain companies’
(non)response to prevailing corporate governance beliefs, (iii) changing corporate gover -
nance beliefs may be associated with unintended consequences and negative performance
implications, and (iv) macro contextual factors have a significant impact on the afore -
mentioned processes. Thereby, our findings highlight important avenues for further research.
Furthermore, we provide directors, regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders with
new insights in key corporate governance developments, in particular in the Netherlands.
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